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Abstract 
 
This thesis contributes to a central theme in the economic history of India: state intervention to 
protect peasants from market fluctuations, especially, interventions in the credit market. With 
novel material drawn from the Madras region in late-colonial and early post-colonial times, the 
thesis asks why unregulated credit markets did not supply enough credit and why regulations 
exacerbated the problem. Private moneylenders controlled the supply of rural credit in colonial 
India. Officials believed that rich moneylenders exploited poor peasants in non-competitive credit 
markets, raising borrowing costs and default rates, restricting investment and widening rural 
inequality. Based on that understanding, governments in the provinces enforced laws to protect 
borrowers. The government in Madras adopted two policy approaches to rural credit that were 
specific to the province. First, from 1904 it established cooperative banks to compete with private 
lenders. Second, from 1937 it enforced an artificial price ceiling on loans from moneylenders. 
This thesis aims to show that intervention failed owing to the nature of the agricultural economy 
and the political-economic ideology that privileged equity over efficiency. The first and second 
substantive chapters critically discuss the view, voiced by government officials and some 
historians, that exploitation drove high borrowing costs and defaults. By looking at the costs borne 
by the moneylender, the chapters show that the frequency of crop failure and inefficient courts 
explain restricted credit supply as well as default and interest rate patterns. The third chapter 
evaluates the impact of credit intervention and demonstrates that the price ceiling failed to deliver 
equity gains and triggered losses in market efficiency as credit supply contracted and moneylenders 
evaded the law. The outcome was limited credit supply and lending at illegal rates of interest. The 
fourth chapter analyses the performance of cooperative banks in rural Madras. The chapter shows 
that regulatory design explains the failure of the cooperative model. The rich refused to cooperate 
with the poor while bank managers embezzled and falsified accounts.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
 
The study of agricultural markets is central to understanding economic development in colonial 
India. Two-thirds of the Indian population relied on cultivation to make a living, a figure that did 
not change much until the latter decades of the twentieth century.1 Colonial India spanned an 
enormous territory, with long coastlines in the east and west as well as mountain ranges in the 
north and south. Rivers emanating from the mountains run through fertile valleys in the north 
and, albeit to a smaller extent, in the south. The vast majority of India’s population cultivated on 
four land forms: coastal plains, dry hinterland, fertile valleys and terraced hills. Colonial Madras 
was no different. Madras spanned from the southern tip to the Deccan Plateau, which bridged 
south and central India. Laterally, the province ran from the western to the eastern coastline. Hill 
ranges ran across central areas in the north and south of the province. Three main rivers flowed 
from the west to the east, with its main tributaries also culminating downstream in the eastern 
deltas. The Madras province, geographically speaking, was a microcosm of the Indian sub-
continent while its size, covering 48,500 square miles and housing 29 million people in 1950, 
justifies studies of the region as its own entity.2 Agriculture employed millions but yielded low and 
unequal output in Madras, as it did with the rest of colonial India. 
Scholars studying the economic history of India agree that growth and productivity stagnated 
in the agricultural sector throughout the colonial period and until 1960, an estimated year for the 
beginning of the Green Revolution.3 Agrarian India did experience growth in commerce and trade 
during the nineteenth century. Transport infrastructure improved, markets developed and 
cultivators shifted from payments in kind to transactions in cash.4 Households transitioned from 
 
1 Tirthankar Roy, The Economic History of India, 1857-1947, (Oxford, 2000), 104. 
2 Christopher Baker, An Indian Rural Economy 1880-1955: The Tamilnad Countryside, (Oxford, 1984), 3. 
3 This view is presented in general accounts on Indian economic history and in national income estimates. For general 
accounts, see Dietmar Rothermund, An Economic History of India : From Pre-colonial times to 1991 (London, 1993); B. 
R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970, (Cambridge, 1996); Roy, Economic History of India. For national 
income estimates, see A. Heston, "National Income." In The Cambridge Economic History of India, 376-462, (Cambridge, 
1983); S. Sivasubramonian, National Income of India in the Twentieth Century, (Oxford, 2000).  
4 On railroads and development in colonial India, see John Hurd, "Railways and the Expansion of Markets in India, 
1861–1921" Explorations in Economic History 12, no. 3 (1975): 263-88; Dan Bogart and Latika Chaudhary, "Engines of 
Growth: The Productivity Advance of Indian Railways, 1874-1912." The Journal of Economic History 73, no. 2 (2013): 
339-70; Dave Donaldson, "Railroads of the Raj: Estimating the Impact of Transportation Infrastructure." American 
Economic Review 108, no. 4-5, 899-934. 
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subsistence to cultivation for profit as cash crop acreage saw a steady increase. However, these 
changes did not lead to growth in the agricultural sector. Through this long stagnation, real 
incomes grew modestly and innovation was limited as production processes remained trapped in 
a low-yielding regime. Output was volatile with some years of mass famine.5  
Why did agricultural productivity and per capita growth remain low? One interpretation of the 
problem holds that rural elites captured the gains from commercialisation, restricting the 
investment potential for peasants, increasing the concentration of capital and driving rising 
inequality.6 Inequality and elite power did matter. However, a general account of agrarian 
development based on elite power alone is difficult to sustain, among other reasons because such 
an account underestimates the role of ecology, risks and institutional responses to risks. Focusing 
on rural credit markets, the thesis contributes to a revisionist view in the economic history of India, 
one that considers geographical constraints, weak institutions and ineffectual policy to explain low 
investment and underdevelopment in colonial India.7 
Credit is a key feature of economic development. Suppliers of goods and services need credit 
to produce or improve efficiency through innovation. Consumers use credit to purchase goods 
and services. Two streams of credit providers exist in the economy. Commercial private and 
nationalised banks are formal suppliers of credit while individuals and group lending organizations 
are informal suppliers of credit. Typically, the distinction between formal and informal lies in 
regulation. The informal credit market is unregulated, while the formal credit market operates 
within the guidelines of laws and administrative procedures. In most cases, both streams of credit 
supply exist simultaneously, servicing different consumers and markets.  
Early to mid-twentieth century rural India presents a useful case study of credit. Agriculture 
was the largest sector in terms of labour share employed. Yet, commercial banks did not lend in 
the region. Individuals and cooperatives were the major suppliers of credit in agricultural India, 
 
5 Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 48, estimates 16 million deaths as a result of famines between 1860 and 1900. 
Famines in 1876, 1896 and 1899 were prolonged and had a significant impact on most Indian provinces. The famine 
in 1943 was significant but had the largest impact on the Bengal Presidency. For general works on Indian famines, see 
Elizabeth Whitcombe, Agrarian Conditions in Northern India, (Berkeley, 1972); David Hall-Matthews, Peasants, Famine and 
the State in Colonial Western India, (New York, 2005). 
6 For general works on peasant exploitation, see Eric Stokes, The Peasant and the Raj : Studies in Agrarian Society and 
Peasant Rebellion in Colonial India, (Cambridge, 1978); Amiya Kumar Bagchi, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. 
(Cambridge, 1982); Peter Robb, Rural India: Land, Power and Society under British Rule, (London, 1983). 
7 On geography and economic development, see Tirthankar Roy, "Geography or Politics? Regional Inequality in 
Colonial India." European Review of Economic History 18, no. 3 (2014): 324-48; Sunil Amrith, Unruly Waters: How Rains, 
Rivers, Coasts and Seas have Shaped Asia’s History, (New York, 2018); Tirthankar Roy, “Climate and the Economy in 
India”. CAGE Working Paper Series, no. 445 (2019). On institutions and state in economic development in India, see 
David A. Washbrook, "Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India." Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 3 (1981): 649-
721; Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer. "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial 
Land Tenure Systems in India." American Economic Review 95, no. 4 (2005): 1190-213; Akhil Gupta, Red Tape : 
Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India, (Durham, 2012). 
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the former being more predominant during the period. The absence of commercial banks did not 
mean that the market operated informally. Colonial and post-colonial administrators attempted to 
regulate, with unintended consequences, the individuals and cooperatives that supplied rural credit. 
The actions of private moneylenders, and the state’s attempt to regulate these, are central to 
discussion on enterprise, investment and economic growth in the colonial and early post-colonial 
period. 
Subscribing to the elite capture narrative, some historians argue that market failure in rural 
credit drove low growth and underdevelopment in rural India.8 In this version of events, rich 
moneylenders monopolised credit markets and extracted rents from poor peasants. Costs of 
borrowing were high, constraining credit access and restricting investment potential for the poor. 
While the facts are not in dispute, an equally plausible explanation for these facts based on market 
structure and costs of credit could exist too, one that places equal weight upon the borrower’s 
situation and the lender’s reason to act in a certain way. This dissertation asks the question: Why 
was it difficult for lenders to provide credit to peasants in colonial India? In answering this 
question, the study shows that the exploitation narrative alone does not explain high borrowing 
costs and low investment. The problem needs to be contextualised against the environmental, 
institutional and political conditions that impinged on both the borrower and the lender. 
 
1.1 Development Economics and Rural Credit 
 
Theoretical literature on market structure and credit pricing motivate the research questions asked 
in this thesis. Development economists writing from the 1970s disagreed on which theory best 
captures the market structure of rural moneylending in India. On the one hand, economists 
subscribing to a Marxist approach argued that informal credit markets were subject to elite 
capture.9 Individual rich landlords monopolised village credit markets, exploiting poor peasant 
borrowers through high interest rates and one-sided sharecropping arrangements. On the other 
hand, economists subscribing to alternative market-based models argued that the credit problem 
 
8 This literature is reviewed in the ‘Historiography’ section. For the application of the elite capture narrative to 
provincial case studies in colonial India, see Sugata Bose, Credit, Markets, and the Agrarian Economy of Colonial India, (New 
York, 1994). 
9 Scholars presented this view in an extensive discussion on the ‘agrarian question in India.’ See Amit Bhaduri, "A 
Study in Agricultural Backwardness Under Semi-Feudalism." The Economic Journal 83, no. 329 (1973): 120-37; Amit 
Bhaduri, "On the Formation of Usurious Interest Rates in Backward Agriculture." Cambridge Journal of Economics 1, no. 
4 (1977): 341-52; Alice Thorner, "Semi-Feudalism or Capitalism? Contemporary Debate on Classes and Modes of 
Production in India." Economic and Political Weekly 17, no. 50 (1982): 1993-999; Utsa Patnaik, "The Agrarian Question 
and Development of Capitalism in India." Economic and Political Weekly 21, no. 18 (1986): 781-93. 
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did not lie with a monopolistic market structure.10 Moneylenders faced high costs in supplying 
credit which filtered into the type of credit arrangements adopted. Both groups published 
extensively on contemporaneous Indian credit markets, while the history of rural credit in colonial 
and early post-colonial India was comparatively under-researched in this scholarship. 
Economists focus on explaining one key problem in undeveloped, informal credit markets. The 
price of credit was high, causing high default rates. The argument put forward by Marxist 
economists suggests that local elites used market power to arbitrarily charge high interest rates. In 
doing so, rich lenders held poor borrowers in forms of debt-bondage, when the latter expectedly 
defaulted on high priced loans.11 In the Marxist interpretation, rural credit markets were non-
competitive. Richer cultivators increased the concentration of capital by monopolising local credit 
markets and extracting from poorer peasants. In this context, creditors were unwilling to invest in 
land improvement and moneylender power translated to stagnation in output growth and growing 
inequality in the agrarian economy.  
The opposing view, developed through field work across villages in the 1970s and 1980s, 
presented an alternative market structure of rural credit in India.12 In this interpretation, markets 
were not always non-competitive. There were many lenders in some villages while richer peasants 
also borrowed on the informal market. The poorer borrowers repaid loans through labour, in 
various sharecropping arrangements, but were not tied to landlords permanently. Indeed, scholars 
argued that seasonal migration was a common feature for tenant and unskilled labourers. The 
credit arrangement lasted seasonally rather than through more permanent forms of bondage. If 
weak market competition and exploitation was not the problem, then what explains the high costs 
of borrowing in informal credit markets? 
Development economists established an extensive framework on risk and the costs of 
providing credit. Scholars suggest that credit markets function efficiently if the price of credit 
matches the cost of lending.13 Lenders price credit accounting for three factors. First, lenders 
 
10 Clive Bell, "Chapter 16 Credit Markets and Interlinked Transactions." In Handbook of Development Economics, 763-830. 
Vol. 1. Elsevier B.V, 1988; Pranab K. Bardhan, "Interlocking Factor Markets and Agrarian Development: A Review 
of Issues." Oxford Economic Papers 32, no. 1 (1980): 82-98. Kaushik Basu, "Exploitation and Efficiency." Economic and 
Political Weekly 24, no. 28 (1989): 1554. 
11 This is the main message of Bhaduri’s work on semi-feudalism and rural credit markets in West Bengal. 
12 See Pranab K Bardhan and Ashok Rudra. "Terms and Conditions of Sharecropping Contracts: An Analysis of 
Village Survey Data in India." The Journal of Development Studies 16, no. 3 (1980): 287-302; Avishay Braverman and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Sharecropping and the Interlinking of Agrarian Markets." The American Economic Review 72, no. 4 
(1982): 695-715. 
13 Bottomley’s seminal work on rural credit pricing shows that prices were high to account for the costs of lending. 
Bottomley presents two hypotheses. First, the ‘Lender’s Risk Hypothesis’ states that creditors priced loans accounting 
for a higher default risk in rural areas.  Second, Bottomley argues that the high costs of approaching courts, which was 
especially important given the high chance of default, needed to be factored into credit prices. This thesis engages 
with these concepts in chapters 1 and 2. Bottomley’s theories are published in, Anthony Bottomley, "The Premium 
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contend with information costs, or the costs of determining the creditworthiness of borrowers.14 
These costs are low in localised markets where lenders and borrowers belong to the same village. 
As such, information costs are not a prominent feature of studies on informal credit markets that 
are self-contained at the village level.15 Second, creditors contend with enforcement costs, or the 
costs of enforcing punishments on borrowers should they default.16 Courts, for example, present 
a set of costs that lenders factor in to the price of credit. Accounting for these costs either lead to 
high-priced loans or creditors adopting low-cost methods of enforcement. Third, creditors 
account for natural and commercial risk.17 In the agrarian context, climate volatility, natural 
disasters and price fluctuations are drivers of default risk. Unpredictable rainfall patterns and a 
high frequency of crop failures lead to unpredictable default rates in rural credit. Unable to predict 
this default risk, lenders increase the lower and upper band of interest rates on rural loans. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
for Risk as a Determinant of Interest Rates in Underdeveloped Rural Areas." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 77, no. 
4 (1963): 637-47. Anthony Bottomley, "Interest Rate Determination in Underdeveloped Rural Areas." American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 57, no. 2 (1975): 279-91.  
14 Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Chapter 5 Economic Organization, Information, and Development." In Handbook of Development 
Economics, 93-160. Vol. 1. Elsevier B.V, 1988; Irfan Aleem, "Imperfect Information, Screening, and the Costs of 
Informal Lending: A Study of a Rural Credit Market in Pakistan." The World Bank Economic Review 4, no. 3 (1990): 329-
49; Richard Arnott, Bruce Greenwald and Joseph E Stiglitz. "Information and Economic Efficiency." Information 
Economics and Policy 6, no. 1 (1994): 77-82. 
15 Parikshit Ghosh and Debraj Ray. "Information and Enforcement in Informal Credit Markets." Economica 83, no. 
329 (2016): 59-90. Information costs were low in the rural credit market in colonial India. See Chapter 2. 
16 High information and enforcement costs allow borrowers to strategically default on loans. If these costs are high, 
then lenders do not possess enough information on the creditworthiness of borrowers and are unable to leverage on 
an administrative structure to compel the borrower to repay loans. Borrowers, as a result, have the power to choose 
not to repay loans despite having the resources to make these repayments. On enforcement and informal credit, see 
Sagrario L Floro and Pan A Yotopoulos, Informal Credit Markets and the New Institutional Economics : The Case of Philippine 
Agriculture, (Boulder, 1991); Ethan Bueno De Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson, "Legal Institutions and Informal 
Networks." Journal of Theoretical Politics 18, no. 1 (2006): 40-67. 
17 See Subrata Ghatak, "Rural Interest Rates in the Indian Economy." The Journal of Development Studies 11, no. 3 (1975): 
190-201. Ghatak discusses four types of credit risk. Natural Risk is driven by bad weather. Technical Risk is driven by 
failures in farming techniques and storage. Commercial Risk is driven by unpredictable commodity price fluctuations. 
Financial Risk is driven by the borrower’s ability to strategically default. 
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Table 1.1 Summary of theories on credit pricing 
Risk Factor Price Mechanism 
Exploitation Monopolists exploit peasants through predatory pricing. 
Information Poor knowledge of borrower profiles drives up prices. 
Enforcement High cost of enforcing repayments priced in loans. 
Natural Likelihood of crop failure raises equilibrium prices. 
 
While economists disagree on the causes, they agree that expensive credit is sub-optimal for the 
economy. High borrowing costs constrain investment and increase default rates. However, the 
solution is not clear.18 The market, left to its own devices, would not make the desired impact. 
State intervention could provide the necessary improvement. The disagreement among economists 
poses a difficult set of questions to the policymaker. If governments believe the exploitation 
narrative, targeted intervention through artificial price ceilings or establishing market competition 
via encouragement to cooperatives should solve the problem. However, structural problems that 
reflect institutional or environmental conditions motivate a different set of policy responses. Under 
these circumstances, the state could invest in public goods that improve market efficiency. For 
example, more efficient and less expensive court proceedings reduce the costs borne by 
moneylenders, which they transmit to lower interest rates. Similarly, governments could invest in 
improving irrigation infrastructure to increase protection against weather shocks.19  
As the rest of this chapter will suggest, this literature on the role of credit markets in economic 
development process suggests a number of parameters that are potentially relevant for an analysis 
on colonial-era credit intervention. 
 
 
 
 
18 For problems in identifying market failure in rural credit and the impact of this on policymaking, see Timothy 
Besley, "How Do Market Failures Justify Interventions in Rural Credit Markets?" The World Bank Research Observer 9, 
no. 1 (1994): 27-47.  
19 Crop insurance is another response to climate volatility. However, crop insurance did not function well in the Indian 
context because risk was difficult to measure. There is a brief discussion of crop insurance in Chapter 2. 
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1.2 Historiography of Rural Credit in India 
 
Key policymakers in the colonial government took an active interest in, and published articles and 
books on, rural credit from the 1870s. The Deccan Riots in 1875 motivated policymakers to reflect 
on credit exploitation, peasant uprisings and the resulting threat to political legitimacy in the 
countryside. S. S. Thorburn wrote in the 1880s about credit exploitation in Punjab.20 Thorburn 
argued that rich Hindu moneylenders, as ‘large unscrupulous businessmen’, extracted from poor 
Muslim peasants, placing them in ‘a state of praedial slavery.’21 According to Thorburn, this led to 
communal conflict and weak rural development. Thorburn famously criticised the colonial 
government for establishing an elite-favouring land tenure system and not intervening to protect 
poor peasants from exploitation. This book motivated a group of economists and political 
administrators to develop a keen interest in rural credit in colonial times. 
Government officials believed that problems in rural credit were caused by cultural 
characteristics unique to lenders and borrowers in India. These accounts suggest that 
moneylenders deviously exploited borrowers, through the charging of high interest rates in 
manipulated contracts and account books, taking advantage of the latter’s illiteracy. Writing on 
credit in 1920s Punjab, Malcolm Darling recognized that increasing debt signalled rising prosperity 
in peasants but presented two problems of the nature of borrowing in India.22 First, rich 
moneylenders extracted rents from poor borrowers with varying degrees of exploitation. Darling 
grouped moneylenders into sub-categories of community and caste, including Banias, Khatris and 
Aroras, placed in order of the degree of exploitation they inflicted on poor peasants. Second, 
Darling believed that lenders could exploit borrowers because peasants were illiterate and 
unthrifty.23 According to Darling, peasants borrowed primarily to consume rather than invest in 
land improvement. In Darling’s view, borrowers spent high priced credit on expensive ceremonies 
after which the small-scale nature of their husbandry forced them to default on these loans.  
 
20 Septimus Smet Thorburn joined the Indian Civil Service in 1863. Thorburn was a civil servant until 1899, spending 
most of this tenure in the Punjab province. Thorburn’s notable positions included the Commissioner of Rawalpindi 
and the Financial Commissioner of the Punjab.  
21 Septimus Smet Thorburn, Musalmans and Money-lenders in the Punjab, (London, 1886), 55. 
22 Malcolm Lyall Darling, educated at Kings College Cambridge, joined the Indian Civil Service in 1904. Until 
retirement in 1940, Darling spent most of his civil service tenure working on rural finance policies in the Punjab 
province. Darling held influential positions as the Registrar of Cooperatives between 1927 and 1930 as well as 
Chairman of the Punjab Land Revenue Board between 1938 and 1940. Darling’s book differed from other colonial 
accounts as it argued that indebtedness in itself was not bad for the rural economy. Peasants, according to Darling, 
need to borrow to be prosperous. This book is widely cited by contemporary scholars working on the topic. 
23 Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt, (Bombay, 1947). 
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Other colonial administrators echoed Darling’s findings. Colonial officials commonly believed 
that default rates were high due to a lack of ‘thrift’, ‘prudence’ and in some cases ‘laziness’ among 
cultivators. C F Strickland, for example, argued that illiteracy in the peasantry drove the problems 
in rural credit.24 According to Strickland, ‘the Indian peasant thus moves in a vicious circle: he is 
indebted because he is illiterate, unhealthy, and unprogressive in his agricultural business, and he 
will make no serious effort toward progress or improvement so long as his higher earnings add 
nothing to the sum available for his own use.’25 Strickland suggested that illiteracy combined with 
a non-enterprising culture led to high default rates, low investment and weak rural development.  
News articles from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century cited similar cultural drivers 
of problems in rural credit. Commenting on similarities in Egypt and India in the 1890s, The 
Spectator suggested that moneylending was a driver of, ‘waste, misery and injustice’, among the poor 
peasants in agriculture.26 In an article titled, ‘India’s “Dumb Millions,”’ the Times of India 
interviewed the political administrator Francis Skrine. In the article, Skrine suggested that, ‘thrift, 
however, is not a characteristic of the Dacca peasant, any more than it is of his brethren elsewhere, 
and all his surplus and sometimes a great deal more, is absorbed, as a general rule, by his fatal 
passion for costly ceremonials.’27 Political administrators in colonial India, thus, contextualised the 
rural credit problem in images of evil but clever moneylenders exploiting uneducated, gullible and 
indolent peasants.  
Economists and nationalists in the late-colonial Indian government extended the exploitation 
argument but blamed the state for the persistence of elite capture in rural credit. In agreement with 
Thorburn’s analysis, they argued that the colonial government enforced policies that allowed rich 
landowners and moneylenders to exploit poor peasant borrowers. Key writings of Indian 
nationalists in the early twentieth century, including Dadabhai Naoroji, Romesh Chunder Dutt and 
Gopal Krishna Gokhale, argued that British administrators pursued elite favouring policies 
 
24 Claude Francis Strickland joined the Indian Civil Service soon after graduating from New College, University of 
Oxford. Similar to Darling, Strickland spent much of his service working on rural finance and development in Punjab. 
Strickland was also Registrar of Cooperatives in the province. Strickland is most cited for works on cooperatives in 
India and Africa. In the Indian case, Strickland’s paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics is one of the first pieces of 
academic writing on credit cooperatives in India.  
25 C F Strickland, "Coöperation and the Rural Problem of India." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 43, no. 3 (1929), 
513. 
26 Moneylending in the East, The Spectator, 15 February 1896. 
27 India’s “Dumb Millions” The Times of India, 23 January 1893. Francis Henry Skrine joined the Indian Civil Service 
in 1868. Skrine joined commissions to support famine relief in Bihar and Madras in the 1870s. Skrine spent the 1890s 
in the customs revenue department in Calcutta prior to retiring in 1897. 
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through regressive taxation laws.28 This criticism was a part of their quest for policy reform on the 
grounds that colonial laws worsened rural poverty. Weak intervention to protect peasants, the 
nationalists argued, perpetuated elite capture in agrarian markets and increased the number of 
starving peasants. The third substantive chapter of this thesis suggests that economists and 
policymakers in the Madras legislature, such as P J Thomas, K G Sivaswamy and C 
Rajagopalachariar voiced similar concerns in the 1930s and 1940s.29 Many of these key provincial 
and national actors joined organizations promoting socialist policies in India. Gokhale founded 
the left-leaning Servants of India Society, an organization that Sivaswamy joined later in the 
twentieth century. Others, including Thomas and Rajagopalachariar, held key positions in India’s 
socialist government in the post-colonial period. 
Historians build on the studies conducted by colonial officers, economists and nationalists to 
explain the mechanism by which exploitation in credit markets drove rural inequality. Scholars 
study rural credit to question whether agrarian exchange transitioned from feudal to capitalist 
production methods in the colonial period. Indeed, credit forms an important aspect in the 
extensive political-economy debates on the ‘modes of production’ and ‘agrarian relations’ in 
colonial India. Historians engaging in this debate ask one key question. Neeladri Bhattacharya, in 
framing the context for research on rural credit in colonial Punjab, summarises this question. On 
analysing estimations of a rise in borrowing in colonial Punjab, Bhattacharya asks, ‘Is this evidence 
of the common view of colonial agriculture: that usury being profitable diverted capital away from 
production, that a mass of impoverished peasants was inextricably integrated into a cycle of forced 
commerce, subordinated to the power of the trader money-lender?’30   
Historians engaged in peasant studies analyse control and concentration of ownership in factor 
markets to show that elite capture persisted in the countryside throughout the colonial period. 
According to this interpretation, the rich owned the majority of land, monopolised capital markets 
and were monopsonists in the labour market, capturing the benefits of commercialisation and 
leading to rising inequality in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century. However, historians 
present different pathways in which high capital concentration led to peasant exploitation. 
Historians disagree with colonial officials and nationalists that credit exploitation persisted solely 
 
28 Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, (London, 1901); Romesh Chunder Dutt, Indian Famines : Their 
Causes and Prevention, (London, 1901); Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Speeches of the Honourable Mr. G. K. Gokhale, C. I. E. 
(Madras, 1908). 
29 Biographies of some key policymakers writing on rural credit in Madras are presented in the Sources and 
Methodology section of this chapter. This section also summarises the content in these accounts and their contribution 
to the thesis. 
30 Neeladri Bhattacharya, “Lenders and Debtors: Punjab Countryside, 1880-1940.” Studies in History 1, no. 2 (August 
1985), 305. 
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through land transfers. They suggest that lenders infrequently used mortgage instruments and the 
land market was less active in the nineteenth century, than originally perceived by policymakers.31 
Instead, scholars argue that rich landowners, through the control on credit supply, forced peasants 
into forms of labour bondage. The argument broadly states that rich landowners forced 
smallholders to part with their produce at low costs, and coerced tenants and labourers into low-
wage employment following defaults on expensive loans.  
General studies on the socio-economic relationship between rich and poor peasants in colonial 
India, such as those by Eric Stokes and Amiya Kumar Bagchi, highlight this dual debt and labour 
bondage across India.32 Several scholars apply this concept to studies of agriculture in the 
provinces. P J Musgrave, Shahid Amin and Shireen Moosvi discuss usury and peasant employment 
in the United Provinces.33 Sugata Bose wrote an influential book on the impact of capital 
concentration and usury on peasant employment in Bengal.34 Arupjyoti Saikia argues that the end 
of colonialism did not change the structure of usury and exploitation in credit markets in Assam.35 
David Hardiman presents a similar argument on moneylenders and usury in Western India, the 
Gujarat state in contemporary India. Extending Darling’s analysis of Punjab, David Cheesman 
writes that Bania moneylenders monopolised credit markets and held peasants in persistent debt 
bondage in the Sind province. According to Cheesman, ‘It made little difference whether a man 
was thrifty or profligate, whether he needed money to improve his estate or celebrate a wedding. 
Once indebted to a bania, it was difficult for him to avoid being caught up in a vicious circle, 
whereby debts generated more debts.’36 This summarises the development of the narrative on rural 
credit markets, from commentators writing in the colonial period to historians engaging in the 
 
31 Literature on different provinces shows that land transfers through credit defaults were lower in the nineteenth and 
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34 Bose, Sugata. Peasant Labour and Colonial Capital : Rural Bengal since 1770, (Cambridge, 1993). 
35 Arupjyoti Saikia, "The Moneylenders and Indebtedness: Understanding the Peasant Economy of Colonial Assam, 
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agrarian modes of production debate. The former pointed to extractive lenders and imprudent 
peasants. The latter disputed the imprudence narrative and expanded the exploitation narrative.  
Research on commercialisation in colonial South India presents similar findings. Works by A 
Satyanarayana and D Rajasekhar focus on the impact of commercialisation on credit and inequality. 
The authors suggest that the rich benefitted from the expansion in commerce during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. By deploying profits to the credit market as moneylenders, 
Satyanarayana argues that inequality rose as the rich expanded wealth while the poor remained in 
debt.37 Rajasekhar suggests that rich moneylenders in the Kurnool district, ‘squeezed credit, hiked 
rates of interest and demanded repayment of previous debts.’38 Taking a different approach, studies 
by David Ludden provide greater political agency to poor peasants. Through a detailed study of 
the Tirunelveli district in South India, Ludden argues that poor peasants actively participated in 
the colonial economy and shaped agrarian capitalism in the region.39 However, critics of Ludden’s 
work argue that rural India needs to be analysed in a top-down rather than bottom-up framework.40 
Credit and inequality needed to be analysed in the context of government and law-making. 
In the dominant narrative of elite capture in agrarian markets, there is agreement among 
historians that weak intervention facilitated peasant exploitation in the nineteenth century while 
laws more strongly protecting borrowers, labourers and tenants in the twentieth century saw some 
reversal in rural inequality. According to Hardiman, usury persisted while the colonial government 
empowered rich landowners to collect taxes from poor peasants. Hardiman suggests that state 
intervention in rural credit markets led to a decline in the ‘hegemonic power’ of the moneylender 
in the early twentieth century.41 The decline in usury in Western India followed strong state 
intervention in the twentieth century. Studies by Neil Charlesworth and Peter Robb focus on the 
role of the colonial state in the politics and economics of agrarian India.42 The authors argue that 
land laws favouring rich landlords as well as the weak protection of poor tenants and labourers led 
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to the persistence of inequality in factor markets. Agreeing with Hardiman, Charlesworth and 
Robb also suggest that the more interventionist state in the late-colonial period left fewer peasants 
in cycles of debt and labour bondage than before. 
Studies by David Washbrook and Christopher Baker criticise the colonial state in their research 
on markets and inequality in the Madras Presidency. Both scholars argue that markets functioned 
inequitably because of poorly designed laws and regressive tax structures. Washbrook provides 
several accounts that demonstrate why government failure explains the limited impact of 
commercialisation on output growth and poverty reduction in the colonial period.43 In 
Washbrook’s view, weak property rights and laws that favoured elites over peasants in the 
nineteenth century cemented a structure whereby rich landowners benefitted from expanding 
markets while poor peasants remained in poverty. The colonial state protected village elites by 
granting these groups large estates and empowering them to collect taxes from the poor in the 
early nineteenth century. Titles to property remained weak in this period, leading to marginal 
changes in the concentration of landownership within rural elites.44 This, according to Washbrook, 
had a lasting effect on the structure of factor markets. Income followed wealth concentration as 
the rich controlled the supply of money in villages. The poor, competing for limited land and 
capital resources, crowded the labour market, allowing rich landowners to be monopsonists in 
their demand for skilled and unskilled workers. The outcome was a ‘casualization of labour,’ as 
labour employment was temporary and wages were low. Washbrook takes the argument further 
to show that the control of factor markets led to the control of commodity markets. Large estates 
gave landowners storage facilities. Tenant cultivators had no choice but to store and trade 
commodities through the landowning elite, cementing the transfer of market profits to the rich. 
The outcome of this structure was supply-constrained money markets, low wages and stagnating 
output growth. Bruce Robert’s study of agriculture in the Bellary district contests the above 
findings. According to Robert, landownership was becoming less concentrated suggesting that 
inequities in factor markets were declining in the early twentieth century.45 Expanding this debate, 
Baker and Washbrook suggest that the economic conditions of the poor was worse in some 
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districts than others. Baker argues that sharecropping arrangements in rice producing districts were 
more landlord favouring than similar arrangements in cash crop and cereal growing regions.46  
Baker expands on the study of credit markets to include, albeit in not much detail, the impact 
of weak legal institutions on constraints in credit supply. Baker suggests that the problem was not 
just the concentration of capital but also inefficient courts as a barrier to entry for commercial 
banks and indigenous bankers. Indigenous bankers in metropolitan Madras refused to lend to 
cultivators in the province due to the challenges of enforcing repayment in expensive and time-
consuming court cases.47 However, Baker along with the other historians so far mentioned, were 
motivated by questions on inequality and the reinforcement of these themes by the colonial regime. 
Discussions on courts and legal institutions were in the context of whether these exacerbated 
inequality by not protecting peasants in agrarian India. 
The problem of lending risk has not been considered in enough detail. The traditional literature 
discussed so far concentrates on the borrower’s condition and weak bargaining power to explain 
perpetual indebtedness. There is, however, an observation bias here. Looking at the problem from 
the lender’s accounts, perpetual indebtedness looks like a state of perpetual default. We need to 
ask, why was the default rate so high that accounts never cleared? A full account of rural credit 
cannot be complete without a serious examination of the lender’s rationale. By considering the 
lender’s position in rural credit, this thesis engages with a revisionist economic history of India, 
one that applies environmental and institutional theories to understanding the past. 
In the book aptly titled, ‘A New Economic History of Colonial India’, Latika Chaudhary, 
Bishnupriya Gupta, Tirthankar Roy and Anand Swamy summarise the revisionist view explaining 
the underdevelopment of rural India during the colonial period.48 Following general accounts on 
the economic history of India in the late 1990s and early 2000s, including those provided by B R 
Tomlinson and Roy, the authors argue that geography, institutions and low public investment are 
central to the problem of low output growth in agrarian India.49 Cultivation was rain-dependent 
due to low public investment in irrigation infrastructure. Climate was volatile with frequent years 
of drought and failed harvests. Weak property rights and inefficient courts disincentivised 
investment in improving cultivated land. The rest of the section summarises the recent scholarship 
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on these issues and asks: How does the revisionist view explain supply-constraints in rural credit 
markets? 
Tropical climate and the limited infrastructure to store water has motivated an extensive 
literature on the history of ecology and water politics in India. Sunil Amrith illustrates that water 
scarcity, and the initiatives taken to access water, has shaped political changes and economic 
development across Indian history.50 Though disagreeing on the economic impact of canal 
construction, Ian Stone and Elizabeth Whitcombe argue that a lack of irrigation infrastructure 
significantly contributed to poor agricultural performance in colonial India.51 Roy extends this 
argument and shows that access to water has not only driven low growth but also regional 
inequality in colonial and post-colonial India.52 Cultivation was seasonal in colonial India, following 
the patterns of rainfall. The well-documented history of agrarian India notes that cultivators sowed 
and harvested crops according to the timing of the monsoons, centring around four- to six-month 
bursts of rainfall every year. In an article on the impact of the monsoon on the rural credit, Roy 
demonstrates that rainfall patterns determined the seasonality of the money market.53 Borrowers 
demanded credit before the monsoon and lenders expected repayment at the end. The price of 
credit, according to Roy, followed this structure of the monsoon.  
On institutions and economic development in colonial India, scholars focus on land tenure 
systems and investment incentives in the agricultural sector. The colonial government 
implemented a dual structure of land taxes and property rights in India. In some villages, local 
elites owned all the land and paid a tax on these vast estates to the colonial government. Elites did 
not cultivate the land and instead leased it out to permanent tenants. In other villages, government 
owned the land and taxed the cultivator directly. Roy and Swamy show that private investment 
was restricted in the elite-favouring land tenure systems.54 Land was not a valuable form of 
collateral due to the lack of transparency in ownership and titles. The outcome of this, the authors 
suggest, was restricted supply of mortgage credit. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer as well as Roy 
and Swamy show that in villages where the colonial government empowered landowning elites to 
collect taxes, landowners transmitted their tax obligation to charging higher rents for tenants. 
Landowners made profits by charging a higher rent than the tax they paid to the colonial 
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government. The value of land increased but investments to improve land remained low. Banerjee 
and Iyer suggest that the dual property rights systems had lasting effects on regional inequality in 
India.55  
Roy and Swamy also demonstrate that inefficient courts further limited the supply of mortgage 
loans. The British-ruled government introduced the system of courts in India, substituting for 
previous informal forms of village administration. The authors use data on the number of annual 
pending cases to show that courts became more inefficient towards the latter half of the colonial 
period. Scholars show that poorly implemented contract laws accentuated the problem of 
inefficient courts. S Abraham and Marc Galanter argue that the British government designed 
contract laws that were one-dimensional and did not properly regulate indigenous forms of trade 
and commerce.56 The authors suggest that this created confusion in Indian courts as judges were 
confronted with a conflict between local customs and superficial contract laws. Marina Martin and 
Sebastian Schwecke show that late nineteenth century contract laws did not capture the diversity 
in negotiable instruments and bills of exchange used in domestic Indian trade.57 Schwecke argues 
that the rural credit market operated outside the regulatory sphere of British-enforced contract 
laws in nineteenth century United Provinces. 
Literature on industrial India similarly documents the impact of weak institutions on capital 
markets. Scholars show that inefficient courts and weak contract laws discouraged the 
development of formal banking networks. Family firms, indigenous merchant bankers and social 
networks determined investment and entrepreneurship in colonial India. Gupta and Gupta et al 
show that community networks of financiers funded entrepreneurs and Indian industrialization in 
the late nineteenth century.58 Thomas Timberg as well as Timberg and C V Aiyar demonstrate that 
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family firms in the Marwari community controlled trade and industry in the colonial period.59 Ritu 
Birla suggests that Marwari bankers operated outside the sphere of contract laws and courts.60 
In the context of lending risk driven by weak institutions and volatile climate, studies by Swamy 
and co-authors reflect on the impact of targeted state intervention on rural credit markets and 
output growth in the provinces. Rachel Kranton and Swamy show that the introduction of courts 
provided some judicial protection for moneylenders but did not protect the welfare of borrowers 
in mid-nineteenth century Bombay.61 The authors suggest that lenders became less lenient on 
defaulting borrowers after the introduction of courts. Two articles by Chaudhary and Swamy 
reflect on the impact of targeted credit intervention in the Bombay and Punjab provinces. The 
first analyses the credit market before and after the Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act in 1879, a law 
that restricted land transfers from rural cultivators to urban moneylenders.62 The article shows that 
the restriction on land transfers led to a decline in the supply of mortgage credit but had limited 
effects on output and growth in the agricultural sector. The second article presents a similar finding 
in Punjab. Land transfer restrictions, imposed in 1900, had a significant impact on the supply of 
mortgage credit but a limited impact on economic outcomes.63  
State intervention in credit cooperatives has been studied in less detail than targeted 
intervention in private moneylending. The colonial government established credit cooperatives to 
compete with moneylenders in the credit market. The current scholarship accepts that the 
cooperative movement failed to compete and displace moneylenders in the provinces. However, 
the scholarship focuses entirely on the infiltration of political interests in the administration of the 
cooperative movement. According to Ian Catanach, the cooperative movement in Bombay 
developed into a complex bureaucratic structure.64 Rent-seeking administrators ran the structure 
and benefitted from it through insider-lending. Robert argues that members from local political 
parties, including the Justice Party and the Indian National Congress, took control of the 
cooperative movement in colonial Madras.65 In a similarly political account, Robert suggests that 
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corruption persisted in the administration of cooperatives. Iftekhar Iqbal expands on this 
argument and suggests that ‘social capital, the cornerstone of the cooperative movement was 
ineffective in Bengal because it had to operate on a ground fiercely contested by political capital.’66 
According to Iqbal, corruption in the administration of cooperatives led to high default rates in 
Bengal. Nikolay Kamenov provides a descriptive assessment of cooperatives in India. The purpose 
of this research is to provide different conceptual avenues, in economic, political and social history, 
that can be applied to understand credit cooperatives in India. The author documents continuities 
in state intervention in colonial and post-colonial Indian cooperatives. Recognizing the need for 
further scholarship on credit cooperatives in colonial India, Kamenov observes, ‘what seems prima 
facie striking for a historical issue of such significance is the sparse attention the theme has 
generated over the last couple of decades.’67 
In contrast to the limited scholarship in India, there is an extensive literature documenting the 
success and failures of credit cooperatives in Europe. Scholars study cooperatives in Germany, 
Netherlands and Ireland, during the nineteenth century, as case studies of divergent results in the 
diffusion of this banking experiment across Europe. Studies by Timothy Guinnane and various 
co-authors establish key determinants for the success of cooperatives. Banerjee et al as well as 
Maitreesh Ghatak and Guinnane provide a theoretical framework of cooperation based on case 
studies of select regions.68 The authors demonstrate the importance of high savings, low and 
localised membership as well as strong external regulation in making the cooperative movement 
successful in nineteenth century Germany. Sole-authored works by Guinnane demonstrate the 
benefits of localised membership and strong supervision of primary banks as the drivers of success 
in Germany but disappointment in Ireland during the late-nineteenth century.69 Monika Huppi and 
Gershon Feder focus on the role of high savings. They argue that cooperatives work well when 
members are jointly liable for loans. Christopher Colvin and Eoin McLaughlin as well as Colvin 
 
66 Iftekhar Iqbal, "Cooperative Credit in Colonial Bengal: An Exploration in Development and Decline, 1905–
1947." The Indian Economic and Social History Review 54, no. 2 (2017): 221-37.  
67 Kamenov, Nikolay. "The Place of the “Cooperative” in the Agrarian History of India, C. 1900–1970." The Journal of 
Asian Studies 79, no. 1 (2020): 103-28. 
68 Abhijit Banerjee, Timothy Besley, and Timothy Guinnane, "Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit 
Cooperative with Theory and a Test." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, no. 2 (1994): 491; Maitreesh Ghatak and 
Timothy W Guinnane. "The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: Theory and Practice." Journal of Development 
Economics 60, no. 1 (1999): 195-228. 
69 Timothy W Guinnane, "A Failed Institutional Transplant: Raiffeisen′s Credit Cooperatives in Ireland, 1894-1914." 
Explorations in Economic History 31, no. 1 (1994): 38-61; Timothy W Guinnane, "Cooperatives as Information Machines: 
German Rural Credit Cooperatives, 1883-1914." The Journal of Economic History 61, no. 2 (2001): 366-89; Timothy W 
Guinnane, "A ‘Friend and Advisor’: External Auditing and Confidence in Germany's Credit Cooperatives, 1889–
1914." Business History Review 77, no. 2 (2003): 235-64. 
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adopt a dissimilar though not contradictory approach to this comparative assessment.70 They 
highlight the dual role of savings and external supervision as key determinants in the success of 
banks in Germany and the Netherlands but failure in Ireland. The authors show that religious 
institutions initiated and managed cooperatives, lowering information costs as membership was 
low and entirely localised. The literature on Europe looks at default rates, profitability and 
expansion of the sector as measurement of its success.  
The recent historiography of rural credit markets in colonial India engages with an extensive 
global scholarship on the role of institutions in economic development. Spearheading this 
approach, Douglas North suggested that property rights, courts and formal procedures are 
fundamental to long term economic growth.71 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson as well as 
Acemoglu et al apply this theory and argue that countries with these prevailing institutions 
developed faster than countries with more ‘extractive’ institutions.72 Andrea Moro et al extend this 
argument and show that firms in economies with strong property rights and judicial protection of 
creditors have greater access to credit than firms in countries without these institutional 
fundamentals.73 Studies by Rafael La Porta et al and Simeon Djankov et al analyse the impact of 
contracts, courts and financial protection on investment.74 The authors demonstrate that countries 
with common law systems protected creditors better than countries with uniform civil codes.  
However, economic historians have recently debated whether government matters more than 
‘formal institutions’ to facilitate lending, investment and growth. Ha-Joon Chang argues that 
government intervention matters more for development than property rights and contract 
enforcement.75 Pranab Bardhan suggests that the identification of ‘good’ and ‘bad institutions’ in 
New Institutional Economics is too prescriptive.76 Government, according to Bardhan, can solve 
 
70 Christopher L Colvin, and Eoin McLaughlin. "Raiffeisenism Abroad: Why Did German Cooperative Banking Fail 
in Ireland but Prosper in the Netherlands?" Economic History Review 67, no. 2 (2014): 492-516; Christopher L Colvin, 
"Banking on a Religious Divide: Accounting for the Success of the Netherlands' Raiffeisen Cooperatives in the Crisis 
of the 1920s." The Journal of Economic History 77, no. 3 (2017): 866-919. 
71 Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, (Cambridge, 1990).  
72 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. "Chapter 6 Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth." In Handbook of Economic Growth, 385-472. Vol. 1, 2005; Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson, 
Why Nations Fail : The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (London, 2012). 
73 Andrea Moro, Daniela Maresch, and Annalisa Ferrando, "Creditor Protection, Judicial Enforcement and Credit 
Access." The European Journal of Finance 24, no. 3 (2018): 250-81. 
74 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny, "Law and Finance." Journal of 
Political Economy 106, no. 6 (1998): 1113-155; Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, and 
Andrei Shleifer. "Courts." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, no. 2 (2003): 453-517. 
75 Ha-Joon Chang, "Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History." Journal of Institutional 
Economics 7, no. 4 (2011): 473-98. 
76 Pranab K Bardhan, "Institutions Matter, but Which Ones?" Economics of Transition 13, no. 3 (2005): 499-532. 
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market coordination problems that institutions might not solve. Identifying the coordination 
problem and designing the right interventions to address this problem are fundamental to 
government success in this context. 
Economic historians further question the institutional construct in New Institutional 
Economics. Scholars argue that institutions encompass a range of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
institutional structures. The latter plays an important role in the absence of the former. Avner 
Greif demonstrates the importance of social networks, trust and reputation in lowering transaction 
costs and encouraging trade in the eleventh century.77 Gareth Austin disputes Acemoglu et al’s 
view of property rights and legal institutions and shows that African colonies relied on local 
customs to facilitate trade.78 In the context of rural credit markets, Robert Bates suggests that 
sharecropping and other types of interlinked markets are forms of social contract that facilitate 
credit exchange in the absence of strong formal institutions.79 Austin and Kaoru Sugihara suggest 
that courts were ineffective in the colonies as colonial powers uprooted indigenous networks and 
forms of administration. These networks facilitated lending in pre-colonial times.80 The edited 
volume by Austin and Sugihara contains case studies of credit markets with non-formal forms of 
contract enforcement in African, Asian and Latin American economies. In the edited volume, 
Rajeswari Brown and G D Sharma discuss the importance of community networks and indigenous 
forms of social contracts and enforcement in the Indian credit market. Sharma’s research focused 
on urban merchant traders in seventeenth and eighteenth century Gujarat.81 Brown documents the 
financial network of the Chettiar bankers in South India.82 This literature on community networks 
and credit demonstrates that informal institutions provided advantages to lenders. They relied on 
social capital to execute lending strategies that protected against losses from defaults. 
Maria Floro and Pan Yotopoulos link the problem of weak institutions and the drive to 
intervene in informal credit markets. They distinguish between three schools of thought. The 
 
77 Avner Greif, "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' 
Coalition." The American Economic Review 83, no. 3 (1993): 525-548. 
78 Gareth Austin, "The ‘reversal of Fortune’ Thesis and the Compression of History: Perspectives from African and 
Comparative Economic History." Journal of International Development 20, no. 8 (2008): 996-1027. 
79 Bates, Robert H., “Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: An Assessment of the New Institutionalism”, In 
Harriss, John., Hunter, Janet, and Lewis, Colin M., The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, (London, 
1997). 
80 Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sugihara, “Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750-1960: Introduction”, In 
Austin, Gareth and Sugihara, Kaoru. Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750-1960, (London, 1993). 
81 G D Sharma, “Urban Credit and the Market Economy in Western India, c.1750-1850”, In Austin, Gareth., and 
Sugihara, Kaoru. Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750-1960, (London, 1993). 
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Gareth., and Sugihara, Kaoru. Local Suppliers of Credit in the Third World, 1750-1960, (London, 1993). 
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Traditional Approach suggests that the state can regulate markets to ensure that credit prices are 
low and investment is high. The Financial Repression Approach argues that state intervention or 
manipulation of the free market creates unfavourable outcomes for credit markets. In particular, 
legislation interfering in the market creates obstacles to the supply of credit and hence 
development in general. The New Institutional Economics approach focuses on reducing 
transaction costs as a method to reducing the price of credit and increasing investment. Either 
contract enforcement or social networks where trust among agents lowers transaction costs 
facilitates higher investment and growth. 
In short, the old and new historiographies of rural credit in India as well as the development 
economics literature provide distinct lessons. The older historiography tells us that poor peasants 
were persistently indebted to moneylenders. The rich monopolised markets, increased borrowing 
costs and left peasants with unrepayable credit bills. Much of this scholarship suggests that unequal 
credit markets accentuated rural inequality in the colonial period, with a mild improvement 
following pro-borrower interventions in the 1930s. Development economists tell us that these 
problems persisted into recent times but market structure and exploitation does not capture the 
full extent of the problems. Weak economic fundamentals, including environmental, institutional 
and policy regimes added to the risk of lending in rural India. Lenders mitigated this risk with 
credit terms that did not suit borrowers. The new historiography finds that weak economic 
fundamentals significantly impacted growth and development in colonial India. Scholars have 
considered the impact of climate, contracts and policies on rural credit supply.  However, there is 
yet to be a systematic analysis of rural credit in the new historiography. The new historiography is 
smaller than the older historiography, exploring these problems independently and in select 
provinces. Expanding these lessons, this dissertation provides a continuous account of lending 
constraints and ineffectual interventions, and adds new avenues to explore these factors in an 
under-studied South Indian province. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure and Contribution 
 
This dissertation asks two interconnected questions: Why were informal credit markets 
constrained and the cost of capital high; and did credit regulations mitigate or exacerbate these 
constraints in late colonial and early post-colonial Madras? It answers the question in four 
substantive chapters. The first two chapters analyse the ecological and institutional barriers to 
lending money and the ways creditors overcame these barriers in the colonial period. The final two 
chapters evaluate the design and impact of credit policies. This section justifies the regional and 
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chronological scope, suggests the major contributions of the project and outlines the structure of 
the rest of the thesis, highlighting the contributions of each individual chapter. 
Why Madras? While facing a similar set of problems as governments in other provinces, officials 
in Madras experimented with unique intervention. To some extent, the aims of intervention were 
similar across the provinces. Broadly, officials in British-ruled India subscribed to the exploitation 
risk narrative. Soaring interest rates and high default rates in the context of stagnating living 
standards and inequality worried colonial officials and Indian nationalists in the mid-nineteenth 
century.83 Both groups believed that unequal creditor-debtor exchange explained high interest rates 
and perpetual indebtedness as the modus operandi for poor peasants. Colonial officials feared peasant 
uprisings as a result of this inequality. Indeed, colonial officials reported that the exploitation of 
poor borrowers by rich moneylenders and landowners led to riots in the Bombay Deccan in the 
1870s. Adopting a different tone, nationalists argued that elite-favouring policies in the colonial 
regime meant that peasants were left-behind. Key actors accused the colonial government of either 
promoting regressive taxation laws or engaging in ineffectual interventions, such as weak lending 
regulation. The concerns, though motivated by different factors, encouraged the same policy 
response. Cutting across colonial and nationalist lines, policymakers promoted the protection of 
borrowers as either a method of preventing riots in the countryside or as a solution to inequality.  
Despite these general similarities, research on credit intervention in India is best conducted as 
provincial case studies. The nature of the credit market differed in each province. Indigenous 
bankers and traders from the cities provided credit to the cultivators in most provinces. Marwari 
and Bania traders, for example, provided the majority of rural credit in Bombay, Punjab and Sind 
provinces. The market operated with a different structure in Madras. In this province, cultivators 
themselves provided the majority of rural credit. The difference in credit supplier motivated a 
unique set of interventions in Madras, relative to the other provinces. Laws, following the 
transition from Company to Crown Rule in 1857, determined the legislative capacity of federal 
and provincial Indian governments. Provincial governments were responsible for regulating rural 
credit markets. As such, the provinces executed different policy responses, at different times, from 
the late-nineteenth century. The Bombay Deccan was the first to regulate rural credit markets in 
1879. The government in Punjab followed suit in 1900. Both governments regulated land transfers 
as a method of tackling exploitation. Credit regulation in Madras came much later. The 
government in Madras regulated private moneylenders in the 1930s. Officials in Madras regulated 
 
83 Kranton and Swamy, “The Hazards of Piecemeal Reform”, provide a discussion of the policy motivations of 
colonial and nationalist administrators in the nineteenth century. The authors show that this culminated in intervention 
in the credit market from the 1870s. 
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credit through interest rate ceilings. While scholars have recently studied the impact of targeted 
intervention in Bombay and Punjab in the late-nineteenth century, the Madras presidency presents 
a new case study of a different set of credit policies.  
The thesis identifies two policy approaches that were specific to Madras. First, provincial 
officials enforced a price ceiling on loans from moneylenders in 1937. Moneylenders were legally 
bound to charge borrowers a fixed rate of interest that was significantly lower than the market 
average. Second, the colonial government introduced cooperative banking to the agricultural 
sector, to compete with local moneylenders, from the early-twentieth century. The strategy to 
nurture greater market competition by establishing credit cooperatives was a common feature 
across the provinces. However, provincial governments erected the institutional structure around 
the cooperative movement. Indeed, local officials were responsible for the regulation and 
management of the cooperative sector. The government introduced the first state-regulated 
cooperative in the Madras Presidency in 1904. The number of rural cooperatives saw a steady 
increase in the 1920s with particularly large state-financed capital injections into the sector in the 
1940s and 1950s. Analysing these specific policies justifies the regional scope of this study, while 
also demonstrating its contribution to our understanding of credit markets in the Indian provinces. 
The chronological scope of the dissertation requires justification. The timing of legislation and 
the availability of sources justifies the starting point of 1930. The Great Depression and the credit 
intervention that followed motivated colonial and post-colonial provincial governments to survey 
rural credit markets at the village level in the 1930s. As the next section will show, the government 
continued this trend of credit reporting in the 1940s and 1950s. Despite the source availability, 
rural credit in the middle decades of the twentieth century is under-researched. Current scholarship 
has focused on the colonial period before 1940 and the Green Revolution period after 1960. The 
analysis in subsequent chapters fills missing gaps in our knowledge of credit in the 1940s and 
1950s.   
Extending the analysis beyond 1947 requires a more thorough explanation. The end of colonial 
rule marks a political turning point but had a small effect on rural credit. When serious discussion 
on rural development began in early-twentieth century India, economists and political 
administrators shared an agreement that the solution to peasant poverty, and stagnant agricultural 
productivity could be found in interventions in property rights and credit markets, usually a joint 
intervention in both spheres. The agreement cut across the colonial and nationalist dividing line, 
and therefore, the interventions that followed spanned both colonial times and early post-
independence decades. Indeed, the policies enforced in the late 1930s lasted after the end of 
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colonialism, inspiring this study to extend its analysis beyond changes in spatial and political 
regimes in the middle of the period.  
If credit policies continued into the latter decades of the twentieth century, then why end the 
analysis in 1960? The thesis stops at 1960 to account for the start of the Green Revolution. As is 
well documented, the colonial and early post-colonial period until 1960 was one of economic 
stagnation in rural Madras. Growth rates were low, innovation was limited and, as subsequent 
chapters will suggest, institutional arrangements did not change much. This offers a unique setting 
to study the rural credit market. Unaffected by changes in economic fundamentals, the thesis can 
isolate the impact of policy decisions on the supply of rural credit. The Green Revolution changed 
the economic landscape of rural South India. After 1960, agriculture saw technological innovation 
and the credit market became more diversified as public banks and micro-lending organisations 
began lending in the countryside. A thorough account of the impact of intervention on rural credit 
markets in this changing landscape would mean introducing a much larger set of assumptions and 
explanations. As such, this dissertation considers 1960 a year marking structural change in the 
Indian rural economy and therefore outside the scope of this project.84  
In studying the context, design and impact of specific interventions, lessons from the 
dissertation intersect policy and economic history. The thesis demonstrates that the results from 
the intervention in Madras were disappointing. Artificial price ceilings led to efficiency losses and 
had an insignificant impact on equity.85 Following intervention, credit supply contracted and 
lenders evaded the law. The strategy to increase competition also failed as cooperatives functioned 
unprofitably and captured a minimal share of the rural credit market.  
An argument can be made that in subscribing to the exploitation risk narrative, the state ignored 
the other factors that contributed to problems in rural credit. The frequency of crop failure and 
high enforcement costs explained the cost of borrowing and high default rates, challenging the 
original motivations and design of the government’s strategy. Low public investment in irrigation 
meant that cultivation was dependent on unpredictable rainfall patterns. Chances of crop failure 
were high resulting in dual risks for borrowers and creditors. Poor borrowers that relied on 
seasonal income ran the risk of defaulting on loans. Lenders ran the risk of providing 
 
84 Although the institutional setup and market structure changed, the problem of defaults did not disappear. Since 
crises in microfinance organisations and public banks recurred in recent times, this thesis may have an enduring 
message. However, because of the institutional changes, including the post-Green Revolution era in this thesis would 
make the narrative much more complicated to handle. 
85 Welfare economics has long contended with Okun’s Law or the trade-off between efficiency and equity. The Law 
explains the inverse relationship between income growth and equality. Arthur M Okun, Equality and Efficiency, the Big 
Tradeoff, (Washington, 1975), shows that the ‘leaky bucket’ of redistribution diminishes the efficiency of resource 
allocation in a given economy. In the context of intervention in rural credit markets, the thesis shows that the price 
ceiling led to a contraction in supply, despite sustained demand, and a black market for loans at pre-ceiling prices. 
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unrecoverable loans. Creditors cum cultivators lending profits made in one year risked losing this 
additional income in the following year, returning to more modest means than before. In addition, 
the costs of enforcing repayments were high. High default rates meant that creditors relied on 
contracts and courts to recover loans. However, contract laws were poorly designed while courts 
offered a lengthy and expensive method of enforcement.86 Creditors accounted for these costs in 
the price of unregulated credit. Unable to account for enforcement costs following intervention, 
lenders either exited the market or evaded the law. 
This thesis finds that a political ideology prioritising equity over efficiency inspired the design 
of credit intervention in the colonial and post-colonial period. Governments acted on a belief that 
investment remained low and peasants remained poor because of market failure. However, this 
belief and the policies it motivated led to unsuccessful results. The desire to protect poor peasants, 
through artificial price ceilings and the introduction of poorly regulated market competitors, from 
market fluctuations constrained money markets further and forced peasants to access high-priced 
credit in unregulated black markets. Indeed, the thesis highlights the glaring juxtaposition in the 
government’s recognition of the need to increase private investment and its belief that reduction 
in credit supply was a measure of economic prosperity. This lesson has some implications for the 
impact of credit policies in the decades after 1960. Governments in modern India continued to act 
on a belief that borrower protection shielded poor peasants from exploitative markets. Whether 
this persistence in ideology was driven by a deliberate diversion away from financially demanding 
public investment policies that could improve productive efficiency in agriculture or a result of 
path dependency and a resistance to ideological and political change remains to be fully 
understood.  
The thesis is divided into four substantive chapters. The first chapter links environmental 
factors to regional variation in cropping patterns and money markets. The chapter shows that 
creditors responded to climate risks in regionally-distinctive ways. Dry regions were prone to 
droughts and wet regions, though much better-off, were prone to waterlogging. Frequent crop 
failures meant default rates were high and liquidity was constrained. This problem was more severe 
in the dry districts. Creditors mitigated this risk by excluding poor borrowers from accessing credit 
in the dry districts, whereas borrowers across income categories accessed credit in the wet districts. 
Fragmented markets accentuated this problem as money rarely travelled from villages in one rural 
district to villages in another. To show this regional variation, the chapter constructs and analyses 
 
86 Inefficient legal institutions further challenged effective implementation of credit laws. The government relied on 
court judges to enforce credit laws. The thesis shows that the institutional legal structure did not properly execute 
policies implemented by the provincial government. 
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two novel data sets. The first examines the provision of loans in select villages illustrating 
differences in the amount of credit provided, purpose of borrowing and default rates. The second 
observes sixty-year climate and cropping patterns in 208 municipalities. The chapter presents the 
data in tables and maps to clearly demarcate regional patterns.  
The chapter contributes to scholarship on environmental economic history. Expanding existing 
scholarship on the climate and credit in colonial India, the chapter demonstrates that credit 
markets in dry villages responded differently to environmental factors than markets in wet villages. 
This was particularly significant in Madras where cultivators were also moneylenders. Liquidity in 
the credit market was strongly linked to the profitability of cultivation. The chapter also has 
implications for weather shocks, growth and regional inequality.  Using new data and material from 
sources that have not been used in this context, the chapter suggests credit access as a previously 
unexplored avenue connecting environmental factors to regional inequality in colonial South India. 
The second chapter demonstrates the ways in which creditors compensated for the costs of 
contract enforcement in rural Madras. Economic theory tells us that moneylenders priced 
enforcement costs in interest rates. This study of credit enforcement in colonial Madras 
corroborates this theory but suggests that creditors transmitted enforcement costs to contracts 
and credit pricing in regionally-distinctive ways. The chapter considers two types of credit 
contracts used in Madras and provides an analysis of the costs of enforcing each. Creditors used 
contracts when the size of loans outweighed the costs of enforcement. The chapter finds that this 
incentivised lenders to operate a multi-tiered loan structure. Creditors initially provided unsecured 
loans and attached contracts to loan extensions. When contracts were used, creditors increased the 
price of loans to compensate for the costs of enforcing them. This further highlights differences 
in credit access between districts. Creditors in the wet districts were more willing to underwrite 
loan extensions with contracts than lenders providing small loans to poor peasants in the dry 
districts. When enforcement costs outweighed the size of loans, credit terms were harsh and 
extensions less likely. 
This chapter contributes to regional and institutional economic history. Contracts and other 
negotiable instruments were important features of the unregulated credit market in Madras. By 
looking at the relative costs of enforcing different types of credit contracts, this chapter fills 
important gaps in our understanding of the role of courts and judicial proceedings in the Indian 
rural economy. Extending regional comparisons, the chapter also suggests that creditors typically 
used financial instruments for loans to richer borrowers. Lending to the poor especially in the dry 
districts, until multiple defaults compounded the value of these loans, remained unsecured and 
operated outside the sphere of formal procedure.  
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The third chapter studies credit intervention in the context of environmental and institutional 
constraints to the money market. It demonstrates that the government intervention of an artificial 
interest rate ceiling led to a contraction in credit supply whilst allowing lenders to operate in a 
‘black market’ where creditors provided loans at illegal rates of interest. The high cost of 
enforcement was a key driver of this policy failure. When the state-imposed ceiling was introduced, 
creditors avoided the high costs of formal courts and resorted to informal enforcement through 
interlinked crop sharing contracts instead. 
The chapter makes contributions to the history of credit intervention and enforcement 
mechanisms in rural India. The chapter is the first study to demonstrate the impact of 1930s 
intervention on rural credit supply in Madras. In doing so, the chapter highlights areas that other 
provincial studies have not considered. The accent on enforcement is one particular area. 
Enforcement mechanisms have been studied in isolated spheres of courts and banking or informal 
arrangements and financial intermediaries. The chapter demonstrates that the study of 
moneylenders, as the only bankers in many villages, requires a framework that can interconnect 
the two institutional structures, formal and informal. Moneylenders contended with a trade-off 
between courts and informal enforcement where outcomes depended on the transaction costs of 
each. Intervention increased the enforcement costs of some arrangements but not others resulting 
in a transition, rather than complete decline, in the supply of credit. 
The fourth chapter analyses the performance of cooperative banking in rural Madras. The 
colonial government aimed to design a cooperative model that mirrored the successful Raiffeisen 
banks in Western Europe. The chapter shows that the transplanted cooperative banking model 
did not perform well in India. The cooperative sector grew exponentially in the early to mid-
twentieth century. However, cooperatives failed to displace the village moneylender. Managers of 
cooperatives selectively allocated loans and despite the selective allocation of loans, the cooperative 
sector was unprofitable. The chapter demonstrates that administrators in late-colonial and early 
post-colonial India designed a cooperative model that differed from the European model in 
important ways. Prevailing political objectives prioritising equity over efficiency led to a 
cooperative structure operating with low savings and weak regulation. The regulatory problem 
ultimately led to exclusion of poorer peasants from accessing credit and over-leveraged 
cooperative banks. Post-colonial Indian governments injected public money into the cooperative 
sector in the belief that this would increase credit access for poor borrowers. However, flaws in 
regulatory design persisted, allowing managers to falsify accounts, embezzle and insider-lend.  
The chapter contributes to a regionally under-researched topic. As discussed in the previous 
section, the existing literature provides a discussion on socio-political barriers to cooperation. 
37 
 
Instead, the chapter considers the design of the transplanted cooperative banking model as an 
explanation for its non-performance. In doing so, the chapter adds a region of comparison to the 
global business and economic history of credit cooperatives. The existing scholarship is largely 
Eurocentric, despite the emergence, and rapid rise in the number, of cooperative banks in British 
colonies in the early twentieth century.87 Analysing the performance of cooperatives in India offers 
a benchmark for further contributions on similar transplants in other colonial contexts.  
 
1.4 Sources and Methodology 
 
The dissertation relies on three groups of sources: government reports, laws and court records as 
well as contemporary studies including journal and newspaper articles, books and doctoral 
dissertations. It uses descriptive and data visualization techniques as well as narrative methods and 
case studies to analyse this source material. This section describes the source material and method 
adopted to analyse data and text.  
On agriculture and cropping patterns, the first substantive chapter of the thesis uses data and 
qualitative material from three key reports. First, the provincial government in Madras published 
a series of District Gazettes to survey socio-economic conditions across villages in select districts in 
1915. The thesis uses the Gazettes from Bellary, Cuddapah, Godavari and Tanjore districts to 
reflect on the different economic conditions in each region. The thesis uses qualitative information 
from the reports to analyse environmental conditions, cropping patterns and types of tenancy 
contracts in each district.  
Second, for micro-level data on agriculture and land use, the thesis relies on the Statistical Atlas 
of the Madras Presidency. The government compiled three reports using agricultural data from 1920, 
1930 and 1940. The thesis uses the data from 1930. The 1936 Statistical Atlas of the Madras Presidency 
provides a range of data at the taluk or municipality level including: cultivated acres, land tenure 
by acres, cropping patterns by acres, average 60-year rainfall patterns in inches, cattle and ploughs 
used per acre as well as amount of irrigated land in 240 municipalities.88 Using this data, the thesis 
 
87 For example, there is little research on the history of cooperatives in British-ruled African colonies. For discussions 
on the politics of cooperatives in mid-twentieth century South Africa and Zambia see, Paul B Rich "Bernard Huss 
and the Experiment in African Cooperatives in South Africa, 1926-1948." The International Journal of African Historical 
Studies 26, no. 2 (1993): 297-317; Andrew Bowman. "Mass Production or Production by the Masses? Tractors, 
Cooperatives, and the Politics of Rural Development in Post-independence Zambia." The Journal of African History 52, 
no. 2 (2011): 201-21. For the cooperative movement in Nigeria, see Samuel Oladele Adeyeye, The Co-operative Movement 
in Nigeria Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow. (Göttingen, 1978). 
88 The rainfall patterns are averages taken over a 60-year period in each meteorological station. By 1930, most 
municipalities had a meteorological station. If not, the thesis uses the meteorological station nearest to the 
municipality. 
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exploits Geographic Information System (GIS) software to show spatial variations in agriculture 
across the Madras province. The maps show differences, by municipality, in cropping type and 
rainfall. Mapping the data was challenging as there is currently no resource containing geospatial 
vector data showing provincial boundaries of colonial Madras. The thesis uses modern-day vector 
data and adjusts the boundaries to reflect those in colonial times. However, using modern vector 
data meant that the prototype map did not include municipality names and boundaries from the 
colonial period. Matching the data to the right municipality added an additional challenge. To 
overcome this, the author  manually indexed the colonial municipalities and matched these to 
modern day municipalities.89 To account for possible border differences, the maps do not take 
whole municipalities as the unit of analysis but instead match data to the centre of the municipality, 
making the assumption that town centres have not changed much since independence. In adopting 
this method, the index could not match 24 municipalities and reported eight errors where 
municipalities matched outside the colonial borders. After indicating the errors, maps in the first 
chapter show agricultural patterns in 208 municipalities. 
Third, the chapter uses material from the Techno-economic Survey of Madras. The Department of 
Industries, Labour and Cooperation in the provincial government published the report in 1961. 
The section on agriculture contains key information on soil quality and yields as well as irrigation 
projects from the late colonial period and their estimated impact on output. The chapter 
supplements this with material on cropping seasons as well as labour and tenancy contracts in 
districts from the 1938 Report of the Madras Famine Code Revision Committee, the 1951 Census of India 
Volume III: Madras and Coorg, the 1951 Agricultural Statistics of India and 1956 Indian Crop Calendar.  
Government reports and surveys provide the majority of rural credit data analysed in the thesis. 
After the 1875 Deccan Riots, the colonial government regularly commissioned reports to record 
the level of development in villages, municipalities and districts. The reports focused on land and 
rural credit markets. The federal government did not commission these reports. Provincial 
governments regularly documented rural credit markets. Regulating rural credit was a provincial 
rather than federal concern, motivating this method of documentation. The government’s purpose 
in writing these reports was two-fold. First, and most informative for the thesis, the government 
used these reports to understand regional differences in the structure of rural credit. The reports, 
surveying select villages and districts, reported on: the number of moneylenders, the type of 
moneylender, the types of lending arrangements including mortgages and some features of the 
borrowers including the purpose of borrowing. Reports also recorded key features of the 
 
89 The Indian Administrative Atlas, published in 2001, provides boundary changes at the municipality level from 1947 
to the present day. 
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cooperative banking sector including lending, repayment rates, savings, share capital and external 
borrowing. Second, the government used the reports to calculate market size of rural credit. In 
this context, the government believed that smaller market size meant more prosperity. The 
government measured the presence and persistence of usury by the volume of lending. In their 
view, peasants that borrowed were poor and exploited in the credit market. Peasants that did not 
borrow had disposable income and were, therefore, better off than borrowers. The government 
did not see moneylenders as a source of investment but as rich agents exploiting poor peasants.  
The thesis analyses two categories of government reports: annual reports and isolated reports. 
In the annual category, the thesis relies on three key reports compiled by departments in the 
provincial government in Madras. First, the Justice Department compiled the Madras Civil Justice 
Report annually. The report contains key data on the number of civil disputes, the number of 
disputes involving credit and the average time taken for money disputes to reach conclusion. The 
government reported these figures annually throughout the period, with the exception of the 
period between 1940 and 1945. The thesis plots this data on bar, line and scatter graphs to show 
temporal variation in the scope and productivity of civil courts. Second, the Registration 
Department compiled the Report on the Administration of the Registration Department in the Madras 
Presidency. The reports, recorded annually, provided all new land registrations in each district from 
the 1870s to the end of the colonial period, with the exception of the period between 1942 and 
1946. The reports recorded land transfers by instrument, differentiating between gifts, mortgages 
and sales. Individual district borders changed and bifurcated during this period resulting in non-
uniformity in the number of districts recorded. The thesis plots line graphs to show temporal 
changes in mortgage lending while using Michelle McAlpin’s commodity price index to calculate 
real values of loans during the period.90 Third, the Cooperative Department in the provincial 
government constructed the Annual Report on the Working of the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 
recorded key annual data of the cooperative banking sector. The reports include the number of 
members as well as volume of saving, external borrowing, share capital and lending. Using this 
data, the thesis plots annual net profit statements on line graphs and data indices demonstrating 
annual growth rates in key measures for the cooperative banking sector. The thesis accesses the 
reports from 1928 to 1940. The reports also contain qualitative information on cooperative banks 
including results from audits, performance of apex banks and changes to cooperative laws.  
In the isolated category, the thesis relies on eight government surveys of rural credit. The 
provincial government commissioned committees of civil servants to survey land and credit 
 
90 Michelle McAlpin, “Price Movements and Fluctuations in Economic Activity (1860–1947).” Chapter. In The 
Cambridge Economic History of India, edited by Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai, 2: 878–904, (Cambridge, 1983). 
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markets in villages across the province. The civil servants were members of the Legislative Council 
in the Madras government.91 The reports on Madras were scarce in the nineteenth century but 
increased in the late colonial period for two reasons. First, the government did not believe rural 
credit posed a development problem in nineteenth century Madras. Provincial policymakers in 
Bombay and Punjab were concerned that land was transferring from rural cultivators to non-
cultivating urban moneylenders at a fast rate. These policymakers commissioned reports to inform 
interventions in credit and land transfer in the late nineteenth century. In Madras, serious 
discussions about credit intervention did not properly begin until the Great Depression. Indeed, 
the Great Depression had a significant impact on credit defaults, and therefore investment, growth 
and poverty. The number of official publications, specifically on rural credit in Madras, increased 
in the 1930s. This informed interventions in the late 1930s while some reports in the mid-1940s 
documented the impact of the intervention. Second, the number of Indian policymakers in 
government increased from 1909. After the establishment of diarchic rule in 1919, regulating rural 
credit was a provincial, and thus local legislator’s, responsibility rather than federal. Local 
government took a keen interest in documenting features of rural credit to inform policy decisions.  
The first provincial report to survey, quantitatively and qualitatively, rural credit in the villages 
was the Madras Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee Report, published in 1930. The federal 
government set up different Provincial Banking Enquiry Committees across provinces and 
published a series of reports on each province in 1930.92 The Madras report and evidences contain 
six substantial volumes. The Banking Enquiry Committee hired a team of investigators to survey 
credit in 80 villages in the late 1920s. The report contains data on types of lenders, volume of 
lending, credit instruments used and purpose of borrowing in each village. The report also 
published a range of interest rates by district and model legal costs for rural credit disputes. This 
data is in the first volume of the report, while the additional volumes contain interviews with 
cultivators and longer descriptive reports from the investigators. The first and second chapters of 
this thesis use data and qualitative material in the first volume to demonstrate features of rural 
credit prior to the Great Depression and before intervention. The data is plotted on graphs to 
show regional variation in moneylending and the impact of legal costs on the price of credit. The 
 
91 The Legislative Council framed laws until 1937 where the government formed the first elected Legislative Assembly. 
From 1937, the leader of the Legislative Assembly appointed a small group of members to the Legislative Council, 
forming a governance structure similar to parliament and cabinet. 
92 H M Hood chaired the Madras Banking Enquiry Committee. Hood spent the early 1920s as Collector (a term for 
tax collector during Company rule but evolved to mean Administrator of a district during Crown rule) of the Nellore 
district. Hood became part of the Legislative Council in the late 1920s and formed a team of policymakers to report 
on banking in the province. The 1930 report cost 59,000 rupees to compile. 
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thesis uses interviews from the second and third volumes to supplement the findings from the 
data. 
The onset of the Depression in the early 1930s motivated the provincial government to 
commission a report on the impact of the price crash on rural credit and, more specifically, whether 
the crisis increased borrower exploitation. The Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, published in 1935, 
expands on the data provided in the Provincial Banking Enquiry Report.93 The report, through a 
larger number of investigators, surveyed 141 villages showing data on types of moneylender, credit 
instruments used and purpose of borrowing. The report also contains data on the number of legal 
disputes in civil courts and the credit instruments under question in those disputes. The thesis 
plots this data in graphs, compares it to data from 1930 and shows regional variation. It also 
analyses the material on auditing procedures in cooperative banks. The report suggests that the 
Depression had a limited impact on reducing indebtedness and therefore argued that exploitation 
persisted. 
On the impact of land laws on rural credit, the thesis analyses select surveys and interviews in 
the 1938 Report of the Madras Estates Land Act Committee: Part 1. Nine members from the Legislative 
Assembly formed the committee and conducted an investigation into problems in one land tenure 
system in Madras. Four members belonged to the Legislative Council, including the Chairman of 
the committee, T Prakasam who was Minister of Revenue for the province at the time.94 The 
committee reported that the strengthening of tenancy laws, enforced by the colonial government, 
in the early twentieth century did not go far enough to strengthen the rights of permanent tenants. 
The provincial government commissioned a survey of rural credit markets in 1946, to evaluate 
the impact of intervention in the late 1930s. B V Narayanaswamy Naidu, an economist and 
member of the Madras Legislative Assembly, compiled the report.95 The purpose of the report was 
to estimate if credit laws in the late 1930s resulted in lower levels of indebtedness across the 
province. In estimating this, the report surveyed borrowers in 8350 households in isolated years 
of 1939 and 1945. The report does not provide data at the household-level but places groups of 
households in 10 regional zones. Data is aggregated and presented at the zone-level. The thesis 
 
93 W R S Sathyanathan, was a member of the Indian Civil Service. The provincial legislature appointed Sathyanathan 
as a ‘Special Officer’ to report on rural credit in 1935.   
94 Tanguturi Prakasam was a barrister in rural Madras until joining the Indian National Congress party in the early 
1920s. Prakasam became an influential political figure in the province in the late colonial period, holding ministerial 
positions in the Legislative Assembly in the late 1930s and early 1940s. In the post-colonial period, Prakasam rose to 
leader of the Madras legislature until advocating for the partition of the province, following which he was elected as 
the leader of the Hyderabad legislature. 
95 B V Narayanaswamy Naidu was a barrister and economist. Following his call to the Bar in 1929, Naidu was 
appointed Professor of Economics at Annamalai University in 1930. In 1939, the university promoted Naidu to Vice 
Chancellor. In the 1937 election, Naidu joined Thomas as member of the Madras Legislative Assembly. 
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calculates the real value of loans borrowed in each zone and plots this data on bar and line graphs 
to show temporal variation in the volume of lending. 
For rural credit in the 1950s, the thesis uses data from the All India Rural Credit Survey. 
Commissioned by the Reserve Bank of India in 1951, the report surveyed villages across rural 
India between 1951 and 1954. The report consists of three volumes. The first volume is divided 
into two parts: Rural Families and Credit Agencies. The second part, published in 1957, contains data 
on types of moneylender, volume of loans secured by different credit instruments and interest 
rates. The report collects this data by interviewing lenders and borrowers in the villages. The thesis 
compares this data with data from the previous decades to show continuities and discontinuities 
in the credit market. The second volume, titled The General Report, contains recommendations for 
policy interventions in rural credit. The report provides case studies of select villages, including a 
village in the Tanjore district in Madras, and recommendations on improving the cooperative 
banking structure to lower the price of credit for poor peasants. The village study informs analysis 
on sharecropping contracts in the third chapter of the thesis and the material on cooperatives adds 
to the analysis on auditing problems in the fourth chapter. 
On cooperatives, the thesis uses material from three other isolated reports. The first is the 1895 
Report on the Possibility of Introducing Land and Agricultural Banks in India. The government 
commissioned the report to analyse whether transplanting the cooperative model in rural India 
would diminish usury and increase investment in the countryside. The report, compiled by 
Frederick Nicholson conducts case studies of successful cooperative banking experiments in 
Europe.96 Nicholson concludes that the Raiffeisen model would work in India as long as the 
government transplanted the model with the same features as its successful counterpart in Europe. 
The thesis analyses the report to determine the differences in the features of the Indian cooperative 
model and those of the European Raiffeisen model. The second and third are the 1928 and 1956 
Report of the Committee on Co-operation in Madras. C A H Townsend chaired the committee that 
compiled the 1928 report.97 The report describes changes to laws pertaining to cooperative banks 
from its inception and demonstrates key features of management in cooperative banks. T M 
 
96 Frederick Augustus Nicholson, educated in the Royal Medical College and Lincoln College, Oxford, joined the 
Indian Civil Service in 1869. He was stationed in Madras throughout his career and was promoted from the lower 
ranks of district administrator to member of the Legislative Council in 1897. Nicholson is credited for his reports on 
rural development including works on famine and banking. Colonial and post-colonial administrators refer to 
Nicholson as the ‘father of the cooperative movement in India.’ 
97 C A H Townsend was an Indian Civil Servant who spend most his career in Punjab. Townsend was Director of 
Agriculture in early 1920s Punjab. In 1927, on the request of the provincial government in Madras, Townsend travelled 
to conduct a report on the progress of the cooperative movement in the southern province. 
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Narayanaswamy Pillai chaired the committee that compiled the 1956 report.98 The report contains 
annual data on savings, membership, external borrowing, lending and repayment rates from 1940 
to 1955. The thesis combines this data with data from the Annual Report of the Working of the Co-
operative Societies Act (see above) to construct an annual data set on key features of credit 
cooperatives from 1928 to 1955. The thesis analyses the data by plotting line graphs and data 
indices showing annual changes in the performance of cooperative banks. The 1956 report also 
contains useful information on changes in the capital and regulatory structure of the cooperative 
movement. This forms an important source for the analysis, on the role of the state in cooperatives 
in the 1940s and 1950s, in the fourth chapter of this dissertation. 
Officials in the executive both commissioned and compiled government reports, suggesting 
areas of potential source bias. Private moneylenders and borrowers rarely maintained account 
books and when they did, they were not compelled to share these with the government. The 
government designed its own method of collecting data on the rural credit market. The committees 
appointed to draft the reports provided questionnaires to teams of surveyors. Surveyors used these 
questionnaires to collect information from residents in villages. This method could result in two 
forms of prejudice. First, in the questionnaire drafting stage, government committees could have 
designed questionnaires to yield biased results. For example, it would suit the government if the 
public believed that credit was expensive because moneylenders were extractive rather than 
because of policy failures. Second, in the results gathering stage, moneylenders and borrowers 
could have fabricated responses to the surveyors. For example, lenders could understate and 
borrowers could exaggerate interest rates.  
However, these areas of bias should not affect the analysis in the thesis for three reasons. First, 
the government asked a different set of questions in its surveys to the questions asked in this thesis. 
The government was more concerned with the volume of credit rather than the nature of credit. 
It asked questions on the size of borrowing rather than structure of the market in the rural villages. 
The reports only indirectly provided the data analysed in this thesis, limiting scope for prejudice. 
Second, the reports often yielded results that contradicted the government’s position. The 
government commissioned the reports on credit to make informed policy decisions. The reports 
themselves offered policy recommendations. Nevertheless, officials in government often disagreed 
with the findings in the reports. This disagreement occurred due to contradictory interests among 
different administrative departments. For example, the Cooperatives Department and the Board 
 
98 The report also records material from a previous report in 1940 compiled by a committee led by T 
Vijararaghavachariar. Narayanaswamy Pillai was a member of the Indian National Congress and the Madras Legislative 
Assembly until losing his constituency in 1952. Following the loss, Pillai was appointed as the Vice-Chancellor of the 
Annamalai University. 
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of Revenue disagreed with the findings and policy recommendations in the 1935 Report on 
Agricultural Indebtedness. The legislature agreed with the views of these departments and ‘dismissed’ 
the report’s recommendations.99 In other words, the interests of the executive did not always 
conflict with the interests of the reporters. Third, the thesis uses material from court records and 
contemporary studies to supplement the data from government reports. For the most part, 
evidence in the different groups of sources show similar patterns. The thesis presents and explains 
areas of conflicting evidence. 
On legal sources, the thesis analyses material from the laws themselves to evaluate the design 
of government intervention. The third and fourth chapters examine nineteenth century contract 
laws and their relationship to rural credit in the twentieth century. The chapters focus on the 1872 
India Contract Act and the 1881 Negotiable Instruments Act. The 1908 Madras Estates Land Act and 
1948 Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act provides descriptive detail on changes 
to laws surrounding property rights and its expected impact on the supply of mortgage credit. 
Laws in the mid-1930s, including the 1935 Madras Debtors Protection Act, 1936 Madras Debt 
Conciliation Act and the 1938 Madras Agriculturists Relief Act focus on direct intervention in the credit 
market. The fourth chapter analyses the design of these credit interventions in the 1930s. 
Cooperatives were a state-driven initiative in India. Studying laws on cooperatives, therefore, is 
fundamental to analysing the performance of this banking structure. The 1904 Cooperative Societies 
Act and 1912 Cooperative Societies Act stated the necessary conditions for group lending arrangements 
to legally register as credit cooperatives. Both Acts also define the capital structure of the 
cooperative movement. In 1919, the federal government delegated policymaking on cooperatives 
to individual governments in the provinces. The 1932 Madras Cooperative Societies Act defined the 
management and regulatory structure of credit cooperatives. 
The government relied on courts to enforce laws. Case records are a key source of information 
on the impact of laws on the moneylending. Case files containing counsels’ pleadings are 
inaccessible to the public. The case records that are accessible contain summaries of pleadings and 
the entire final judgement. The thesis analyses case judgements from the Madras High Court.100 
The second and third chapters examine select case judgements in the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
The cases involved moneylenders challenging credit intervention by citing the sanctity of contract 
promoted in nineteenth century contract laws. The chapters use court disputes to explore legal 
conflicts between contract laws protecting free enterprise and credit intervention restricting the 
 
99 Manikumar, A Colonial Economy, 148-149. 
100 There is no accessible resource for case judgements from lower courts. The thesis finds some judgements from 
district courts in contemporary accounts. 
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contractual obligations of borrowers. The fourth chapter analyses case judgements involving 
failing cooperative banks. The government liquidated unprofitable cooperative banks. 
Cooperatives challenged their liquidation in courts. The chapter analyses these judgements, 
exploring the impact of mismanagement on failing cooperatives. 
Finally, the thesis supplements government reports and court records with material from 
contemporary studies. The thesis uses articles books written by economists and policymakers to 
further investigate differences, within the colonial and post-colonial provincial administration, in 
the state’s approach to rural credit. Many of these key actors compiled the government 
commissioned surveys on rural credit in the 1930s and 1940s. 
The thesis uses data and qualitative material from five economists cum legislators: C F 
Strickland, P J Thomas, B V Narayanaswamy Naidu, K G Sivaswamy and M L Dantwala. 
Strickland wrote articles on rural credit markets and cooperatives in 1929 and 1932 while 
producing a pamphlet in 1939, outlining expected results from credit intervention in the late 1930s. 
Thomas, a member of the Indian National Congress and the Madras Legislative Council in the 
1930s, published a book titled The Problem of Rural Indebtedness in 1934.101 The book, mostly 
qualitative, echoes the results from government surveys and discusses the importance of reducing 
the volume of debt in rural India. Naidu was Thomas’ compatriot in the Madras Legislative 
Council. Naidu wrote on the impact of intervention on credit supply and the evolution of the 
cooperative movement in the 1920s and 1930s. The third and fourth chapter of the thesis uses the 
data from both accounts. K G Sivaswamy published on the impact of the Madras Agriculturists 
Relief Act, immediately post the intervention in 1939.102 The publication contained descriptive 
evaluations of tenancy laws and credit markets across colonial India. Dantwala, an economist in 
the University of Mumbai, held important positions in the Indian National Congress until the 
1970s.103 The thesis analyses data from one of Dantwala’s articles titled, ‘Agricultural Credit in 
 
101 P J Thomas was a lecturer in the Economics Department at the University of Madras between 1927 and 1942. 
Thomas was elected as a member of the Madras Legislative Assembly in 1937 and contributed to governance in the 
province till 1942. At this point, Thomas began a 20-year career as an advisor to the Indian government in Delhi. 
Thomas published extensively on all areas of the Indian economy.  
102 K G Sivaswamy was among the less familiar historical figures that shaped the evolution of the Indian independence 
movement. He was an active member of both the Servants of India Society as well as the Agricultural Workers Union 
prior to independence. Sivaswamy’s ideological leanings eventually inspired his membership of the Madras Socialist 
Party in the early 1950s where he advocated for the benefits of collective farming in India. Sivaswamy encouraged a 
practical approach to regulating informal lending in rural India. He criticised the 1879 Deccan Agriculturists Relief 
Act, which restricted the transfer of land from borrower to moneylender in agricultural Bombay, for causing an 
immediate contraction in the supply of credit for smallholder cultivators. 
103 M L Dantwala was a well-published economist and political activist. Politically, Dantwala was a fervent supporter 
of Gandhi and joined other activists in the movement for Indian independence. Academically, Dantwala, while 
incarcerated in a jail in Bombay for his political activism, completed a doctorate in economics from Wilson College in 
1937. He published on agriculture in the 1940s and 1950s. Dantwala was known as ‘the founding father of modern 
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India: The Missing Link’, published in Pacific Affairs in 1952. The article presents two arguments. 
First, moneylenders successfully evaded intervention in the 1940s. Second, cooperatives offered a 
solution to problems in rural credit but the movement failed to reach the poor. The thesis 
compares these findings to the results in government reports in order to produce accurate 
evaluations of the impact of policy on rural credit.  
The thesis also analyses data in studies by economists in academic institutions. Eleanor Hough’s 
doctoral dissertation, published in 1932, provides a description of the cooperative movement 
across India in the late 1920s. Studies by G D Agarwal, S Thirumalai and C W B Zacharias focus 
on agriculture in the 1940s. These studies present key findings on rural credit and discuss the 
impact of 1930s intervention on the supply of credit in Madras. Zacharias’ work focuses entirely 
on Madras and two chapters in his book contain descriptions of land and credit markets in the late 
1940s. Data from these studies supplements the data from official reports and contributes to 
graphs showing spatial and temporal variations in rural credit. 
The dissertation now turns to the first substantive chapter, focusing on geography as an 
explanation for regional variation in credit risk and the nature of rural moneylending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
agricultural economics in India.’ See Anonymous, "Obituary: Professor M.L. Dantwala." Indian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 53, no. 4 (1998), 567. 
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Chapter 2. Climate, Credit Risk and Selective 
Lending 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Moneylenders faced a central problem in providing credit to peasants in colonial Madras: 
Borrowers regularly defaulted on loans. Official reports in the 1930s suggest that peasants 
borrowed beyond their means in colonial Madras. Cultivators were over-leveraged and perpetually 
in debt to moneylenders. When borrowers did have disposable income, this went towards servicing 
old debts rather than investments into improving production techniques. High default rates, in 
turn, affected the rural money market in a specific pattern. Whereas merchant communities 
channelled profits made from trade to agricultural credit businesses in Bombay and Punjab, the 
urban traders in Madras did not lend in the countryside. Cultivators themselves provided credit to 
other rural households in the province. High default rates in one year, therefore, constrained 
money markets in the next. The problem seems to have been more severe in some regions than 
others. Money markets were more constrained in central areas of the province than nearer the 
coasts. 
What explains regional variation in credit supply? In the current historiography of rural credit 
in India, the explanations put forward focus on market structure and exploitation. According to 
contemporary studies in the late-colonial and early post-colonial period as well as mainstream 
historical accounts, rich moneylenders monopolised the supply of credit. The non-competitive 
structure of credit markets, allowed the rich to over-price loans and keep the poor in a state of 
permanent debt bondage. Scholars typically consider the proportion of indebtedness as a measure 
of the problem. Markets were less competitive and cultivators borrowed more, relative to their 
income, in some regions than others.104 This chapter shows that the size of indebtedness, market 
structure and credit pricing did not necessarily indicate market constraints. Instead, the chapter 
suggests environmental factors as the source of regional variations in credit supply. In wet and dry 
districts, lenders adopted different strategies to hedge default risk, and therefore, a general account 
 
104 Government reports typically associated the size of debt with the level of poverty. The Tanjore District Gazette in 
1915, for example, was perplexed that cultivators in a well-off municipality were as indebted as cultivators in a poorer 
region.  
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of credit markets based entirely on the lender’s power cannot work. That account should factor in 
strategies to deal with risk. 
The reference to geography and regionality is important. The majority of cultivation in Madras 
was rainfed, however, wet districts benefitted from proximity to irrigated river deltas. Private 
investment was low and public investment was not high enough in the dry districts, leading to little 
increase in acreage with access to irrigation infrastructure.105 The problem persisted throughout 
the period. The dry corridor in central Madras had an abundance of low-quality red soil and 
remained poorly irrigated in the colonial and early post-colonial period. Increases in irrigated land 
during this period largely responded to canal and dam construction. When dams were built, the 
government designed them poorly and constructed them near fertile areas, leaving the dry districts 
continually water-scarce. The wet districts were not without a share of problems. Rainfall was 
volatile and unpredictable across the province. Data from meteorological stations suggests that 
droughts were common in the central corridor while waterlogging was common in the deltas. 
However, the risks of crop failure were higher in the dry districts than the wet. This presents a 
greater set of challenges for money markets in the dry districts than those in the wet districts. 
How did these geographical variations impact credit supply? This chapter shows the importance 
of geography by comparing credit markets in wet and dry districts in the Madras province. Rich 
cultivators, through crop-diversification, were better-equipped to manage the risks of crop failure 
than the poor cultivators in the dry districts. This problem was less severe in the wet districts.  
Smallholders in the wet districts faced a lower risk of harvest failure than the poor in dry districts.  
As a result, client selectivity was one way for creditors to manage risk. In the dry districts, creditors 
provided loans to the rich while the poor were excluded from participating in the credit market. 
In the wet districts, however, money markets were more liquid and cultivators across income 
categories borrowed from moneylenders. Fragmented credit markets accentuated the problem. 
Money rarely travelled from villages in one district to villages in another. Credit supply was self-
contained within each district.  
These findings corroborate the theoretical contributions of development economists, which 
shows that creditors selectively choose borrowers to mitigate the risk of lending.106 In conducting 
this regional analysis, the chapter places geography at the centre of lending barriers and suggests 
 
105 Private investment was particularly low and funded just 1.7 per cent of the irrigation construction in India. Public 
money financed the majority of irrigation works. See Chaudhary et al, A New Economic History, 105. 
106 Stiglitz and Weiss, “Credit Rationing”; show that credit rationing is a commonly used method for banks to mitigate 
lending risk. When prices are not a good indicator of risk, selective client-choosing is evidence of risk mitigation. 
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credit access as an avenue connecting the environment to regional and household inequality in 
mid-twentieth century South India.  
The chapter uses data from the Statistical Atlas of the Madras Presidency to show regional disparities 
in climate and cropping patterns. Data includes average and range of rainfall over a 60-year period 
and crops cultivated by acreage. To demarcate the micro-level variations in agriculture, the chapter 
displays this data in maps, clearly justifying the environmental distinctions between dry and wet 
regions in Madras. On credit, the chapter uses data from village surveys, conducted by the Provincial 
Banking Enquiry and the Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This 
data is displayed in figures and tables, and analysed in the context of the village’s proximity to wet 
and dry districts. The chapter supplements data with text from district gazetteers, using gazettes 
from select wet and dry districts to highlight regional disparities, as well as text from government-
commissioned crop and agricultural science reports in the 1940s and 1950s.  
The chapter proceeds in three stages. The first describes agricultural features in the province 
and introduces the key areas of distinction between wet and dry districts. The second discusses 
distinctive features of the provincial credit market. The third presents the mechanisms through 
which environmental constraints impacted the supply of credit in villages. 
 
2.2 Agriculture in Madras 
 
The majority of cultivation in Madras occupied two landscapes: The fertile deltas near the eastern 
coast and the dry hinterland in the central parts. The fertile river valleys had a different history of 
agrarian settlement from the dry hinterland in South India. Prior to British rule, territory in South 
India was divided into multiple kingdoms. Types of settlement differed by quality of land. Early 
forms of agrarian settlement crowded around the fertile valleys near the eastern coast and focused 
on rice production. The value of land increased in the Early Middle Ages and society began to 
stratify along caste and landownership lines.107 During this period, the Chola, Pallava and Chera 
rulers governed the majority of territory along the valleys. The Cholas governed the largest 
kingdom, most of which later constituted the Tanjore and Ramnad districts of British-ruled India, 
between the fifth and tenth century. In the Early Modern Period, this region fragmented as 
multiple militarised rulers clashed over fertile territory. However, agrarian settlements continued 
to grow in the fertile valleys independent of this political and military shift. In contrast, the dry 
plains remained more fragmented and less settled until British rule. Territory was divided and 
 
107 Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, 30-33. 
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governed by chieftains in the early Middle Ages. Rulers from the north-east of Madras, now the 
Andhra Pradesh state, began acquiring lands in the dry plains in the Early Modern period. Militias 
and local alliances developed primarily to defend against Mughal and Maratha armies from the 
Deccan region, which were attempting to obtain land in the South. Throughout these periods, 
settlement was less entrenched than in the valleys. Cattle rearing and millet cultivation was 
common. Occupational structure developed alongside military hierarchies and agriculture 
remained subsistence focused until the nineteenth century.108 The East India Company was the 
first ruler to consolidate and govern the various kingdoms as one administrative unit from the 
early nineteenth century. Madras, during the colonial period, extended from parts of the west coast 
to the entire south-east coast (see Map 2.1). The Company divided Madras into multiple districts 
and taluks or municipalities. The shift to Crown rule in 1857 created further administrative units, 
limiting the size of each district. In the post-colonial period, the province was divided and land 
was shared between 5 Indian states: Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and parts of Karnataka, Kerala 
and Orissa.   
Outputs from agriculture in rural Madras followed general patterns of cultivation across India. 
By all measures, agriculture performed poorly in the colonial and early post-colonial period. 
Figures for GDP and yields show both unproductive cultivation and weak growth throughout the 
colonial and early post-colonial period. Net domestic product in agriculture grew modestly 
throughout the period. Heston estimates an average output growth of 0.7 per cent per year 
between 1868 and 1947.109 In the same period, population grew rapidly and the share of the labour 
force in agriculture remained stagnant.110 Due to low growth in yields, supply of commodities 
regularly failed to match demand. Indeed, Baker approaches the problem in Madras as a conflict 
between rising demand and the scarcity of ‘productive resources.’111 Foodgrain production, in tons 
per person, in India declined by 30 per cent between 1901 and 1946.112 In the Madras case, 
population growth outstripped growth in grain output throughout the colonial and early post-
colonial period.113 In the same period, cash crop acreage increased but did not substitute food 
 
108 Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, 34-37. 
109 Heston, “National Income”, 397-399. 
110 Baker, An Indian Rural Economy; Roy, The Economic History of India. 
111 Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, 136. 
112 Originally compiled by Sivasubramonian, National Income, cited in Heston, “National Income”, 410. 
113 For data on population and crop output growth in northern Madras, see G N Rao and D Rajasekhar, “Commodity 
Production and the Changing Agrarian Scenario in Andhra: A Study in Interregional Variations, c.1910 – c.1947” In 
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Sumit Guha, Raman Mahadevan, Sakti Padhi, D Rajasekhar and G N Rao, (Oxford, 1991). For similar data on the 
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crops in the majority of districts. The prolonged and economically crippling famine of 1896 
evidenced the subsistence crisis of high demand and disrupted supply in rural Madras. In other 
words, commercialisation and market integration did not remove supply-side constraints in 
agriculture.114 Rural Madras, as with the rest of colonial India, contended with generally poor-
quality soil, limited irrigation and volatile rainfall. Yet, distinctive geo-spatial features show 
important regional variation within the province.  
By 1930, there were 26 districts in Madras, some with more fertile soils than others. Map 2.1 
illustrates the colonial borders, showing rivers and key wet and dry districts of interest. Two major 
rivers, the Cauvery and Godavari, ran from the west to the east coast. Other rivers were 
concentrated near the south-east coast. Districts located near the east coast, and downstream the 
major rivers, contained the most fertile lands. Land in the hinterland was generally dry and soil 
types were less conducive to high-yielding agriculture. However, some districts in the south-central 
parts of the province, the areas west of Tanjore, had mixed land types. Washbrook and Ludden 
show that some central districts had both wet and dry characteristics.115 Baker refers to these 
districts, including Coimbatore, Salem and Trichinopoly, as the Kongunad areas where contrasting 
soil types between neighbouring municipalities within the districts allowed for the cultivation of 
both rice and millets.116 More recently, Parthasarathi argues that the varied land types in these 
mixed districts blurred the boundaries between wet and dry. Canals and channels built in pre-
colonial times carried water from rivers to some in-land districts, which typically also had more 
subsurface water supply than the entirely dry areas.117 
To focus on the stark environmental contrasts within Madras, the four districts shown in Map 
2.1 provide useful representations of wet and dry districts. The map does not include the mixed 
districts. Land in the East Godavari and Tanjore districts, both located near the eastern coast, sat 
in fertile river deltas. Land in the Bellary district, located in central South India, was dry but soil 
types in some areas allowed for cash crop cultivation. Land in the Cuddapah district was dry and 
soil quality was poor, allowing for the cultivation of millets and, in some municipalities, the 
 
South Indian Economy: Agrarian Change, Industrial Structure and State Policy c. 1914-1947, ed. Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Sumit 
Guha, Raman Mahadevan, Sakti Padhi, D Rajasekhar and G N Rao, (Oxford, 1991). 
114 See Robin Burgess and Dave Donaldson. "Can Openness Mitigate the Effects of Weather Shocks? Evidence from 
India's Famine Era." The American Economic Review 100, no. 2 (05, 2010): 449-453. The authors suggest that railway 
construction, and the increase in trade it facilitated, did cushion the size and impact of famines in the late colonial 
period. However, the frequency of crop failures shows that cultivation continued to be fraught with problems despite 
the construction of transport infrastructure. 
115 Washbrook, “Country Politics”, 476; Ludden, Peasant History, 60. 
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117 Prasannan Parthasarathi, "Water and Agriculture in Nineteenth-Century Tamilnad." Modern Asian Studies 51, no. 2, 
(2017): 489. 
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cultivation of pulses. The rest of the chapter makes references to these districts when analysing 
the impact of these conditions on credit and economic outcomes. 
 
Map 2.1 Wet and dry regions in Colonial Madras 
 
 
Regional cropping patterns persisted for most of the period. Rice was the most commonly 
cultivated crop in the deltas while the majority of the dry hinterland produced millets. When the 
soil allowed, cultivators in some dry districts increased the production of cash crops, primarily 
cotton and groundnut, during the period. Map 2.2 illustrates cropping patterns in Madras 
municipalities in 1930. The map includes rice, cereals, cotton and tobacco but excludes oil seeds, 
pulses, vegetables and spices. 
As illustrated in the Map 2.2, Cultivators grew rice in the delta regions while millets were the 
most commonly grown crops in the hinterland. Tanjore, as an example of a delta region, was the 
largest rice producing area in the province during the colonial period. In nine out of eleven 
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municipalities in Tanjore, rice occupied over 85 per cent of cultivated acreage in 1930.118 Cereals 
occupied similarly large shares of acreages in the central districts. Though cultivation of cash crops 
did see expansion from the mid-nineteenth century, it accounted for a minority of total production 
by 1930. Cotton was the most popular of the cash crops and was primarily grown in the central 
corridor. Bellary, Kurnool and Anantapur were key cotton districts by the end of the colonial 
period. In seven out of eight municipalities in the Bellary district, cereal cultivation accounted for 
more than 50 per cent of total acreage. Cotton was most prominent in the Siruguppa municipality, 
occupying 37 per cent of total cultivated acreage.119 However, even in these regions, millets 
occupied a larger share of the acreage than cotton. This trend broadly continued in the 1940s and 
1950s. The mixed wet and dry districts saw some changes during the period. As illustrated in Map 
2.2, rice was grown in some parts of the south-central districts.  Cash crop acreage did see some 
increase with the substitution of groundnut cultivation for cotton and millets in Coimbatore and 
Salem. Sugarcane production also increased marginally in these parts of the province.120  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 A Statistical Atlas of the Madras Presidency, (Madras, 1936). 
119 Statistical Atlas. 
120 Rao and Rajasekhar, “Commodity Production and the Changing Agrarian Scenario”, 15; Nair and Dhas, 
“Agricultural Change in Tamil Nadu”, 128. 
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Map 2.2 Crop patterns in 208 municipalities, 1930 
 
Source: Statistical Atlas. 
Notes: Ratios calculated by the author. Data measures three-year average cropping patterns in number of acres. The 
pie charts measure the ratio of crop acres to total acres cultivated in each municipality. The source arrives at total 
cultivated acres by estimating 10-year average. Fallowed and public lands excluded. Cash crops include cotton, indigo, 
palm, sugarcane, hemp, tobacco, turmeric and ‘other’. Cereals include sorghum, five types of millets and ‘other.’ The 
map excludes oil seeds, pulses, vegetables and fruits. The data is matched to modern day municipality borders. To 
adjust for name changes, the author manually provided an index number to each municipality, matching the index 
numbers in the geo-vector municipality database of the shapefile. In using this method, 24 municipalities could not 
be matched and the eight municipalities outside the provincial boundaries are the errors in matching, bringing the 
number of successfully matched municipalities to 208. The eight errors presented do not bias the results in any way 
as they constitute a small share of the territory in two districts. Two errors, the Kudala and G. Udayagiri municipalities, 
are located in the Ganjam district. The other six errors, the Gunupur, Jeypore, Koraput, Malkangiri, Nowrangapur 
and Rayagada municipalities, are located in the Vizagapatam Agency. This region was a semi-autonomous unit of 
British-ruled Madras and composed mainly of tribal lands. 
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Table 2.1 Output (tons) per acre in Madras, 1937-1944 
Year Rice Cotton Millets 
1937 0.48 0.20 0.25 
1938 0.48 0.20 0.24 
1939 0.42 0.19 0.26 
1940 0.45 0.21 0.27 
1941 0.48 0.22 0.28 
1942 0.49 0.22 0.25 
1943 0.44 0.21 0.23 
1944 0.45 0.22 0.23 
Source: Agricultural Statistics of India, (Delhi, 1951). 
Notes: Calculations made by the author. Output measured in number of tons across the entire province. Area recorded 
as number of acres. The table shows the number of tons per acre. The cultivation of sorghum is taken to represent 
millets in the table. Sorghum was the most commonly grown millet during the period. 
 
Evidence on yields, land prices and population density suggest that cultivators in the wet 
districts were better off than those in the hinterland. Table 2.1 reports that agricultural productivity 
stagnated across the region in the 1930s. Any reported output growth was extensive. This trend 
continued into the early post-colonial period. Increases in crop output in the early 1950s were 
largely driven by increases in inputs.121 In this context, rice cultivation outperformed millets and 
cotton, in yields per acre.122 Rice cultivators harvested double the amount as cotton and millet 
cultivators. Millet yields exceeded cotton yields, a trend that continued in the 1950s.123 Sugarcane 
cultivation accrued the highest yields. However, sugarcane was cultivated in a small area of the 
central province and the high yields, therefore, benefitted a marginal share of the rural 
population.124 
 
121 Techno-Economic Survey of Madras: Economic Report, (Madras, 1961), 81-82. 
122 Techno-Economic Survey, 80. 
123 Techno-Economic Survey, 81-82. 
124 Nair and Dhas, “Agricultural Change in Tamil Nadu”, 130-132. 
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Cultivation in the wet deltas was more labour and capital intensive than cultivation in the dry 
districts. Rice cultivation in these districts required more labour than millet cultivation in the dry 
districts. Delta municipalities reported an average population per cultivated acre of between one 
and three.125 In contrast, there was, on average, less than one person per cultivated acre in 
hinterland municipalities in 1930. Population per cropped acre within municipalities in the East 
Godavari district ranged from between 1.65 and 2.43. In contrast, the same measure of population 
density in Bellary municipalities ranged from 0.28 to 0.65.126 Investment in capital was high in the 
rice deltas. Rice cultivators regularly invested in purchasing livestock and running ploughs. In areas 
with cereal cultivation, on the other hand, working and breeding cattle as well as ploughs per capita 
was much lower.127 Furthermore, Yanagisawa suggests that working cattle were well-fed and 
efficient at ploughing in the Tanjore district.128 In this context, working cattle refers to bullocks 
and buffaloes while breeding stock refers to cows, young bulls, she-buffaloes and young buffaloes. 
Goats and sheep are not included in this analysis. Some areas in the hinterland reported large 
numbers of livestock. However, working cattle was not used for cultivation in these areas. 
Cultivators in some central municipalities, the Palmaner municipality in the Chittoor district for 
example, reared livestock and hosted weekly cattle markets. Cattle was either bred in these 
municipalities or brought to them by breeders in neighbouring regions to sell to cultivators, who 
were primarily based in the deltas. Data from the Statistical Atlas also shows that carts per capita 
were higher in the rice-growing municipalities than in the municipalities in the central province.129   
Land under rice cultivation was more valuable than other land types. According to Baker, land 
in the rice dominated Tanjore district was above four times as valuable as land in millet producing 
Salem.130 From a survey in 1930, the average value per acre of land in the Shiyali municipality in 
the Tanjore district was around 800 rupees as compared to an average value of approximately 60 
rupees in the Adoni municipality in the Bellary district.131 Revenue collection in 1930 highlights 
this regional inequality. The government collected above two rupees per person in land revenue 
 
125 Statistical Atlas. 
126 Statistical Atlas. 
127 Statistical Atlas. 
128 Haruka Yanagisawa, “Elements of Upward Mobility for Agricultural Labourers in Tamil Districts, 1865-1925”, In 
Sugihara, Kaoru, Yanagisawa, Haruka, and Robb, Peter. Local Agrarian Societies in Colonial India: Japanese 
Perspectives, (Surrey, 1996), 208. 
129 Statistical Atlas. 
130 Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, 319. 
131 Statistical Atlas. 
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from residents in delta districts. The corresponding figure for the hinterland was below one rupee 
in 1930.132 How did soil and rainfall vary between the districts? 
Water storage is at the centre of discussion on agricultural variation in Madras. Water, according 
to Parthasarathi, ‘is life in Tamilnad.’133 In the Chola period, irrigation infrastructure was built in 
two forms and in two regions. The Chola rulers invested in the construction of channels and dams 
to divert water from the Cauvery river to deltas in Tanjore.134 The most famous example of such 
constructions was the Grand Anicut, built early in Chola rule. While large projects were 
concentrated in the deltas, tanks were common forms of water storage in the south-central 
districts, located primarily in Trichinopoly.135 During British rule, this regional concentration 
continued. The government constructed dams, canals and channels near the river deltas, while 
replacing tanks, that were poorly maintained in the pre-colonial period, with wells in the south-
central districts.136 In the process, water access increased substantially in the wet districts, partially 
in the mixed districts and insignificantly in the driest districts. 
Financial constraints, modernisation agendas and political conflicts explain the distribution of 
irrigation infrastructure in Madras. Raising enough capital, and seeing returns on these 
investments, was a significant determinant in expanding irrigation infrastructure. When serious 
discussion around irrigation began in the mid-nineteenth century, the government first attempted 
to encourage private British firms to invest in the construction of large irrigation projects in 
Madras.137 When this attempt failed, the government undertook the responsibility themselves but 
raised little funding in London capital markets. As a result, the government extended large projects, 
including canals and dams, in higher revenue earning areas, the districts near river deltas in 
particular.138 Construction of the Upper Anicut in the nineteenth century and the Mettur Dam in 
the 1930s were examples of the dams and channels that distributed water from the Coleroon and 
Cauvery rivers to the deltas in Tanjore. The Cauvery-Mettur project, initiated by the colonial 
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133 Parthasarathi, “Water and Agriculture’, 487. 
134 Dharma Kumar, "Private Property in Asia? The Case of Medieval South India." Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 27, no. 2 (1985), 343. 
135 Parthasarathi, “Water and Agriculture’, 502. 
136 Yanagisawa, “Elements of Upward Mobility”, 202; Mosse, David. "Colonial and Contemporary Ideologies of 
'community Management': The Case of Tank Irrigation Development in South India." Modern Asian Studies 33 (1999): 
306-308; Parthasarathi, “Water and Agriculture’, 504-508; Aditya Ramesh, "The Value of Tanks: Maintenance, 
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government in 1934, involved the construction of a seventy-mile canal which carried water from 
the Cauvery River to the plains, an artificial reservoir of 59 square miles to hold channelled water 
and a dam to prevent flooding. The New York Times praised the government in Madras for 
constructing the ‘largest masonry dam in the world’ and for extending ‘301,000 acres of new 
irrigation to the existing 1,000,000 acres of delta land.’139 The project irrigated rice cultivation 
primarily in the Tanjore and South Arcot districts.  
The regional allocation of smaller infrastructure including wells extended the government’s 
desire to modernise productive areas.140 The building of new wells and replacing old tanks in 
Coimbatore and Salem during the nineteenth century reflected this agenda. By 1900, there were 
502 wells in the Coimbatore district, almost one-quarter of total wells in all the Tamilnad 
districts.141 The focus on the mixed districts continued in the 1950s where the post-colonial 
government invested in extending canals from the Cauvery and Noyyal rivers to the Coimbatore 
and Erode districts.142 In contrast, large projects and infrastructure to support groundwater 
extraction in the driest districts, such as Bellary, remained limited throughout the period.143 Political 
conflicts over water resources added an additional barrier to the extension of canals and dams. In 
the colonial period, the Cauvery river ran through the Mysore Princely State and the Madras 
Presidency. Governments of both provinces signed treaties in 1892 and 1924 on the sharing of 
water from the river. The construction of canals was either blocked or legally challenged if they 
were deemed to violate the treaties’ terms by diverting shared water away from either province.144  
In short, the wet and mixed districts saw improvements while dry districts remained dry during 
the period. Data from official reports further confirms that irrigation infrastructure was 
concentrated in select regions. According to an official survey, 50 out of 241 municipalities 
reported a ratio of irrigated to cultivated land above 50 per cent. In 80 per cent of municipalities, 
the majority of cultivated land was unirrigated in 1930.145 This trend did not change during the 
colonial and early post-colonial period. The average ratio of irrigated to cropped land increased 
marginally for the majority of the province. 
 
139 ‘Big Irrigation Job under way in India’ The New York Times, 30 June 1930. 
140 Ramesh, “The Value of Tanks”; Ramesh, “Indian Rivers”. 
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144 Velayutham Saravanan, "Technological Transformation and Water Conflicts in the Bhavani River Basin of Tamil 
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Irrigation investment increased in the deltas, such as the deltas in the Tanjore district, while dry 
regions stagnated. Following the construction of the Mettur Dam, as illustrated in Table 2.2, the 
ratio of irrigated land to net cultivated land in the Tanjore district showed steady increase between 
1931 and 1951. Similarly, government reports suggest that land was fertile and well irrigated, due 
to rivers and high private investment in the regions near the western coast. Land in the western 
districts was conducive to rice cultivation as well as the cultivation of non-food crops such as 
coconut and rubber. Dismissing the possibility of drought in the South Kanara district, for 
example, the government reported, ‘Famine is unknown and the district produces more food grain 
than is required.’146 Accordingly, Yanagisawa notes that rice cultivation became more intensive in 
the early to mid-twentieth century.147 
 
Table 2.2 Ratio of irrigated land to net area sown, 1921-1951 
Region 1921 1931 1941 1951 
Madras 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.31 
Tanjore 0.74 0.74 0.80 0.85 
Cuddapah 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.23 
Bellary 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
Source: Census of India, 103-105. 
Notes: Calculations made by the author. The ratio calculated by dividing the reported figures for irrigated area by the 
net area sown for the given year. 
 
Soil quality increased proportionally to water access. Deltas around rivers on the west and 
eastern coast were blessed with alluvial soil. Rusty-red lateritic soil was commonplace in low-lying 
areas partially inland from deltas. Both soil types were more conducive to surface water retention 
than other black and red soil varieties, enabling rice cultivation in the deltas.148 These fortunes 
were, to some extent, marred by mineral content in the soils. Nitrogen and phosphoric acid levels 
were low in the Madras soil, creating problems for water absorption across the province.149 
Nitrogen in organic manure only partially solved the problem. Cultivators in Madras did not 
 
146 Statistical Atlas, 13. 
147 Yanagisawa, “Elements of Upward Mobility”, 202-210. 
148 Techno-Economic Survey, 69-75. 
149 Techno-Economic Survey, 69-75. 
60 
 
commonly use artificial fertilizers in the colonial and early post-colonial period.150 This problem, 
again, was more severe in the dry areas. Cultivators in Ramnad, Tanjore and Tinnevelly districts 
reported higher manure and fertilizer use in the early-twentieth century.151 Land in the central 
corridor was a mix between black and red soil types. The northern part of the central corridor, in 
districts such as Bellary, Kurnool and Anantapur, had a larger amount of black soil than other 
areas in the province, enabling some cotton cultivation in these areas.152 Land across the rest of 
the province had various forms of red soil. Red loam, or a mix between sand and clay, was the 
most common soil type across the central part of the province. Without sufficient rain or irrigation 
support, this porous soil was not nurtured enough to cultivate crops other than dry millets.153 
Sandy red soil in Coimbatore and Salem differed in texture, enabling the production of groundnuts 
in the late-colonial period.154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
150 For a discussion on the use of organic fertilizers in indigo farms in Bengal, see Prakash Kumar, Indigo Plantations 
and Science in Colonial India, (Cambridge, 2012). According to, Srabani Sen, “Scientific Enquiry in Agriculture in Colonial 
India: A Historical Perspective”, Indian Journal of History of Science 45 no. 2 (2010): 199-239, natural fertilizer did not 
provide enough nitrogen to deficient soils and imports of artificial fertilizer was low in the colonial period. 
151 Yanagisawa, “Elements of Upward Mobility”, 205-208. 
152 India Crop Calendar, (New Delhi, 1954), 5-8. 
153 Techno-Economic Survey, 69-75. 
154 India Crop Calendar, 5-8. The loose surface later enabled more efficient draining, when compared to loam or clay 
textures, creating a suitable environment for oil seed cultivation. 
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Map 2.3 Average annual rainfall (inches) in 208 municipalities, 1870-1930 
 
Source: Statistical Atlas. 
Notes: The British government set up meteorological stations in most municipalities from the late nineteenth century 
onwards. In most cases, the source calculates average annual rainfall from 1870 to 1930. In a minority of cases, 
meteorological stations were established later. In these cases, the source calculates the average from the start of the 
station to 1930. In a handful of municipalities, the meteorological stations were only 15 years old by 1930. For example, 
a meteorological station was created in the Pamarru municipality in the Kistna district in 1915. The data for this 
municipality is based on a 15-year average. The author uses data from the nearest meteorological station when 
municipalities did not have one of their own. The method of data matching, and the errors it produced, are similar to 
Map 2.2. 
 
The British-ruled government invested in meteorology from the late-nineteenth century. 
Frequent droughts and famines persuaded government officials to record weather patterns across 
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colonial India.155 By 1930, most municipalities had their own meteorology stations, recording daily 
rainfall patterns. The stations could not predict future weather but record past climate patterns. 
Large annual swings in rainfall limited the cultivator’s potential to use past patterns as a method 
to predict the future. Analysing average annual rainfall over a 60-year period, Map 2.3 illustrates 
regional variation in climate patterns across municipalities. 
With regionally concentrated high-quality soil and irrigation infrastructure, rainfall patterns 
drove differences in agricultural yields. In years with weak rainfall, crops in deltas had a higher 
chance of survival. Yet, as shown in Map 2.3, delta areas had significantly higher rainfall than the 
hinterland. Data from meteorological stations in eleven municipalities shows that the Tanjore 
district experienced 45.35 inches of rainfall in an average year. In contrast, an average year in the 
Cuddapah district experienced 27.16 inches of rainfall. As an example of dry and poorly developed 
district in colonial Madras, Bellary had an average annual rainfall of 23.03 inches.156 On the dry 
central corridor, the Census reported in 1951 that, 
 
The main area liable to periodical famines in Madras State comprises the whole of Anantapur 
district the eastern taluks of Bellary district and the western taluks of Kurnool district 
adjoining Bellary district. Inadequate and ill-distributed rainfall in both the monsoons and 
consequent failure of crops are of frequent occurrence in this area.157  
 
Madras was subject to a monsoon climate with significant seasonal changes in rainfall. The 
majority of annual rainfall was concentrated in short bursts of two to three months. Colonial India 
was subject to two seasonal monsoons. The southwest or summer monsoon ran from 
approximately June to September and the northeast or winter monsoon ran from approximately 
October to December. As such, cultivation in rural Madras was seasonal. Crops sown before and 
harvested after the southwest monsoon were referred to as the kharif crop. Crops sown before and 
harvested after the northeast monsoon were referred to as the rabi crop. A failure or delay in the 
monsoon led to crop failure. Moreover, cultivation in the majority of colonial Madras relied heavily 
on the northeast monsoon.158 The delta districts, in the north of the province in particular, got a 
‘fairly distributed rainfall from both monsoons.’159 However, for the majority of central districts, 
 
155 Amrith, “Risk and the South Asian Monsoon”, 19. 
156 Statistical Atlas. 
157 Census of India Vol. III Madras and Coorg Part I, (Madras, 1951), 8. Hereafter source referred to as Census of India. 
158 Census of India, 95. Areas on the western coast benefitted from the southwest monsoon. However, the majority of 
cultivation in the province took place on the eastern section. 
159 Techno-Economic Survey, 72. 
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annual yields were unpredictable and relied on rainfall patterns in a concentrated three-month 
period. Describing the status of cultivators in Bellary, one district surveyor commented in 1915, 
 
The result is that the average ryot of Bellary is poor….His food supply depends on the rains 
of June and July; if two successive monsoons fail his cattle die in thousands; and he himself, 
as will be seen later, lives from crop to crop and as usually hardly emerges from one famine 
before he is submerged under another.160 
 
In short, low public investment and tropical climate created a fragile agriculture industry in 
colonial and post-colonial Madras. Water scarcity, poor soil quality and insufficient irrigation 
facilities led to a high likelihood of crop failure in a large part of the province. The chapter now 
turns to variations in credit supply across wet and dry districts. 
 
2.3 Credit Supply in Rural Madras 
 
Private, informal credit was a valuable input in rural India. Cultivators, particularly smallholders 
and tenants, relied on credit to carry out production. Private capital accumulation was too low to 
drive investment. Commercial banks and regulated forms of finance did not supply credit to rural 
cultivators. Corporate, joint-stock and indigenous banks operated in cities but not in rural villages. 
Cooperative banks provided some credit but only captured a minimal share of the rural market. 
From an official report in 1935, moneylenders captured 93 percent, cooperatives captured six per 
cent and government welfare loans captured one per cent of total market share.161 Rural credit 
markets were active, despite the absence of a formally regulated market structure. Demand for 
credit was high, not always matched by supply.  
The credit market in Madras presented distinct features, relative to similar markets in other 
provinces. Though moneylenders controlled the supply of credit across rural India, they differed 
by type. Urban traders and merchant bankers were moneylenders to cultivators in Bombay and 
Punjab.162 Cultivators controlled the supply of credit in Madras.163 Rural households with 
disposable income provided working capital loans to other cultivators during the colonial and early 
 
160 Madras District Gazetteers: Bellary Vol. I, (Madras, 1915), 91. Hereafter, source referred to as District Gazetteers: Bellary.  
161 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, (Madras, 1935), 40. 
162 Assessments of rural credit in Bombay and Punjab focus on the Gujarati, Marwari or Bania moneylenders. Writing 
on debt in Punjab in 1925, Malcolm Darling categorises moneylenders into sub-castes of Bania, Arora and Khatri 
while differentiating them according to the level of exploitation they inflicted on peasant borrowers. 
163 Sources classify these lenders as ‘agriculturist moneylenders’. 
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post-colonial period.164 Colonial officials referred to the merchant bankers as ‘professional 
moneylenders’ and cultivator creditors as ‘agriculturist moneylenders.’ They differed by their 
primary occupation. Whereas professional moneylenders were moneylenders by profession, 
agriculturist lenders cultivated land and provided credit if they had money to lend. As noted in the 
Provincial Banking Enquiry, ‘it is doubtful whether even half of the moneylending of the 
Presidency is done by professional moneylenders. The evidence we have indicates that the major 
part of it in villages is from one ryot to another while the rural moneylender who does nothing but 
lend is rare.’165  
Indigenous banking houses in Bombay, such as the Marwari traders, operated credit businesses 
with branches in the cities and agents deploying money in rural areas.166 Similar to the Marwari 
lending houses, the Nattukottai Chettiars operated banking houses in Madras. They provided credit 
to export businesses and urban industries in South India, as well as plantations in South-east Asia. 
The Chettiar bankers did not lend to farming-households in Madras. These businesses did not have 
a specific aversion to lending in agricultural settings. The Chettiars operated large funds that 
provided loans to rubber plantations in Burma and Malaya from the early twentieth century. 
Similarly, banking businesses run by the Kallidaikurchi Brahmins, were headquartered in urban 
centres around the southern districts of Tinnevelly, Ramnad and Madura but provided large 
volumes of credit to plantations in Malaya.167 The combination of high default rates and expensive 
enforcement deterred indigenous banking houses from lending in the countryside. Enforcement 
is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. 
As shown in Table 2.3, agriculturist moneylenders dominated the supply of credit in villages. A 
government report in 1935 classified village moneylenders according to their profession. The 
survey finds that lenders cum cultivators were more common in rural credit markets than 
community banking houses. Over three-quarters of moneylenders were agriculturists in 114 out 
of 141 surveyed villages in 1935. The only exception to this rule was the Nellore district where, in 
the two villages surveyed, 58 professional moneylenders competed with 29 agriculturist 
moneylenders. Does this have implications for market structure? 
In most cases, several moneylenders operated within villages. Large landowners did lend 
money, as did smaller landowners and tenants with disposable income. Indeed, village surveyors 
 
164 The source of the capital for rural moneylending largely came from profits in cultivation. Cultivators with surplus 
capital were the primary source of credit in the region. See Madras Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee Report, Volume 
I, (Madras, 1930). Hereafter, source referred to as Provincial Banking Enquiry.  
165 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 220. 
166 Catanach, Rural Credit in Western India. 
167 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 30. 
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in 1930 reported that, ‘there are moneylenders everywhere.’168 As illustrated in Table 2.3, 2429 
agriculturist moneylenders operated in 141 surveyed villages in 1935. The ratio of moneylenders 
to number of villages suggests that credit markets operated competitively. There was some 
variation between districts. There were fewer lenders per village in wet districts when compared 
to villages in dry districts. This figure was driven by select villages. For example, there were only 
22 moneylenders in five surveyed villages in South Kanara and 14 lenders in the eight villages in 
Tanjore. Market structure differed in other wet districts. There were 17 agriculturist moneylenders 
in the one village surveyed in the East Godavari district and 420 lenders in eight villages in the 
Tinnevelly district. In the dry districts, markets in Bellary were more concentrated than others. 
There were nine lenders in the two surveyed villages in Bellary. In the majority of other dry 
districts, there were between 20 and 30 lenders per village.  
 
Table 2.3 Moneylenders in 141 villages, 1935 
Village Type 
Villages 
(1) 
Agriculturist 
Lenders (2) 
Total 
Lenders (3) 
Ratio (2) to (3) Ratio (2) to (1) 
Mostly Wet 73 1184 1357 0.87 16.22 
Mostly Dry 66 1245 1436 0.87 18.86 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness. 
Notes: Data extracted from a survey of 141 villages in Madras. Village data aggregated to district level in the source. 
The government surveyed between 1 and 16 villages in each of the 25 districts. The source does not provide names 
of the villages. The distinction between ‘Mostly Wet’ and ‘Mostly Dry’ is made by the author. Mostly Wet villages are 
in the districts where the majority of cultivated acreage produced rice. The opposite is the case in the Mostly Dry 
villages. Mostly Wet districts include: Ganjam, East and West Godavari, Kistna, Nellore, Chingleput, South Arcot, 
Tanjore, Ramnad, Tinnevelly, Malabar and South Kanara. Mostly Dry districts include: Guntur, Vizagapatam, 
Chittoor, Salem, Coimbatore, Trichinopoly, Madura, Kurnool, Bellary, Anantapur, Cuddapah. Total Lenders measures 
the number of agriculturist and professional moneylenders in the villages. Calculations made by author. 
 
The competitive market structure does not imply that money was easily accessible in rural 
districts. The distinctive features of moneylending in Madras constrained the availability of credit 
in crisis years.  Indigenous bankers in other provinces, such as the Marwaris, ran large-scale lending 
businesses by providing credit to members of their community at a lower price than credit to other 
borrowers in cities and villages. Moneylenders residing in villages borrowed from the indigenous 
banking houses at a lower cost than the price of their loans to poor peasants. Indeed, when this 
system operated in Madras, village moneylenders borrowed, ‘at 8 to 12 per cent from the more 
 
168 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 220. 
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wealthy Marwari bankers’ and credited this money to poor peasants at much higher prices.169 
Evidence suggests that petty traders in villages, such as shopkeepers, also borrowed from 
indigenous banking houses in cities and provided credit to cultivators. Shopkeepers borrowed at a 
lower cost from bankers than cultivators did on the rural credit market. However, linkages between 
rural lenders and urban bankers were rare in Madras. In practice, money did not flow easily from 
city bankers to peasants. The cultivators cum moneylenders in Madras relied on their disposable 
income to lend to peasants. On the movement of money in rural Madras, the Provincial Banking 
Enquiry reported, ‘the ryot moneylender does his business almost entirely on his own capital.’170 
Disposable income was the requirement to lend, but was easily constrained in Madras. Wealthy 
landowners with savings allocated a part of this disposable income to moneylending. Less wealthy 
cultivators allocated profits made in year n-1 to the credit market in year n.171  Creditors may have 
also been borrowers in the same year or borrowers in one year and creditors in the next. Borrowers 
and lenders were not necessarily distinct agents in the credit market. Indeed, the colonial 
government reported that a cultivator cum moneylender ‘may borrow for his own needs during 
the cultivating season.’172 This feature created a distinctive risk structure. Crop failures 
simultaneously bankrupted borrowers and constrained the supply of money. Cultivators without 
profit in year n-1 both defaulted on loans and restricted the availability of credit in year n.173 If 
professional moneylenders supplied credit, one would expect that they would have a diversified 
portfolio and can absorb risks better by passing it on to other more secure loans. If borrowers and 
lenders were both agriculturists there is much greater risk of contagion, and an inability to absorb 
risks. A crop failure will have impact on all parties, and pass on from party to party more quickly. 
In other words, any fragility in the agricultural sector reinforced credit and investment constraints 
in localised village credit markets. Cultivators recycled money within villages but this led to liquidity 
constraints following harvest failure.  
The seasonality of the money market further affected short-term fluctuations in credit supply. 
Monsoons in tropical Madras were biannual with cycles of cultivation operating around the timing 
of rainfall. Crops were either sown in June for harvest in October or sown in September for harvest 
in January. The majority of cultivation depended on rainfall in the three months between 
 
169 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 219. 
170 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 220. 
171 P G K Panikar, Rural Savings in India, (Bombay, 1970), shows that this trend persisted in the early post-colonial 
period. Credit was supplied by cultivators with disposable income. Cultivators preferred to lend than to save. 
172 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 220. 
173 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 220. 
67 
 
September and December. The demand for credit was high in the autumn while the demand for 
repayment was expected at the end of the spring harvest when commodities were to be traded.174 
Liquidity in the formal money market responded to seasonality in agriculture. Roy demonstrates 
that seasonality affected the market for formal banking credit across colonial India.175 Seasonality 
and yearly climate fluctuations constrained overall money supply. As such, commercial and 
indigenous banks were indirectly exposed to the seasonal fluctuations. Bank rates and bill 
discounting, or bazaar bill, rates varied according to changes in the demand for agricultural credit.176 
Bank rates were low on the eve of the cultivation season when the supply and demand for money 
were high. Rates were high after in the off-season when the demand and supply of money were 
low. 
As a result of this link between credit and seasonality, moneylenders in rural villages commonly 
provided loans on a short-term basis of four to six months.177 Lenders provided loans in monthly 
instalments, matching changing input requirements during the production cycle. Cultivators 
borrowed in one month to cover the costs of fertilizer while borrowing in another to finance the 
renting of cattle.178 Lenders charged monthly rather than annual interest rates. With the credit 
market operating on such short-term arrangements, default rates were high and credit was 
constrained after a bad season. Official surveys echoed the concern that, ‘a crop failure may reduce 
the debtor to bankruptcy.’179 In the Madras case where moneylenders were also cultivators, crop 
defaults also resulted in reduced disposable income to lend in the next agricultural season. Liquidity 
was volatile, expanding after good harvests and significantly constrained after bad seasons. In the 
decade between 1938 and 1948, the monsoon failed three times. The provincial government 
marked cycles in 1938-39, 1945-46 and 1947-48 as ‘bad years’ with a more serious famine in the 
winter of 1945.180 Despite initiatives by the colonial and early post-colonial governments, crop 
insurance schemes were rejected across the region. The contention with the possibility of insuring 
crops was always the extraordinary indemnity costs given the frequency of failed harvests.181  
 
174 Roy, “The Monsoon”, 15-20. 
175 In this context, formal credit refers to loans provided to merchants, firms or traders. The creditors to these 
businesses in colonial Madras were either large indigenous banking communities, auction houses or public and private 
banks. 
176 Roy, “The Monsoon”; Roy, “Climate and the Economy”. 
177 Strickland, “Cooperation and the Rural Problem”, 510. 
178 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 86-88. 
179 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 221. 
180 A Scheme of Crop Insurance for the Province of Madras, (Madras 1949), 9. 
181 For barriers to designing crop insurance schemes in colonial and contemporary India, see V M Dandekar, "Crop 
Insurance in India." Economic and Political Weekly 11, no. 26 (1976): A61-80; Pramod Kumar Mishra, Agricultural Risk, 
Insurance and Income : A Study of the Impact and Design of India's Comprehensive Crop Insurance Scheme, (Aldershot, 1996); 
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Given the frequency of failed harvests, it is unsurprising that default rates were high in colonial 
Madras. According to the Banking Enquiry’s survey of 76 villages in the late 1920s, creditors 
provided 37 per cent of total loans for the repayment of prior debts. As illustrated in Table 2.4, 
2.2 million rupees out of the total 5.9 million rupees credited to borrowers went towards servicing 
previously defaulted debts in all the villages surveyed. The problem was not unique to the year this 
data was collected. The Banking Enquiry reported on credit markets in the 1928-1929 season, prior 
to the commodity price crash in the early 1930s.182 Prices declined from the previous year but not 
enough to cause structural changes in default rates.183 Moreover, high default rates were a 
systematic concern in the rural credit market. Naidu and Vaidyanathan, writing in a period of rising 
commodity prices in the late 1930s, commented that ‘the root cause of the indebtedness of the 
Indian peasant is the insufficiency of his income which is the result of uneconomic holdings, lack 
of attention to improved methods of cultivation, manuring, irrigation or the introduction of 
seasonal crops…and the frequent failure of crops due to bad seasons.’184 
If, as noted by Naidu and Vaidyanathan, agricultural fundamentals were the root cause of high 
default rates, then Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1 present a regional puzzle. Default rates were higher in 
villages located in wet districts when compared with those in the dry districts. A larger percentage 
of loans in the wet villages went towards servicing previous defaults than in the dry villages. Figure 
2.1 illustrates this stark contrast by comparing select wet and dry villages. The villages recorded in 
the Bellary district were located in the Adoni municipality. The area contained, ‘a light black soil’ 
and was ‘at the mercy of deficient monsoons.’185 Yet, each of the three villages in this region 
reported ratios of debt servicing to new loans of under 20 per cent. In contrast, the Gollapallam 
village in the Coconada municipality in the East Godavari district reported similar ratios of 90 per 
cent. The municipality was well located, by the Godavari river. The Tanjore district did show lower 
default rates on average. However, one village reported prior debt servicing rates above 40 per 
cent which was higher than the rates in Bellary. This is particularly puzzling as the village surveyed 
in Tanjore was located in the Shiyali municipality, a fertile location near the Cauvery River.  
 
 
 
Reshmy Nair, "Crop Insurance in India: Changes and Challenges." Economic and Political Weekly 45, no. 6 (2010): 19-
22. 
182 The impact of the Depression on the credit market is discussed in Chapter 4. 
183 McAlpin, “Price Movements”. 
184 Bijayeti Venkata Narayanaswami Naidu and P Vaidyanathan, The Madras Agriculturists' Relief Act: A Study, 
(Annamalainagar, 1939), 2. 
185 District Gazetteers: Bellary, 84-92. 
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Table 2.4 Default rates in 76 villages, 1929 
Village Type Villages 
Total Borrowing 
(Rupees) 
Prior Debts 
(Rupees) 
Default Servicing 
(per cent) 
Mostly Wet 33 2,987,151 1,199,589 40 
Mostly Dry 43 2,885,445 975,327 34 
Total 76 5,843,836 2,157,918 37 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry. 
Notes: Data extracted from a survey of 76 villages in 1929. The grouping of Mostly Wet and Mostly Dry conducted 
in the same format as Table 2.3. The villages are grouped based on the district they are located in. The Banking Enquiry 
Committee surveyed select villages in each district except Malabar. Prior Debts refers to the amount borrowed to 
repay defaulted loans. Default Servicing measures the percentage of loans, relative to total lending in the village, 
provided to repay defaulted loans. Ratios calculated by the author. 
 
Figure 2.1 Default rates in select villages, 1929 
 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry, 60-70. 
Notes: East Godavari, Tanjore and South Arcot were wet districts and primarily rice producing. Cuddapah was dry 
and millet or pulses producing. Kurnool and Bellary were dry and either cereal or cotton producing. The report 
surveyed between 2 and 3 villages in each district. Ratio calculated in the same format as Table 2.3 but presented in 
number form instead of percentage. 
 
Why were default rates lower in dry villages than in wet villages? One explanation is that 
peasants in wet districts over-borrowed, either by increasing the accumulation of consumption 
debt or by borrowing at high prices. Influential commentators on credit including Malcolm Darling 
and C F Strickland, argued that peasants borrowed beyond their expected income to spend on 
weddings and lavish ceremonies.186 In practice, however, data from the Provincial Banking Enquiry 
shows that the majority of borrowing was for investment rather than consumption purposes. As 
illustrated in Table 2.5, lending for ceremonial expenses, as a ratio of total fresh lending, accounted 
 
186 Darling, The Indian Peasant; Strickland, “Cooperation”. 
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for 15 per cent in wet villages and 16 per cent in dry villages. Borrowing to pay old tax bills 
accounted for a much smaller share, two and four per cent in wet and dry villages respectively. 
The majority of credit provided went towards working capital expenses and large capital 
investments including land purchase and education. Lending in Tanjore and Bellary corroborates 
this assessment. The ratio of consumption to total credit, in this case the ratio of ceremonial to 
total lending, was 16 per cent in Tanjore and 24 per cent in Bellary. Working capital credit exceeded 
consumption credit in both regions. More puzzling, consumption debt was higher, but default 
rates were lower, in Bellary than in Tanjore. Credit for large capital investments was higher in 
Tanjore than in Bellary. Credit for the purchase of land accounted for 34 per cent of total lending 
in the three villages surveyed in Tanjore.187 
 
Table 2.5 Credit composition in 76 villages, 1929 
Village Type Villages 
Fresh Lending 
(Rupees) 
Ceremonies 
(per cent) 
Tax Payments 
(per cent) 
Working Capital 
(per cent) 
Mostly Wet 33 1,787,562 15 2 45 
Mostly Dry 43 1,910,118 16 4 57 
Tanjore 3 206,500 16 0.2 28 
Bellary 6 354,802 24 1.1 36 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry, 60-70. 
Notes: The distinction of Mostly Wet and Mostly Dry follows the same format as Table 2.3. The Banking Enquiry 
Committee estimated the total value of loans provided in each village. This was categorised by purpose of borrowing. 
Fresh Lending is the total lending minus the lending for the repayment of prior debts. Ceremonies is the ratio of 
lending for marriage and ceremonial expenditure to total lending. Tax Payments is the ratio of lending for the payment 
of old land tax bills to total lending. Working capital includes borrowing for cultivation expenses, trade expenses and 
expenses for land improvements. The table excludes credit for large capital expenses including land purchase, 
construction and education. 
 
On credit pricing, it is plausible to suggest that interest rates were higher in the wet villages than 
the dry villages. Borrowers were defaulting on loans due their inability to repay expensive credit in 
the wet villages. However, it is also plausible to suggest the opposite, that if rice-growing regions 
were likely to have a more stable season than dry ones, this should reflect in lower price of credit. 
In Tanjore, for example, cultivators in or near the delta had access to a constant supply of water 
including in years with failed monsoons. As a result, one would expect loans in wet regions to have 
been cheaper than loans in dry regions owing to the lower likelihood of crop failure.  
 
187 Provincial Banking Enquiry. 
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In practice, the evidence shows that neither assumption held true. there was little district-level 
variation in the price of credit. Lenders provided loans seasonally and charged interest on these 
loans at monthly intervals.188 From official village surveys in the 1930s, the price of credit showed 
little variation between villages. According to the Provincial Banking Enquiry, annualised interest 
rates varied between 12 and 24 per cent, but this variation existed across most districts. Indeed, 
the report suggests that interest rates varied between nine and 24 per cent in villages within the 
wet Tanjore district and between 12 and 24 per cent in the villages within the dry Bellary district. 
This is corroborated in district surveys. A survey of the Bellary district noted that rates varied ‘from 
1 to 2.5 per cent per mensem.’189 In the Tanjore District Gazetteer, the surveyor reported that 
interest rates ‘never seem to fall below ten and in some cases rises as high as 24 per cent.’190 
According to the District Gazetteer of the Godavari district, a primarily rice growing region, ‘the 
rates of interest on loans are much as the same as usual, 12 to 24 per cent being common.’191 This 
does not imply that 24 per cent was the maximum interest charged on loans. Indeed, sources 
reported on loans with higher interest rates. According to a survey in 1935, ‘sowcars 
(moneylenders) of Kurinjipadi who supplied the villagers with money usually charged 6 pies for a 
rupee for a month or 37.5 per cent but 9 pies for a rupee for a month or 56.25 per cent was not 
uncommon.’192 Lenders charged higher interest rates for loans in kind or those secured by crop 
sharing arrangements. According to the Banking Enquiry, interest rates on crop sharing loans 
averaged between 25 and 50 per cent per annum.193 The Bellary District Gazetteer noted that 
creditors provided grain advances at rates of 25 per cent.194 However, as shown in Table 2.6, there 
is no evidence to suggest that the range of interest rates differed greatly by geographical region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
188 Strickland, “Cooperation”; Roy, “The Monsoon”. 
189 District Gazetteers: Bellary, 101. 
190 Madras District Gazetteers: Tanjore Vol. I, (Madras, 1915), 112. Hereafter, source referred to as District Gazetteers: 
Tanjore. 
191 Madras District Gazetteers: Godavari Vol. I, (Madras, 1915), 91. Hereafter, source referred to as District Gazetteers: 
Godavari. 
192 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, Madras Agriculturists Relief Act: A Study, (Madras, 1939), 3. 
193 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 221. 
194 District Gazetteers: Bellary, 101. 
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Table 2.6 Interest rates (annualised), 1929 
District Type Agriculturist Professional 
Mostly Wet 9-36 12-50 
Mostly Dry 7.5-40 9-49.5 
Tanjore 9-24 24-36 
East Godavari 12-18 18-26 
Bellary 12-24 12-24 
Cuddapah 9-18 n 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry, 221. 
Notes: The Banking Enquiry Committee arrived at these figures based on a survey of select villages in each district. 
The table shows the range of interest rates recorded. The interest rates are annualised but moneylenders typically 
provided working capital loans for a short period of four to six months. Borrowers commonly paid interest bills in 
monthly instalments. The distinction between Mostly Wet and Mostly Dry conducted in the same format as Table 2.3. 
Data unavailable for professional moneylenders in Cuddapah. 
 
In other words, the evidence shows that the range of interest rates in wet districts was similar 
to the range of interest rates in dry districts. Moreover, it does not seem likely that interest rates 
on loans in wet districts were more likely to congregate at the lower end of the range. According 
to the Tanjore district surveyor, interest rates varied, ‘by the security offered and the amount 
borrowed.’195 Enforcement costs and the nature of collateral led to wide variations in credit pricing 
at the level of the individual loan transaction. This is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
In short, this section shows that cultivators dominated credit supply and the market operated 
seasonally. Agricultural fundamentals affected the borrower’s ability to repay and the lender’s 
disposable income to lend. Default rates were higher in the wet regions than the dry and this 
problem was not driven by lending composition or interest rate variations. The next section shows 
that lending strategies explain the regional differences in default rates and credit constraints. 
Creditors adopted safer lending strategies in dry districts and more risky strategies in wet districts. 
As a result, default rates were subdued in the dry but high in the wet areas. 
 
 
 
195 District Gazetteers: Tanjore, 112. 
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2.4 Geography and Selective Lending 
 
Climate volatility and the design of water management meant that crop failure was also typical of 
wet districts. Areas near the coast were prone to significant seasonal and annual volatility in rainfall. 
Though reporting high average rainfall, rice regions were vulnerable to lower than required rains 
as well as waterlogging in years with a strong northeast monsoon. From annual rainfall patterns 
reported in meteorological stations across the province, Map 2.4 illustrates the rainfall range, 
arrived at by estimating the difference between maximum and minimum annual rainfall in a 60-
year period.196 As illustrated, meteorological stations around the coast reported significantly higher 
rainfall volatility than stations in the hinterland. The Shiyali municipality in Tanjore reported a 
maximum rainfall of 103.26 inches in 1913 and a minimum rainfall of 24.43 inches in 1892. In its 
maximum year, the annual rainfall in Shiyali exceeded its 60-year average by 43.58 inches, double 
the amount of annual rainfall in the minimum year. In contrast, the Adoni municipality in the dry 
Bellary district reported a maximum rainfall of 53.31 inches in 1916 and a minimum annual rainfall 
of 11.25 inches in 1876. Using range as an estimate of unpredictability, rainfall in the Shiyali 
municipality was 47 per cent more volatile than rainfall in the Adoni municipality. 
Variations in geographical features within the Tanjore district suggests that crop failure was a 
problem on the coast and in the regions marginally inland from the deltas. The Cauvery River ran 
from the Coorg province in western Madras, now the Karnataka state, down to Ramnad and 
Tanjore in eastern Madras, now the Tamil Nadu state. The river drained in the Tanjore delta where 
it met the Bay of Bengal. The river had 8 tributaries, the eastern of which was the Coleroon River 
which flowed out of the intersection between the Tanjore Delta and the coast.  Waterlogging and 
salinity were problems in the delta region. The eastern delta had, on average, a 30 per cent higher 
annual rainfall than the rest of the basin.197 Poor soil drainage meant that higher than average 
rainfall led to flooding and crop failure. In 1918, Harrison, an agricultural chemist reported to the 
provincial government that ‘certain portions of the Delta (Tanjore) are badly drained and are 
tending to become saline.’198 In the same period, the District Gazetteer reported that, ‘in almost 
every year there have been breaches in the river banks, and losses of crops of a more or less serious 
 
196 The period runs from 1870 to 1930. However, this is contingent on the meteorological station remaining in 
operation during that period. The time period shortens in cases where the government set up the station later than 
others. 
197 S Vedula, "Optimal Irrigation Planning in River Basin Development: The Case of the Upper Cauvery River 
Basin." Sadhana 8, no. 2 (1985), 225. 
198 A Soil Survey of the Tanjore Delta Vol. III, (Madras, 1921). 
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nature.’199 In one such example, excess rainfall from the northeast monsoon in the winter of 1900 
led to flooding and damaged rice crops across the Shiyali municipality, located in the Tanjore 
district.200  
 
Map 2.4 Annual rainfall range (inches) in 208 municipalities, 1870-1930 
 
Source: Statistical Atlas. 
Notes: The source provides the maximum and minimum volume of annual rainfall from the start of the meteorological 
station to 1930. The method of data matching, and the errors it produced, are similar to Map 2.2. 
 
 
199 District Gazetteers: Tanjore, 153. 
200 District Gazetteers: Tanjore, 153. 
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Water management projects did not solve the problem. The colonial and the post-colonial 
government considered large hydraulic projects such as canals and dams as solutions to the 
flooding problem. The building of the Cauvery-Mettur Dam in the 1930s was an example of this 
in the colonial period. The government commissioned the construction of the reservoir upstream 
of the Tanjore delta. However, the dam overflowed in years with excess rainfall, leading to flooding 
and subsidence in the downstream Tanjore delta.201 The outcome of the Mettur Dam construction 
in 1930s was a continued reliance on unstable rainfall in the downstream Tanjore deltas.  
The unpredictable pattern of rainfall led to large volatility in rice output during the period. The 
late 1940s and early 1950s are a good example of the large annual variation in output. A good year 
in 1953 to 1954 followed a string of volatile rainfall between 1949 and 1953. Much of the variation 
in total crop production was driven by annual changes in rice output. Low yields in the late 1940s 
prompted the provincial government to commission ‘soil and irrigation research’ to understand 
the causes of ‘alkalinity, salinity or other defects or deficiencies’ in rice producing areas.202 The 
good year in 1953 to 1954 saw an increase of 1.7 million tons of food production from the previous 
year. According to a government report, rice contributed to 76 per cent of this increase. Further 
explaining the increase in food production in the mid-1950s, the report claimed that ‘seasonal 
factors’ explain 50 per cent of the annual changes.203 Major and minor irrigation accounted for 
nine and 11.5 per cent respectively, while fertilizer and manures drove 14.7 per cent of the output 
increase.204 This substantiates the persistent importance of stable rainfall in crop production. Crop 
failure was likely in high water-demand areas with volatile rainfall. Dams had a limited impact on 
this outcome.  
Crop durability differed by region, offering borrowers different capacities for loan repayments 
in wet and dry districts. Rice cultivation, though more valuable, had a higher water requirement 
than dry crops. According to a government survey in 1960, ‘conditions for growing rice are 
normally more exacting chiefly on account of the greater water and manpower requirements’.205 
In contrast, Hazareesingh describes cotton and millets as ‘rain-prudent crops, growing under 
varied conditions of rainfall and sustained by the deep moisture-holding capacity of black soil.’206 
The versatility of the millet crop allowed peasants the flexibility to grow both cotton and cereal 
 
201 S Vedula, "Optimal Irrigation Planning”, 225. 
202 Agriculture and Fisheries in the Madras State, (Madras, 1954), 8. 
203 Techno-Economic Survey, 80. 
204 Techno-Economic Survey, 80. 
205 Techno-Economic Survey, 77. 
206 Sandip Hazareesingh, "Cotton, Climate and Colonialism in Dharwar, Western India, 1840–1880." Journal of Historical 
Geography 38, no. 1 (2012), 9. 
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crops year-round.207 Though richer, Tanjore reported a lower amount of double-cropping than the 
less developed, drier South Arcot, Salem and Coimbatore.208 Areas in-land from the delta 
benefitted from crop rotations. Cultivators in the drier Tanjore municipalities grew millets and 
groundnuts in years with limited rainfall and rice varieties with comparatively lower water 
requirements and finger millets in good years.209 One crop acted as insurance for the other in the 
dry areas. Indeed, according to Washbrook, cultivators in dry areas commonly grew ‘as many as 
five different crops on the same land in the hope that should some fail, the others at least might 
survive.’210 From a survey of villages in the dry Kistna district, the Provincial Banking Enquiry 
finds that cultivators growing ‘five crops together on one bit of land’ was common.211 Creditors in 
these regions were in a position to recover loans even if one crop failed.212 On the disadvantages 
of single-cropping, the Banking Enquiry observed, ‘the ryot may borrow from two places from the 
same crop and pay neither.’213 Single-cropping cultivators in rice-producing regions, therefore, had 
less of an insurance on droughts and waterlogging than double-cropping cultivators in dry districts. 
Additionally, credit requirements were low in the dry districts and high in the wet districts. The 
Provincial Banking Enquiry estimates that the average debt per acre across the province was 58 
rupees in 1930. Surveys of cultivation costs suggest that 58 rupees is a reliable figure of the average 
working capital required per acre in a single rice-growing season. The average cost of cultivation 
per acre varied between 45.99 and 85.14 rupees in 1930 prices. Approximately 70 per cent of the 
23 observations in Tables 2.7 and 2.8 shows that the average cost of rice cultivation was between 
48 and 68 rupees per acre. As such, the Provincial Banking Enquiry’s estimate of 58 rupees is a 
strong proxy of the average borrowed per acre in the deltas. The cultivation of millets and cotton 
in the dry districts yielded a lower set of expenses per acre than 58 rupees. According to Rao and 
Rajasekhar, sorghum and cotton cultivation in Bellary cost the cultivator, on average, nine and 12 
rupees per acre respectively.214 These were between a quarter and a fifth of the expenses incurred 
by rice cultivators in Tanjore. This does not take into account the credit borrowed to finance 
 
207 Hazareesingh, “Cotton, Climate and Colonialism”, suggests that cotton tended to mature later than millets in the 
nineteenth century.  
208 Techno-Economic Survey, 94-95. 
209 District Gazetteers: Tanjore, 100. 
210 Washbrook, “Country Politics”, 479.  
211 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 14. 
212 This practice was more plausible in black soil areas. Areas with red clay soil allowed for little flexibility in crop 
cultivation. Here, the cultivator was dependent on growing millets all year round. 
213 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 220. 
214 Rao and Rajasekhar, “Commodity Production”, 17. 
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termly capital requirements or land purchases. Costs of cattle and ploughs were expectedly higher. 
As a point of comparison, a pair of cattle used for ploughing in cotton fields in the Bellary district 
cost between 200 and 400 rupees while the cost of a pair of untamed bulls was approximately 100 
to 120 rupees in the ‘southern districts’ in 1939.215 The government estimated the all-India average 
annual cost of living at 230 rupees in 1945, approximately 177 rupees in 1930 prices.216 
The size of borrowing increased with the size of landholding. Yet, borrowing did not increase 
linearly relative to size of landownership. In other words, there was a declining marginal increase 
in additional borrowing with each additional acre owned. According to a survey of 564 families in 
1935, debt per capita among large landowners was over four times higher than debt per capita 
among smallholders. However, the debt per acre accrued by large landowners was 38 per cent 
lower than the debt per acre accumulated among smallholders.217 The Provincial Banking Enquiry’s 
estimate of 58 rupees per acre exceeded the average borrowed by tenants in richer deltas and 
smallholders in the dry interior. However, the figure is lower than the average borrowed by 
smallholders in the rich deltas and large landholders in the hinterland. Farm labourers borrowed 
less than the average smallholder. According to one report in 1935, one moneylender provided 
loans of 25 rupees, half the recorded debt per acre, to farm labourers or coolies.218 
 
Table 2.7 Cost of rice cultivation per acre, 1926 (in 1930 prices) 
Plots Minimum (rupees) Maximum (rupees) Average (rupees) 
9 45.99 55.47 50.93 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry, 168; McAlpin, “Price Movements”. 
Notes: Data collected by the Lalgudi Sivagnanam Co-operative Agricultural Society between 1925 and 1926. The 
cooperative examined the expenses per acre incurred by nine small landholdings during two cultivation cycles. The 
table shows the data from the costs estimated in the first crop. Costs in the second crop show similar figures. 
Minimum indicates the landholding with the lowest reported expenses. Maximum shows the landholding with the 
largest. Average is the mean of all 9 observations. The author adjusts costs to 1930 prices, using McAlpin’s price 
index, for easier comparison with Table 2.8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
215 Washbrook, “The Commercialisation of Agriculture”, 138; Report of the Economist for Enquiry into Rural Indebtedness, 
(Madras, 1946), 47. The cost of cattle was higher in 1939, relative to the early 1930s, owing to upward swing in prices 
post-Depression. The difference in cost also reflected variation in the quality of the cattle. The same is true of the cost 
of living index in the 1940s. Prices of commodities soared during the early 1940s. 
216 Report of the Economist, 47; McAlpin, “Price Movements”. 
217 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 42. 
218 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 16. 
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Table 2.8 Cost of cultivating rice per acre, 1939 and 1947 (in 1930 prices) 
District 1939 (rupees) 1947 (rupees) 
East Godavari 62.16 57.21 
Nellore 62.16 42.29 
South Arcot 85.14 77.61 
Tanjore 51.35 55.22 
Source: Indian Agricultural Statistics, (Delhi, 1950), 174; McAlpin, “Price Movements”.  
Notes: Table refers to irrigated land and excludes data for unirrigated rice cultivation. The source contains incomplete 
information on unirrigated paddy areas. Rice requires a minimum level of irrigation to be cultivated thus eliminating 
any possibility for bias in the data. The author adjusts the costs presented in the source to 1930 prices using McAlpin’s 
price index. Commodity price inflation was high in the 1940s which would show bias in the data if unadjusted. 
 
The average size of landholding was larger in dry districts. The average landholding in seven 
municipalities in the dry Anantapur, Bellary and Kurnool districts was 12.12 acres in 1930. In 
contrast, the average size of landholding in five municipalities in the East Godavari, Ganjam, 
Ramnad and Tanjore districts was 3.7 acres.219 The average landholding size in the Adoni 
municipality in Bellary was 10.79 acres in comparison to an average size of 4.88 acres in the Shiyali 
municipality in Tanjore.220 In Bellary, tenancy was rare while labourers were commonly temporary 
workers that worked seasonally and emigrated in bad years. Indeed, the 1951 Census recorded 
large movements of labour from famine prone areas to rice deltas in bad years.221  In contrast, 
tenancy was common and permanent in Tanjore. The delta reported a large number of tenants 
and cultivating owners while also reporting a low number of temporary labourers.222 Tenants 
accessed the credit market, at times borrowing from landlords on sharecropping arrangements.223 
Labour was more permanent, creating a more conducive structure for investment.   
Cultivators in dry districts, through higher average landholdings, exploited more risk-bearing 
economies of scale than cultivators in wet districts. The lack of improvements in technology, 
including irrigation, seeds and fertilizer, meant that scale provided average landholders insurance 
 
219 Statistical Atlas. 
220 Statistical Atlas. 
221 Census of India, 14-22. 
222 Census of India, 14-22. 
223 District Gazetteers: Tanjore, 108-111; Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, suggests that sharecropping was a common 
feature of the Tanjore delta in the colonial and early post-colonial period. 
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against environmental fluctuations. In 1929, the average landholder in the Adoni municipality in 
Bellary earned just over half the revenue of the average landholder in the Shiyali municipality in 
Tanjore.224 However, landholders in Bellary borrowed significantly less than landholders in 
Tanjore. As noted, the costs of cultivation were low in Bellary. From a survey of select villages in 
each district, the average debt per acre in Bellary was 17 rupees in 1929 and 21 rupees in 1935. In 
contrast, the average debt per acre in Tanjore was 116 rupees in 1929 and 86 rupees in 1935.225 
The number of mortgage registrations, at the district level, show similar results. The value of 
mortgages per cropped acre was three times higher in Tanjore when compared to Bellary.226 In 
other words, average landholders in Bellary were more likely to repay loans than average holders 
in Tanjore, as they benefitted from scale. Lower risk-bearing economies of scale in Tanjore led to 
higher default rates in comparison to dry regions.  
 
Table 2.9 Annual revenue per average landholder, 1929 
Municipality 
Land Size 
(acres) 
Crop 
Annual yield 
(tons per acre) 
Output 
(tons) 
Price (rupees 
per ton) 
Annual Revenue 
(rupees) 
Adoni 10.79 Sorghum 0.25 2.7 75 203 
Shiyali 4.88 Rice 0.48 2.3 171 393 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry 9-12; Statistical Atlas; Agricultural Statistics of India. 
Notes: The author choses one municipality in Bellary (Adoni) and one in Tanjore (Shiyali). Average land size taken 
from the Statistical Atlas. Yields are for 1937 and taken from the Agricultural Statistics of India. This should not bias the 
results for 1930 as yields remained stagnant throughout the period. Output calculated by multiplying yields with land 
size. Price of each crop obtained from the Provincial Banking Enquiry. Surveyors in the Banking Enquiry Committee 
analysed prices from 2 markets in each district across the province in the year 1928-1929. Agriculture in that year was 
not exposed to unpredictable price shocks and therefore reflects an average price from a successful harvest. The 
source provides prices per maund. The author scales up prices to per ton estimates for easier analysis. Annual Revenue 
calculated by multiplying prices with output. The table assumes that cultivators did not diversify cropping patterns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 This analysis assumes that the cultivator in Bellary did not crop-diversify. As discussed, cultivators in dry regions 
diversified more than cultivators in wet regions. This diversification could increase the annual revenue earned by the 
average landholder in Bellary. 
225 The Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee Report and Report on Agricultural Indebtedness arrived at these 
figures by dividing the total lending by number of acres in each village surveyed.  
226 Calculations made by the author. Mortgage loans taken from Report on the Administration of the Registration Department, 
(Madras, 1929); Number of cropped acres taken from Statistical Atlas. 
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Table 2.10 Borrower characteristics in 141 villages, 1935 
Village Type 
Lending per Village 
(rupees) 
Borrowers per 
Household 
Borrowers per 
Lender 
Debt per Borrower 
(rupees) 
All Villages 109,339 0.8 27 206 
Tanjore 59,595 0.8 96 332 
Bellary 39,365 0.4 11 812 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness. 
Notes: Data taken from a credit survey of 141 villages across the province. Between 1 and 16 villages surveyed in each 
district. Lending per Village measured by dividing the total value of lending (including all surveyed villages in the 
district) by the number of villages surveyed. Borrowers per Household measured by dividing the number of borrowers 
by the total number of households in the villages. Borrowers per Lender measured by dividing the number of 
borrowers by the number of moneylenders (agriculturist and professional included). Debt per Borrower measured by 
dividing the total lending by the number of borrowers. Calculations made by the author. 
 
Creditors selectively allocated credit to the large landholders in the dry districts, whereas lending 
was less risk-averse in the wet districts. As the borrower’s default risk reduced inversely to scale of 
landownership, excluding poor borrowers was one way for lenders to mitigate the risk of lending 
in the dry districts. Inequality in landownership was higher in the dry districts compared to the wet 
regions. In Bellary, for example, land was either owned by poor peasants in several scattered 
holdings under five acres or owned in 20-acre estates and above by large landowners.227 Lenders 
excluded smallholders in dry areas because, without the benefit of diversification, these borrowers 
cultivated single crops on poor quality land.228 As illustrated in Table 2.10, the credit market was 
smaller and more concentrated in Bellary, when compared to Tanjore. The volume of money 
credited in Bellary villages was approximately two-thirds the size of total lending in Tanjore 
villages. This money also went to fewer households in the former. As shown, 40 per cent of 
households borrowed in Bellary. In contrast, 80 per cent of households borrowed in Tanjore. 
Similarly, from those registered in 1930, the number of mortgages per acre in Bellary was three 
times lower than the same measure in Tanjore.229 Fewer households borrowed, but the average 
borrowed per borrower in Bellary was almost three times larger than the average borrowed by the 
borrower in Tanjore. This shows than the borrowers in Bellary were richer than the borrowers in 
Tanjore. A survey of credit in the dry Anantapur district provides similar results. From a sample 
of 741 cultivators in the district, 519 borrowed from moneylenders in 1929. The average borrowing 
 
227 Washbrook, “The Commercialisation of Agriculture”, 132-134. 
228 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 15-17. 
229 Report on the Administration of the Registration Department, (Madras, 1931); Statistical Atlas. 
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per capita was 639 rupees, just shy of double the average debt per capita in Tanjore. Explaining 
why this was the case, the surveyor commented that the borrowers, ‘were proprietors of whole or 
part of the land they cultivated and therefore naturally commanded higher credit.’230  The size of 
land mitigated the restrictions of poor quality and enabled larger landowners to borrow in the dry 
regions. Richer peasants in dry areas, with the benefit of crop diversification and insurance against 
volatility, accessed credit and invested in production.231  Poor peasants in dry districts, however, 
did not have access to the credit market, constraining their investment potential. In contrast, 
lending was more inclusive in the wet districts. The data shows that households across income 
categories borrowed in Tanjore.  
Financial fragmentation, in the lack of money market integration between villages, constrained 
lending expansion in dry districts. Writing on rural Indian money markets in 1929, L C Jain notes, 
‘In rural areas the general level of the rates of interest  does not show notable fluctuations….It is 
well known that excess of money in one rural centre in India does not flow, as it should, to an area 
where it may be in defect.’232 In other words, cultivators with disposable income in one village did 
not lend in other villages where money was scarce. 
In short, natural risk, caused by climate fluctuations, affected poor peasants more in dry regions 
compared to poor peasants in wet districts. However, natural risk affected rich peasants in dry 
districts less than poor peasants in wet districts. In other words, low growth and stagnant 
inequality, particularly in the dry districts, was a problem. However, climate volatility and poor 
land quality, was the root of this problem. The constrained money market, with further constraints 
after bad years, restricted investment potential for poor peasants, especially in the dry districts. 
This makes the response from government puzzling. As subsequent chapters show, colonial and 
post-colonial governments constrained the money market further, in an attempt to alleviate 
poverty by further reducing access to credit for the rural poor. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
  
Fragmented credit markets give us reason to imagine villages in Madras as self-contained monetary 
units. External borrowing was limited as commercial and indigenous banks did not lend in the 
villages. Cultivators with disposable income were the only source of credit. In this context, one 
 
230 Provincial Banking Enquiry Vol III, 1046. 
231 According to the Provincial Banking Enquiry, land sales were also more likely when the size of land was larger in 
the dry districts. 
232 L C Jain, Indigenous Banking in India, (London, 1929), 99. 
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interpretation of the problem might be that credit monopolies restricted money supply and hiked 
interest rates. However, this does not explain the problem fully. Indeed, liquidity was constrained 
and credit relatively scarce because changes in the volume of money in each village was significantly 
correlated with the profitability of agriculture. The credit market operated seasonally. Supply 
expanded after good years and declined after bad years. The frequency of bad years simultaneously 
increased default rates and restrained the money market in villages.  
In this context, creditors faced different levels of risk depending on the region in which they 
were lending. Rice was cultivated in the districts located near fertile river beds. Districts in the drier 
hinterland offered soil and climate conditions that suited millet and, in some cases, cotton and 
groundnut cultivation. Smallholders in wet districts were better able to manage climate volatility 
than smallholders in dry districts. However, scale offered a distinct advantage to the cultivators in 
dry districts. Costs per acre of cultivation were lower in the dry districts, and reduced inversely to 
land size. Further, larger landholders were able to insure against climate risk by diversifying and 
rotating cropping patterns. The chapter shows that large landholders in dry districts were more 
likely to repay loans than the smallholders in both wet and dry districts.  
Creditors mitigated risk by selectively lending in the dry districts. Cultivators across income 
categories borrowed in the wet districts, however, lenders provided credit only to the richer 
cultivators in the dry districts. Credit markets in the Bellary district were smaller and more 
concentrated than credit markets in the Tanjore district. As a result, default rates were higher in 
the wet districts than in the dry districts. These findings corroborate the credit rationing theories 
put forward by development economists. Moneylenders in rural Madras managed risk by 
selectively choosing their clients, rather than by increasing interest rates.  
This chapter shows that geography played an important role in the relationship between rural 
credit and inequality. Contradicting previous studies, this chapter suggests that size of 
indebtedness, interest rates and default rates are not strong indicators of credit market structure 
or rural inequality in Madras. The poor had access to credit in the areas with more favourable 
geographical conditions to cultivate than the poor in the dry areas. Peasants in the dry areas, 
therefore, had limited potential to invest owing to limited credit access, perpetuating poverty in 
these areas over time. Investment rates were low in the dry areas and high in the wet areas, resulting 
in persistent regional inequality. Policies to artificially irrigate the wet areas, and limited policy 
initiatives to irrigate the dry areas, seem to have exacerbated the problem in the colonial period. 
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Chapter 3. Contract Enforcement and Credit 
Pricing in the 1930s 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
How did moneylenders enforce the repayment of loans in colonial Madras? Informal, private 
negotiations were one method. Contracts and negotiated instruments were another. Mortgages 
and promissory notes were two typically used contracts in rural credit markets in Madras. Courts 
emerged and spread in the nineteenth century while laws enforced at different points in the 
nineteenth and early-twentieth century regulated the types of contracts used. Land and tax laws, 
implemented in the early-nineteenth century and amended in the early-twentieth century, regulated 
the use of mortgage instruments. The laws stipulated the proprietary rights of landowners and 
tenants. These rights differed depending on the region and type of land tax arrangement. 
Nineteenth century contract laws regulated the use of promissory notes. The 1872 India Contract 
Act and 1881 Negotiable Instruments Act included guidelines on the use of promissory notes in 
credit transactions. Mortgages and promissory notes had one uniting factor: Both contracts were 
enforced in courts. Economic historians tell us that poorly designed laws and rising court cases 
made judicial proceedings expensive in colonial India.233 Economic theory tells us that creditors 
price the costs of enforcement into interest rates on loan transactions.234 In doing so, creditors 
transfer dispute costs to the borrower. This chapter expands on both assessments, demonstrating 
that creditors in 1930s Madras increased prices when enforcing region-specific contracts in courts.  
Contracts, and the costs of enforcing them, played an important role in the decisions made by 
rural creditors. Writing in 1954, Frank Moore suggests that expensive court proceedings 
contributed to the high overhead costs borne by private moneylenders in rural India.235 Indeed, 
indigenous bankers cited enforcement costs as a sufficient reason to not lend in the Madras 
countryside but in the Burmese plantations instead. In an interview with the Provincial Banking 
 
233 On land laws and mortgages, see Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy. On contract laws and negotiated 
instruments, see Martin, “Between Informality and Formality”. 
234 Bottomley, “Interest Rate Determination”; Besley, “How Do Market Failures Justify Interventions in Rural Credit 
Markets?". 
235 Frank J, Moore, "Money-Lenders and Co-Operators in India." Economic Development and Cultural Change 2, no. 2 
(1954): 139-59, 140-141. 
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Enquiry Committee, one Chettiar banker claimed, ‘I know in Southern India cases have taken ten 
years and sometimes even centuries to be finally decided.’236 The agriculturist moneylenders were 
not as deterred by the enforcement cost problem. Creditors had personal relationships with 
borrowers and could enforce repayments more easily than urban credit businesses. When creditors 
failed to obtain repayments with informal arbitration, contract laws allowed creditors to enforce 
repayments through courts while charging the borrower higher interest rates to account for court 
and legal fees. In this context, the chapter shows that enforcing promissory notes generated a 
lower set of expenses than enforcing mortgages. 
Creditors used contracts depending on the type of client and size of loans. This chapter finds 
that the relationship between loan size and the cost of enforcing the contract determined whether 
creditors used mortgages or promissory notes in rural Madras.  The size of loans, a combination 
of the principal and interest, needed to be high enough to satisfy the cost of enforcing contracts 
in courts. Large loans to rich landowners satisfied court enforcement more easily than small loans 
to poor peasants. As a result, loans to the poor were, at least on first issue, unsecured and enforced 
informally. Only when the size of loans compounded, high enough to satisfy the costs of contract 
enforcement, did creditors attach contracts to loans. On initial default, creditors extended the 
primary loans with the added protection of a promissory note. On additional default, creditors 
upgraded the promissory note to a mortgage instrument. Informal enforcement was the cheapest 
form. Enforcing promissory notes was more expensive while executing land transfers generated 
the highest costs.  
Creditors enforced repayment on loans to the poor through a three-stage ‘loan upgrading’ 
process, where each stage generated a higher level of enforcement costs. As illustrated in Table 
3.2, when defaults inflated small loans to a size high enough to allow it, creditors upgraded 
unsecured loans to contracted ones. Lenders transmitted the costs of enforcing these contracts to 
higher interest rates. Expensive contract enforcement highlights the inverse relationship between 
transaction costs and equity in rural credit. Indian courts offered expensive judicial protection to 
moneylenders. Borrowers absorbed these high costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
236 Cited in Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, 283. 
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Table 3.1 Loan size and credit instrument 
Borrower Category Principal Size Credit Instrument Interest Rates 
Rich High Mortgage Low 
Poor Low Unsecured High 
 
Table 3.2 Multi-layered enforcement in Madras 
Credit Instrument Enforcement Type Enforcement Cost Price Increase 
Unsecured Informal Low Stagnant 
Promissory Note Courts Rising Mild 
Mortgage Courts High High 
 
This study of the relative use of credit contracts is novel. So far, the historiography has focused 
separately on either the design of land laws or the design of contract laws, and the impact of these 
on the use of negotiated instruments. Much of this literature considers the impact of weak property 
rights on the use of mortgages and the vague instruction contract laws gave to traders and judges 
in Indian courts as a discouraging factor in the use of Hundis or indigenous financial instruments. 
Both types of instrument shared the enforcement problem and rather than study these 
independently, this chapter introduces the importance of enforcement costs in explaining the type 
of contract lenders used in credit transactions. Whereas enforcement and mortgages have been 
studied in some detail, promissory notes are under-researched despite their frequent use in rural 
credit markets in colonial Madras.  
The chapter analyses land laws and contract laws as well as new material from administration 
reports, judicial reports and credit surveys in the early 1930s. The price crash makes the early 1930s 
a useful period to study enforcement in rural credit. Enforcement problems were most acute when 
repayment rates were low. Indeed, default rates were high in the early 1930s. Unable to recover 
loans informally, creditors provided loan extensions with attached contracts and ultimately relied 
on courts to enforce repayment. The need for formal enforcement entrenched the multi-layered 
lending structure during this period. The early 1930s presents an additional benefit of the market 
being unregulated. As discussed in the next chapter, this distinctive loan and enforcement structure 
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in Madras explains why credit intervention in the late 1930s failed to have the desired impact. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first considers the evolution of courts and judicial 
proceedings in colonial India. The second and third analyse the market for mortgage and 
contracted credit in late 1920s and early 1930s Madras. The final section provides an analytical 
framework of the transmission of enforcement costs on the prices of credit in the multi-layered 
loan format. 
 
3.2 The Evolution of Courts  
 
The East India Company established courts to resolve civil and criminal disputes across provinces 
in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century. Panchayats or local village administrations were 
forums for civil disputes in the period prior to the expansion of Company rule.237 Company 
officials abolished Panchayats and replaced them with a centralised court structure in the eighteenth 
century. The Company organised Royal Courts in 1727 under Royal Charter from the King. 
Warren Hastings transplanted the court model, establishing a three-tier court structure in the 
Company-controlled Indian provinces. Hastings was originally a military leader, playing a vital 
leadership role in the Company’s acquisition of Bengal from Mughal rulers. Hastings led forces 
that accompanied regiments led by Robert Clive and Hector Munro in the famous Battle of Plassey 
in 1757 and Battle of Buxar in 1764. The Company appointed Hastings the first Governor of the 
Bengal Presidency, a position that extended to all Company-controlled provinces in the 1770s. In 
this administrative position, Hastings established district and provincial Company courts in 
1772.238 District courts were the primary forum for rural disputes. Provincial courts heard appeals 
from district courts. The ‘federal’ Sadar Adalat heard final appeal proceedings under Company 
Rule.239 Provincial administrators hired British judges to administer company proceedings in the 
courts. The Company created two Sadar Adalats, separated according to civil and criminal 
proceedings. Judges in the Sadar Dewani Adalat settled civil cases while those in Sadar Nizamat 
Adalats resolved criminal disputes. The Company transplanted this structure to Madras in 1802. 
Some company officials in early nineteenth century Madras believed that the replacement of 
indigenous administrative procedures with colonial legal institutions was not an entirely successful 
initiative. Spearheading this criticism was Thomas Munro. Munro played an important role in the 
 
237 Panchayat literally translates to ‘assembly’ and describes a form of village administration where a group of 
administrators solve disputes and implement local reforms within villages across rural India.  
238 Mootham, The East India Company’s Sadar Courts, 3-5. 
239 Sadar Adalat translates to ‘Main Court’ and was the top provincial court until 1857. 
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conquest of Madras. Under Munro’s leadership, the company army gained vast territory in the 
battles against Tipu Sultan and the Nizam of Hyderabad in the late eighteenth century. Following 
victorious battles, the company promoted Munro to administrative positions. The company 
ultimately promoted Munro to Governor of Madras in 1819. In this position, Munro attempted to 
devolve some judicial power to pre-colonial indigenous administrations. The organization of 
company courts, according to Munro, was ‘too great a departure from native institutions to work 
with success.’240 As Governor, Munro enforced two policy changes to courts. 
The first was changes in rules relating to the selection of judges in Sadar Adalats. Provincial 
governors and members of the provincial council were also judges in Sadar Adalats in the late-
eighteenth century. In 1807, Company officials altered the composition of court benches to include 
a chief judge and two puisne judges. The Chief Judge was a member of the governing council while 
the others were not required to be members of the provincial government.  The selection criteria 
of judges underwent significant changes under Munro’s Governorship.241 Munro recognized the 
importance of judicial experience in the selection criteria for the appointment of judges. Though 
the Chief Judge was a legislator, Munro enforced a minimum qualification barrier for puisne judges 
to ensure Sadar Adalats were administered by those that have prior experience in lower provincial 
courts.242 The Company selected judges in lower courts from the civil or government service. 
Despite having judicial experience, these judges were civil servants by training. In 1825, Munro 
increased the number of puisne judges in the Madras Sadar Adalats to three in order to avoid delays 
in judgements. 
The second judicial policy change in the early nineteenth century referred to the official role of 
the Panchayat. During his tenure as Governor of Madras, Munro believed that successful control 
required the merging of British forms of administration with indigenous Indian institutions.243 He 
criticised the abolishment of indigenous forms of justice administration. Munro believed that the 
introduction of pre-colonial forms of village administration would legitimise Company rule 
through decentralised power centres. According to his memoirs, 
 
Munro strongly advocated the revival of the native institution called ' panchayat ' — a court 
of arbitration composed of five or more persons — and the transfer of the duty of 
superintending the police from the Judge to the Collector, who, moving frequently about 
his district, and mixing with the people, had better means of effectively supervising the police 
than were available to a stationary judicial officer. The union, for similar reasons, of the 
 
240 Arbuthnot, Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, 109. 
241 Mootham, The East India Company’s Sadar Courts, 104-107. 
242 Mootham, The East India Company’s Sadar Courts, 104-107. 
243 Arbuthnot, Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, 109. 
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offices of Collector and Magistrate, and the utilization of the village officials to deal with 
petty offences and with petty suits, were also included in his proposals.244  
  
Following the transfer of powers to the Crown in 1857, colonial officials attempted further 
fusions of western and indigenous institutional structures. Sadar Adalats were abolished and High 
Courts were established across provinces. Dual justice structures under the Sadar Adalat system 
were streamlined to single appellate courts. Village panchayats were revived through various reforms 
in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century. The 1871 Mayo Resolution and Lord Rippon’s 
resolution in 1882 legitimised village administrations and devolved local policymaking to panchayats. 
The 1907 Royal Commission increased the power of panchayats to deal with petty civil disputes, 
including credit defaults.245  
Despite its revival, the official role of the panchayat was limited by the end of the colonial rule. 
By the 1950s, ‘the chief work of the panchayat,’ was the provision of some public goods through 
the construction of roads and wells and the administration of civil disputes, including credit 
defaults that were too small to be considered in courts.246 Credit defaults were more commonly 
heard in district courts with the High Court as the main forum of appeal. Rural credit disputes 
were initiated in small cause courts prior to entering a hierarchy of appellate courts including lower 
and higher district courts with a final forum of appeal at the provincial high court.247 Colonial 
governments supplemented this transition in the court structure with changes in the rules for judge 
selection. The 1861 High Court Act and the 1935 Government of India Act specified minimum 
qualification experience for judges to qualify in Indian courts. British barristers qualified as high 
court judges only with prior judicial experience in colonial India.248 
Enforcement in rural credit markets followed changes in the structure of courts. By 1850, rural 
credit disputes were governed by courts rather than customary law and village administration. 
 
244 Arbuthnot, Major-General Sir Thomas Munro, 109. 
245 The decentralisation of judicial power to Panchayat has prompted some debate on whether its revival marks a 
continuity or discontinuity of indigenous legal organisation. Galanter, “The Aborted Restoration”, argues that the 
newly revived Panchayat marks a discontinuity in legal traditions as it was governed by a newly formed group of legal 
agents with a vested interest in maintaining the transition to colonial forms of justice. Abraham, “Colonial Law in 
Early British Malabar”, argues in favour of a discontinuity in legal structures. Abraham emphasises the creation of a 
court hierarchy, the appointment of court registrars to ensure the functioning of court procedure, appointments of 
trained attorneys, the issuing of summons and recording case trials. However, Abraham also suggests that this 
transition was weakened by the recruitment of local judges, magistrates, court officials and staff. Customs of caste and 
religion influenced the directives issued by judges. 
246 Rural Credit Survey Vol. II, 76. 
247 Cases from high courts could appeal to the Privy Council in London, the Federal Court after its inception in 1934 
and the Supreme Court post-independence. However, there were stringent conditions on the admittance of disputes 
in the Privy Council. Cases above a certain value could qualify.  Credit disputes rarely qualified for appeal in a court 
higher than the provincial high court. 
248 Part IX, Chapter 2, Government of India Act 1935. 
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Contracts substituted social capital as methods of risk mitigation. Lenders reported first time 
defaulters in civil courts. Kranton and Swamy argue that moneylenders in the Bombay Deccan 
were less incentivised to show leniency to defaulters following the transition to courts.249 Writing 
in 1954, Moore believed that, ‘the traditional relationship between creditor and debtor in the Indian 
village was upset by the introduction of the British legal system. Customary limitations on interest 
gave way to enforceable contracts legalizing unlimited compounding interest.’250  
Were contracts easily enforceable in courts? Did they come at a cost to the moneylender? 
Moneylenders in Madras used different versions of contract. Mortgages functioned separately 
from loans that were contracted but not secured by immovable property. Subsequent sections in 
this chapter discuss variations in the design, use and cost of credit contracts. 
 
3.3 The Mortgage Market  
 
Land tax was an important source of revenue for the East India Company and later the British 
crown-ruled government. The East India Company extended forms of land taxes enforced during 
Mughal rule. In agreement with rich landlords in Bengal, the Company enforced the Permanent 
Settlement agreement in 1793. According to the agreement, large estates remained under the 
ownership of pre-colonial elite households. The Company taxed these households, based on the 
size of the land owned, and the landlords divided their land into plots and leased these out to 
multiple tenants. The tenants cultivated the land. The Company extended this tax structure to the 
Madras Presidency in 1802. However, under Munro’s governorship, the company administration 
made changes to the tax structure in Madras from the 1820s. Munro’s government excluded the 
intermediary and implemented a structure allowing the Company to tax the cultivator directly. The 
strength of property rights followed the tax structure in colonial India. 
By 1900, three structures of tax and ownership operated in the province. First, the Ryotwari 
tenure provided ownership rights to the government. The government fixed land taxes for a period 
of thirty years and collected this directly from the cultivator.251 Second, in Zamindari settlements, 
pre-colonial elites retained the proprietorship of landed estates. As proprietors of this land, the 
owners of landed estates were charged a permanently decided land revenue payment or peishkash. 
The vast tracts of land owned by zamindars were divided into individual plots and leased to 
 
249 The authors argue that the presence of courts increased competition in the credit market but punishments on 
defaulters were more severe than the preceding period where lenders relied on informal enforcement mechanisms. 
250 Moore, “Moneylenders and Co-operators”, 142. 
251 Madras State Administration Report, (Madras, 1947), 87. 
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cultivators at a privately determined rent. Third, colonial governments granted proprietorship over 
tracts of land to regional nobility in the Inam or Jagir structure. Inamdars provided military and 
policing services to the colonial government in return while leasing cultivated land to individual 
tenants. In determining the strength of property rights, there were two systems of land ownership 
in colonial India. The government-cultivator structure provided proprietorship to individual 
cultivators. The government-owner-tenant structure provided proprietorship to non-cultivating 
landlords.  
Land titles were comparatively secure in the government-cultivator structure. The government 
divided land into fields. Each field varied in size but were commonly between five and ten acres 
in Madras.252 Cultivators divided holdings and fields with physical boundaries. Local revenue 
departments taxed each subdivided holding. The government attached a title document or patta to 
each holding. The patta was a quasi-contract, confirming the cultivator’s fiscal obligation to the 
government.253 Each patta specified the name of occupant, size of holding and extent of tax 
assessment for the occupied landholding.254 The revenue collectors in the provincial government 
reviewed pattas annually to document changes in landownership. The pattas ultimately acted as 
transferable property titles.  Transfers in the ownership of land required revisions in this title to 
reflect the obligations of the new landholder.255 While the government de jure owned ryotwari lands, 
the pattas allowed for an active land market from the mid-nineteenth century. Cultivators de facto 
owned the land they cultivated. Cultivators commonly collateralised pattas to obtain credit. 
Titles were more complicated in government-owner-tenant settlements. The government 
issued proprietary rights to landlords. The government attached one condition to this 
proprietorship, that the landlord met their tax obligation for the entire period of ownership.256 The 
government issued similar pattas, but to the landlords instead of the cultivators. The pattas in the 
government-owner structure were stronger than those provided to government-cultivators. 
Government-owner titles confirmed the landowner’s proprietorship of the estate whereas 
government-cultivator titles inferred ownership through identifying the fiscal responsibility of the 
landholder.257 The permanent occupiers of zamindari land were tenants charged with a rent 
 
252 State Administration Report, 87-88. 
253 Report of the Economist, 7. 
254 State Administration Report, 87-88. 
255 Despite its primary function as a tax statement, the patta also served as the confirmation of a landholder’s title. 
Transfers in ownership were reflected in this title. 
256 The pattas issued to zamindars were stronger than ryotwari settlements as they confirmed their proprietary 
ownership of the estate rather than inferring ownership through the fiscal responsibility of the landholder. 
257 Report of the Economist, 7. 
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determined by the landlord.258 This structure of owner and quasi-tenant complicated the 
transferability of land in these settlements. 
Zamindars and inamdars benefitted from rent rather than cultivation profits. Landlords and 
tenants privately determined rents in these settlements. The rents were commonly higher than land 
taxes. Landlords profited from the difference between the rent charged to their tenant and the tax 
paid to the government.259 According to one government report,  
 
the ryots in zamindari tracts are not so well off as those in government taluks. They are 
generally required to pay their rental in grain which, as a rule, represents half the gross 
produce of the lands cultivated by them; and the zamindars ordinarily lease out their villages 
yearly in auction to middle men who have no interest in the welfare of the ryots and try to 
rack rent them.260 
 
As such, landowners were not incentivised to invest in improving land quality. Investment into 
improvements in production techniques and agricultural infrastructure was low throughout the 
colonial period.261 The previous chapter, for instance, records the low levels of private investment 
in irrigation infrastructure. Despite possessing transferrable titles, landowners in zamindari estates 
rarely mortgaged land or borrowed on the credit market.262 Tenants in zamindari estates were unable 
to borrow on the credit market. Tenant titles in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
were weaker and less tradable than titles possessed by landowners.263  
However, the distinct features of land tax in the province partially solved the problem. Ryotwari 
or government-cultivator settlements formed the ‘principal tenure of the province.’264 According 
to government reports, cultivators owned 90.09 million acres of rural land in 1930. Government-
cultivator arrangement accounted for 60.05 million acres while the owner-tenant arrangement 
existed in 23.6 million acres. An accurate identification of the regional variation in land tenure 
arrangements is a challenging task. Different tenure arrangements commonly existed within 
municipalities and occasionally within villages.265 Indeed, out of 241 recorded municipalities, 40 
 
258 Zamindars often leveraged on the income from rent rather than cultivation. Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy, 
show that zamindars gained their surplus through the difference between the rent charged to the tenant and the tax 
owed to the colonial state. Land revenue was a fixed annual cost while rent increased over time. 
259 A M Khusro, “Land Reforms since Independence”, In V B Singh, Economic History of India, 1857-1956, (Bombay, 
1965), 181. 
260 Statistical Atlas, 40. 
261 Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy in Colonial India, 61. 
262 Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy in Colonial India, 47. 
263 Report of the Economist, 7-8. 
264 State Administration Report, 87. 
265 This challenges some existing literature that makes broad regional assumptions about regional variation in land 
tenure structure. Banerjee and Iyer, “History, Institutions and Economic Performance”, for example, identify 
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reported to be aligned with one tenure arrangement. Land ownership in the Berhampur 
municipality in the Ganjam district highlights the complex nature of this sub-regional variation. In 
1930, there were 230 ryotwari villages, 57 imam villages and 178 zamindari villages.266 However, the 
evidence shows the dominance of one arrangement over another. Either by acreage or by number 
of aligned municipalities, data from official reports classified three-quarters of rural land under the 
government-cultivator tenure arrangement. 
 
Figure 3.1 Acreage by tenure arrangement, 1930 
 
Source: Statistical Atlas. 
Notes: Data on acreage per municipality aggregated to the provincial level. Data corresponds to the total number of 
acres owned, sub-classified by the type of land tenure arrangement. Calculations made by the author. 
 
Table 3.3 Land tenure in municipalities, 1930 
Total 
Municipalities 
Entirely 
Ryotwari 
Majority 
Ryotwari 
Entirely 
Zamindari 
Majority 
Zamindari 
241 32 149 8 52 
Source: Statistical Atlas. 
Notes: Data corresponds to the total number of acres owned, sub-classified by the type of land tenure arrangement 
within each municipality in the province. The source identifies the number of acres declared as ‘owned’ while reporting 
the number under each tax classification. ‘Entirely Ryotwari’ measures the number of municipalities where the ratio of 
ryotwari land to total land owned was 1. ‘Majority Ryotwari’ measures the number of municipalities where the ratio of 
ryotwari land to total land owned was above 0.5. The same exercise was constructed for Zamindari municipalities. 
Zamindari municipalities include inam tenure arrangements. The data includes semi-autonomous Agencies. These were 
tribal areas in the Vizagapatam district and a collection of zamindari owned lands in the Ganjam district. Calculations 
made by the author.  
 
Provincial laws in the colonial and post-colonial period attempted to address the problem in 
the remaining one-quarter of land classified under the owner-tenant arrangement. The provincial 
government enforced laws to strengthen the rights of tenants in zamindari settlements. This 
followed legal cases in the late nineteenth century where landowners questioned the rights of 
 
‘landlord’ and ‘non-landlord’ land tenure arrangements by districts. This ignores large variation within municipalities 
and villages. 
266 Statistical Atlas.  
 Ryotwari
 Zamindari
 Inam
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tenants to securitize leased land in return for credit. Judges ruled in favour of tenants as they were 
not ‘tenants at will’. Judges believed that the occupation of zamindari land provided cultivating 
tenants with stronger rights than tenants in ryotwari areas.267  
The provincial government supported this view and enforced the Madras Estates Land Act in 
1908. The Act provided tradable occupancy rights to tenants in zamindari areas.268 According to 
Section 6 of the act, occupiers or cultivators in ‘possession’ of land had the ‘permanent right of 
occupancy in his holding.’269 In terms of transferability, Section 10 of the Act stated that, ‘all rights 
of occupancy shall be heritable and shall be transferable by sale, gift or otherwise.’270 G. S. Forbes, 
a member of the provincial government, proposed the Madras Estates Land Bill in 1905.271 Forbes 
believed the Bill would allow tenants to leverage on their occupancy right to borrow and invest on 
cultivated land.272 The aim of the legislation was to provide tenants on zamindari settlement with 
the equivalent protection as given to ryotwari landholders.273 The act strengthened tenancy 
protection by limiting the landowner’s ability to exploit tenants through high rents. Sections 26, 
27 and 28 of the Madras Estates Bill exercised limitations to short term rent increases. 
Theoretically, this improved the borrowing capacity of tenants cum cultivators.  
The 1908 Act empowered tenants to borrow externally on the credit market. In practice, 
absentee landlords were also present in ryotwari areas. Urban or non-cultivating landowners 
benefitted from land rents rather than the profitability of cultivation. This perverse incentive 
restricted productive investment in rural areas. The Madras Estates Act partially eroded this 
investment barrier as tenants benefitted from rent ceilings and were encouraged to access credit 
through mortgage instruments. 
Tenant protection eventually culminated in a complete detachment from colonial land tenure 
arrangements post-independence. Nationalists and members of the newly formed Indian 
government believed that permanent occupiers continued to be exploited by rent-seeking zamindars 
 
267 Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy in Colonial India, 46-47. 
268 The Madras Estates Land Act also strengthened tenancy protection by restricting the zamindar’s ability to exploit 
tenants through high rents. Sections 26, 27 and 28 enforce restrictions on short term rent increases. 
269 Section 6, Madras Estates Land Act 1908. 
270 Section 10, Madras Estates Land Act 1908. 
271 George Stuart Forbes graduated from Aberdeen University and joined the Indian Civil Service in 1871. Forbes 
held positions in the Madras administration including Secretary to the British Resident in Hyderabad, Secretary to 
Berar and Chief Secretary to the Governor of Madras. Between 1906 and 1909, Forbes served on the Madras 
Legislative Council. 
272 Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St. George, (Madras, 1905). 
273 Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy in Colonial India, 62. 
94 
 
despite changes in tenant laws at the turn of the century.274 The provincial government in Madras 
implemented land reforms that replaced the colonial Permanent Settlement structure. The majority 
of provincial governments across India implemented similar laws during the decade following 
1947.   
The 1948 Madras Estates Act abolished the government-owner-tenant land ownership 
structure. The provincial government took temporary ownership of the settlements under this 
category. Local departments then redistributed the ownership of sub-holdings to permanent 
occupiers.275 Zamindars were entitled to ownership of the land they cultivated. The government 
provided tenants ownership if they were permanent cultivators.276 The government hoped that this 
redistributive legislation would abolish the exploitation of cultivating tenants and reward 
permanently settled agriculturists. The government provided new landholders with stronger land 
titles. Section 12 of the Madras Estates Act stipulated that, ‘in the case of zamindari estate, the 
landholder shall with effect on and from notified date be entitled to a ryotwari patta.’277 The 
provincial government converted the opaque ownership structure of zamindari settlements into 
more cemented property titles, as previously existed in government-cultivator settlements. This 
then provided a greater clarity of ownership and hence theoretically increased the negotiability of 
titles to obtain credit.  
The result of the government-cultivator tenure structure and the reversal of eighteenth-century 
land laws was that property titles were not much of a barrier to mortgage lending in rural Madras. 
Even in the early twentieth century, during the colonial period, the number of disputed land 
transfers due to the strength of titles was low. Courts typically ratified land transfers. Judges 
amended titles and new owners registered titles in government registration offices. When titles 
were weak or unenforceable, judges rejected the sales or mortgages of land. This practice was rare 
in Madras, suggesting that titles were not a barrier to land transfers. In 1928, for example, court 
judges reversed 70 land purchases for invalid land titles. The government reported over one million 
 
274 Khusro, “Land Reforms since Independence”, 181. 
275 The impact of this reform has inspired debate on inequality post-independence. For example, Chattopadhyay, 
Suhas, "On the Class Nature of Land Reforms in India since Independence." Social Scientist 2, no. 4 (1973): 3-24, 
highlights the persistence in rural inequality as the share of land owned by smallholder cultivators did not increase 
after 1948. Chattopadhyay expands and suggests that zamindars retained absentee landholdings through benami 
ownership. Benami, in this context, refers to a version of fraud where zamindars retained the ownership of land after 
land reform laws by registering titles under the ownership of their relatives or close friends. The widespread practice 
of this fraud, according to Chattopadhyay, restricted the impact of land reforms on wealth redistribution. 
276 Chattopadhyay, “On the Class Nature of Land Reforms in India since Independence”, 3-5. 
277 Section 12, Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion to Ryotwari) Act 1948. 
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mortgage and sale transactions in the same year.278 If not titles, then did the value of land 
discourage mortgage lending? 
There were two other barriers to mortgage lending in Madras.279 First, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, the quality of land encouraged or deterred mortgages and sales. Non-irrigated 
and low-quality soil reduced the value and tradability of land. Second, creditors were discouraged 
from mortgage lending as they were afraid of inheriting unpaid tax obligations with the possession 
of new property. Indeed, cultivators defaulting on mortgages also defaulted on taxes. If not 
mortgaged, revenue officers in municipality governments auctioned land with unpaid taxes 
attached. The tax inheritance either deterred sales or significantly reduced the auction-price of 
these lands. According to the Madras Estates Land Act Committee’s report, ‘for an arrear of one 
rupee, land worth Rs. 100 is brought to auction and taken for a very low price.’280 According to an 
account by the Deputy Registrar of the Bellary district in 1929, the sale price of red soil land in 
government auctions was between five and 25 rupees. This was between a half and a quarter of 
the sale price in private negotiations.281 Both barriers affected some regions more than others. Poor 
peasants in dry regions were most affected by bad quality land and tax defaults. According to 
Washbrook, labourers and tenants in Bellary were discouraged from owning land as, ‘independent 
farm production brought only tax-bills.’282  
As demonstrated in Figure 3.2, annual or short-term shifts in the supply of mortgage loans in 
the early twentieth century responded to shifts in commodity prices. As annual growth in yields 
was low, the size and value of the harvest determined the prosperity of the cultivator. The 
cultivator’s revenue can be measured as crop output multiplied by the trade price of the crop. 
Annual increase in output or prices increased the cultivator’s revenue. Two factors explain why 
creditors were more likely to provide mortgage loans in years with commodity price increases. 
First, borrowers saw increases in revenue and were more likely to repay loans. Second, increase in 
 
278 Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1929, 5. 
279 There is a third barrier which is not discussed in the main text: Land fragmentation. Misshapen plots or multiple 
and disconnected plots in a single holding were potential barriers to mortgage lending. Official reports suggest, 
however, that this problem was uncommon in Madras. On land fragmentation, the Provincial Banking Enquiry reports, 
‘These conditions, however, do not seem to prevail to any great extent in this Presidency. Holdings undoubtedly are 
fragmented and there is nothing uncommon about a ryot having half a dozen different plots but it is not the rule and 
though it is common for the ryot to have three plots it is uncommon to have many more.’ The report proceeds to 
suggest that land sales consolidated landholdings in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. According to the 
report, the rich reported fragmentation, but this was because they owned multiple and cultivable plots of land in 
different parts of the village. See Provincial Banking Enquiry, 18-19. 
280 Madras Estates Land Act Committee Report: Part I, (Madras, 1939),187. Hereafter source referred to as MELAC Report. 
281 Provincial Banking Enquiry Vol III, 1014. 
282 Washbrook, “The Commercialisation of Agriculture”, 137. 
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the value of commodities meant an increase in the value of land. This incentivised creditors to 
provide new mortgage loans or upgrade previously unsecured loans to mortgages. 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates that the difference in mortgages between year n and year n-1 
corresponded to the difference in prices in the same years. The chapter suggests that the swift 
response of supply to price shocks was driven by the short-term structure of the credit market. As 
loans were provided seasonally, lenders withheld or increased credit supply in response to yearly 
shifts in prices. Expectations of price changes from shocks such as droughts were reflected in 
credit supply. 
 
Figure 3.2 Annual shifts in mortgage loans and commodity prices, 1911-1933 
 
Source: Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1911-1933; McAlpin, “Price Movements”. 
Notes: The graph measures annual changes in the number of mortgage loans and McAlpin’s commodity price index. 
The author collected data on the annual number of mortgages in each district and aggregated this to the provincial 
level. The author calculates annual changes by taking the difference between the number of mortgage loans in year n 
and the number of mortgage loans in year n-1. The same method is applied to calculating changes in the commodity 
price index. Base year for mortgages and prices is 1911. The first point in the graph is the difference in mortgages and 
prices between 1911 and 1912. The graph stops at 1933 as recovery from the Depression began in 1934. The 
government installed a series of credit regulations from 1935 which affected the mortgage market. These factors are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Annual movements in prices and mortgage supply saw large upward and downward shifts after 
the First World War and during the Great Depression. The inflationary trend after the war led to 
a short-term increase in the number of mortgages. The value of land increased in 1918 owing to 
higher demand. The increase in land transfers after the First World War occurred because of a 
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‘revival in trade’ and ‘investment in land of the savings of a large number of demobilised men.’283 
In contrast, deflationary pressures during the global Depression drove down the number of 
mortgages in the province. Commodity prices declined by 20 per cent between 1929 and 1930, 
and 31 per cent between 1930 and 1931. The number of mortgage loans declined by 8 per cent 
and 12 per cent in the same years. The number of mortgage loans in 1933 was 27 per cent lower 
than the number provided in 1927. The provincial government corroborated this trend. According 
to one official report, 
 
Prices of the staple products in the various districts have considerably fallen and 
consequently the value of the land on the whole has very much decreased, the result being 
that creditors are not able to realize their moneys nor have they the courage to advance fresh 
loans and the debtors are not able to find purchasers of their properties to clear off their 
debts.284 
 
Moneylenders provided three types of mortgage instruments during the late colonial period. 
First, lenders provided credit secured by mortgage without possession. Agents contracted the 
transfer of land but did not execute the transfer until the borrower defaulted. Borrowers continued 
to cultivate the land until they defaulted. Second, lenders provided usufructuary mortgages or loans 
secured by mortgage with possession. Borrowers transferred the ownership of land to lenders prior 
to loan issue. Lenders took responsibility for cultivating the land until borrowers repaid. Third, 
borrowers provided lenders with a bond or promise of land transfer in the event of default. 
Mortgage without possession was the most common instrument used during the period. Lenders 
rarely provided loans with the obligation of prior possession or bond.  From a government survey 
of 54 villages in 1935, the number of loans secured by mortgage without possession was 2.5 times 
higher than the number of loans secured by both possession and bonds.285  
Lenders commonly provided mortgages as secondary rather than primary loans. As shown in 
Figure 3.3, the purposes of borrowing in the mortgage loan market had some similarities to the 
already identified features of the rural credit market.  Evidence shows that cultivators borrowed 
more production than consumption credit. The value of loans for cultivation and trade were higher 
than the value of loans for marriage. However, the data in Figure 3.3 excludes the loans provided 
for the repayment of prior debts. As illustrated in Figure 3.4, cultivators primarily borrowed in the 
 
283 Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1920, 4. 
284 Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1931, 4. 
285 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 35. Mortgage bonds were more common in loans provided for trade rather than 
cultivation. This reflects the difference in the risk of lending. Bonds were less secure than other mortgage instruments. 
Cultivation was more unpredictable than trade. 
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1930s to repay previously undertaken debt. One factor driving this outcome was that deflationary 
pressures during the Depression increased default rates. Creditors provided loan extensions and 
defaulters re-borrowed on the market to repay previous loans. Another explanation is that 
secondary borrowing was a structural feature of the mortgage market. Lenders were more likely to 
use mortgage instruments following initial defaults. Lenders demanded the transfer of land when 
granting extensions to defaulters. A subsequent section in this chapter demonstrates that this 
feature of the mortgage market is explained by the cost of enforcement. 
 
Figure 3.3 Nominal value of mortgage loans by purpose of borrowing, 1930-1934 
 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 35. 
Notes:  Government commissioned surveyors collected data on mortgage loans in two villages per district, across 27 
districts in the province. The figure excludes data where the source reported the purpose of borrowing as either ‘other’ 
or unidentifiable. ‘Cultivation’ includes borrowing to finance production. ‘Trade’ includes borrowing to finance the 
transport of produce after the harvest. ‘Land Tax’ includes borrowing to specifically pay unpaid tax bills. ‘Marriage’ 
includes borrowing to finance a marriage ceremony. The graph excludes data on borrowings for the repayments of 
prior debts. 
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Figure 3.4 Nominal value of mortgage loans issued to discharge old debts, 1930-1934 
 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 35. 
Notes:  Data scope and source similar to Figure 3.3. ‘Discharging Old Debts’ includes borrowing to repay previous 
loans. ‘All Other’ includes borrowing to finance cultivation, trade, land taxes and marriages. The graph excludes data 
where the source reported the purpose of borrowing as either ‘other’ or unidentifiable. 
 
The Depression had a significant impact on the mortgage market. The supply of credit 
contracted, across borrowing categories, between 1930 and 1934. In this context, the rate of 
decline in cultivation credit was higher than the rate of decline in marriage credit. In other words, 
the supply of investment credit was more inelastic, in response to price shocks, than the supply of 
consumption credit. More importantly, the value of loans borrowed to repay previous debts 
overshadowed other measures by a significant margin. The value of defaulted loans increased at 
the start of the Depression but decreased from 1932. The value of loans for purposes other than 
the discharge of previous debts did not see a similar decline after 1932, implying that the reduction 
in defaults was not driven by a contraction in total supply.  
The high ratio of secondary to primary borrowing in the mortgage market was not entirely a 
Depression driven phenomenon. Indeed, at the onset of the Depression in 1930, the value of 
borrowing to repay prior debts was 14 times higher than the value of borrowing to finance 
cultivation expenses. In 1934, despite increasing prices and the beginning of the recovery from the 
crisis, the value of secondary borrowing was still 11 times higher than the value of productive 
borrowing. In other words, borrowers on the mortgage market were commonly defaulters. 
Lenders provided mortgage loans as secondary loans to defaulters and not working capital loans 
to first time borrowers. 
Data on the average loan terms, from when the loan is issued to when the contract expires or 
matures, of mortgage loans shows that the primary purpose of borrowing on the mortgage market 
was the repayment of defaulted loans. Lenders provided long-term loans of between one and three 
years to high-income borrowers for the purchase of land or large capital expenses. Yet, these loans 
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constituted the minority of total mortgage lending in rural Madras. ‘No term’ was specified on the 
majority of recorded mortgage loans between 1930 and 1934. Lenders deliberately avoided 
declaring specific time periods as a means of increasing their flexibility. As mortgages were 
secondary loans, lenders leveraged on undeclared loan terms to enforce land transfers with short 
notice periods given to borrowers.  
 
Figure 3.5 Value of mortgage loans by time period, 1930-1934 
 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 36. 
Notes:  Government officials collected data on the time span (in years) of mortgage loans in two villages per district, 
across 27 districts. The source categorised data by the annual number of mortgages without possession, mortgages 
with possession and mortgage bonds between 1930 and 1934. Each category shows the volume of lending according 
to time period. The time period measures the number of years between loan issue and loan maturity.  
 
In short, this section demonstrates that property titles were not a barrier to mortgage lending 
in rural Madras. However, lenders provided mortgage instruments as secondary rather than 
primary loans. The questions that remain consider the alternatives to mortgage lending and 
whether lenders secured loans with other forms of contract. To these questions we now turn. 
 
3.4 Contract Law and Rural Credit 
 
The establishment of Crown rule in 1857 brought with it a new legislature. The colonial 
administration divided legislative responsibilities between federal and provincial governments. 
Both governments designed laws while the judiciary enforced these laws. As part of this 
‘formalising’ process, the colonial government, at the federal level, enforced contract laws to 
regulate markets. More specifically, the contract laws regulated indigenous trading instruments or 
Hundis. The term hundi describes a variety of negotiated commercial instruments used in financial 
transactions throughout Indian history. There was non-uniformity in the design of hundi 
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instruments during the colonial period. The colonial government implemented a series of laws to 
unify and regulate diverse hundi arrangements in the late nineteenth century. 286 
The government enforced two contract laws in the late nineteenth century, both of which had 
a significant bearing on the rural credit market. The 1872 India Contract Act (ICA) and the 1881 
Negotiable Instruments Act (NIA) encouraged and regulated the use of contracts in rural credit.287 
The NIA was the colonial government’s attempt at regulating hundi transactions. The act refrained 
from the use of the word hundi but instead attempted to create an accessible law that uniformly 
regulated any negotiated instrument. The act defined a negotiable instrument as, ‘a promissory 
note, a bill of exchange or cheque payable either to order or to bearer.’288 The act further defines 
each instrument as follows: 
 
A promissory note is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) 
containing an unconditional undertaking signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money 
only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. 
 
A bill of exchange is an instrument in writing containing an unconditional order, signed by 
the maker, directing a certain person to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order 
of, a certain person or to the bearer of the instrument. 
 
A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified banker and not expressed to be payable 
otherwise than on demand.289 
 
The challenge for the colonial government was to integrate markets into this formal institutional 
structure. Indeed, an extensive scholarship demonstrates the failures of the colonial state to 
integrate the use of indigenous instruments under the umbrella of unified contract laws.290 Martin 
describes the period 1857-1947 as one of ‘discontinuity’ as the state made attempts to marginalise 
indigenous hundi instruments through a series of codified laws. As a result, judges faced difficulties 
in hearing disputes involving hundi transactions that weren’t adequately regulated in the NIA. 
Judges had a choice between arbitrating based on an applied judicial structure from Britain or the 
use of local precedent to deal with disputes involving hundi instruments.291 Roy provides examples 
 
286 See Abraham, “Colonial Law in Early British Malabar” and Martin, “Project Codification”, for an assessment of 
these laws in failing to account for the diversity of indigenous commercial instruments. 
287 Section 10 of the India Contract Act defined a contract as, ‘All agreements are contracts if they are made by the 
free consent of parties competent to contract for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby 
expressly declared to be void.’ 
288 Section 13, Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 
289 Sections 4 -7, Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 
290 Abraham, “Colonial Law in Early British Malabar”; Martin, “Project Codification”; Roy, “The Monsoon”. 
291Martin, “Project Codification”, 70-73. 
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of hundi transactions used by Chettiar bankers. The Darshani instrument was payable on sight, the 
Muttadi instrument defined a specific period of payment on paper and, what was commonly used 
by Chettiar bankers in this period, a Nadappu or flexible period of repayment dependent on cash 
flow. With each hundi displaying a complexity beyond the structure created in the NIA, judges were 
unprepared to deal with transactions of this nature.292 Colonial administrators seemed aware of 
this problem. However, the government’s solution was to empower agents and judges to classify 
the ambiguous instrument under one of the three categories in the NIA. Section 17 of the NIA 
contained a provision for ‘Ambiguous Instruments’ where, ‘an instrument may be construed either 
as a promissory note or a bill of exchange, the holder may at his election treat it as either and the 
instrument shall be thenceforth treated accordingly.’293 The provision recognized the diversity in 
hundi instruments as it enforced a vague instruction for judges to use the three known instruments 
as the point of comparison for others. In this context, the law designated the promissory note as 
the model instrument in rural credit. 
The key difference between promissory notes and bills of exchange was their tradability. 
Promissory notes were fixed contracts. Referring to contracts in rural credit markets, the NIA 
declared that ‘where a debtor, owing several distinct debts to one person, makes a payment to him, 
either with the express intimation or under circumstances implying, that the payment is to be 
applied to the discharge of some particular debt, they payment if accepted, must be applied 
accordingly.’294 The act referred to a model debt contract as, ‘A owes B, among other debts, 1,000 
rupees upon a promissory note, which falls due on the first June. He owes B no other debt of the 
amount. On the first June A pays to B 1,000 rupees. The payment is to be applied to the discharge 
of the promissory note.’295 By referring to promissory notes as a model example of a debt contract, 
the NIA confirmed its legitimacy as legally binding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
292 Roy, “The Monsoon”, 345-347. 
293 Section 17, Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 
294 Section 59, Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 
295 Section 59, Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. 
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Figure 3.6 Model promissory note in 1930 
 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry Vol. III, 1215. 
 
Despite the varied design of pro-notes used in the credit market, some similar features brought 
this instrument under the purview of nineteenth century contract laws. Figure 3.6 illustrates the 
key characteristics of commonly used promissory notes. In general, lending terms including the 
loan principal, rate of interest and repayment or maturity date were defined on pro-notes. 
Signatures or thumb prints from lenders, borrowers and co-applicants were universal features of 
these contracts. As shown above, the obligation to repay fell on both the borrower and guarantor, 
as illustrated by the wording of ‘me/us’ and ‘I/we’ in Figure 3.6. Borrowers that did not have the 
skills to read promissory notes typically relied on the assistance of teachers in local schools as well 
as village accountants and clerks. According to the Provincial Banking Enquiry, borrowers 
approached, ‘the village schoolmaster, or karnam296 or other friend conversant with arithmetic to 
ensure that he has not been cheated.’297 Lenders executed notes that distinguished between cash 
and grain loans while enforcing specific interest rates. Creditors presented pro-notes, similar to the 
illustration in Figure 3.6, to local courts following defaults. When presenting pro-notes, lenders 
petitioned courts for either the repayment of loans in cash or the transfer of the borrower’s assets.  
 
296 Karnam refers to local accountants in villages. 
297 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 220. 
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Data from village surveys and court records show that creditors used promissory notes more 
frequently than mortgages in the late 1920s and early 1930s. As shown in Table 3.4, the majority 
of rural lending in villages was unsecured in the late 1920s. Over half of the loans provided in the 
80 surveyed villages were unsecured. Mortgages were less frequent in the dry districts. The ratio 
of unsecured to total lending in the villages surveyed in the Kurnool district was 96, 74 and 87 per 
cent.298 Data from the government’s Justice Department shows that mortgages were less frequently 
used than the data from village surveys suggest. The Civil Court Statistics series from Civil Justice 
Reports show the total number of civil disputes heard across the district courts and the High Court 
in Madras. The reports demarcate the number of disputes involving money and further categorised 
those disputes involving mortgages. Based on these annual surveys, creditors attached mortgage 
instruments to between 4 and 5 per cent of all the credit transactions in dispute between 1925 and 
1935.299 The majority of credit disputes in courts involved loans that were not underwritten by 
mortgage instruments. Data from thirteen district courts in the early 1930s demonstrate that 
creditors more commonly attached promissory notes to credit disputes. As illustrated in Table 3.5, 
of the surveyed 257,727 credit transactions in dispute between 1930 and 1934, creditors attached 
promissory notes to 212,619 transactions and mortgages to 35,723 transactions. Non-contracted 
and mortgage instruments were rare while promissory notes were commonly attached contracts to 
disputed credit transactions in courts. 
 
Table 3.4 Security on rural loans in 79 villages, 1929 
Village Type Villages 
Total Lending 
(rupees) 
Unsecured Lending 
(rupees) 
Ratio Unsecured to 
Total 
Mostly Wet 36 2,775,772 1,395,967 0.50 
Mostly Dry 43 2,476,317 1,363,587 0.55 
Source: Provincial Banking Enquiry. 
Notes: The Banking Enquiry Committee surveyed between 1 and 6 villages per district. Distinction between wet and 
dry conducted in the same format as Table 2.3 in previous chapter. Credit from cooperatives and government excluded 
for this analysis. Only unsecured and mortgage loans from moneylenders included in the data set. Calculations made 
by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
298 Provincial Banking Enquiry. 
299 Statistics of Civil Courts in the Madras Presidency, (Madras, 1925-1935). 
105 
 
Table 3.5 Credit disputes in 13 district courts, 1930-1934 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 44. 
Notes: The data refers to cases in lower courts involving moneylenders and borrowers who listed their profession as 
agriculture or cultivation. The total numbers of disputes were classified according to the security provided on loans. 
The cases involving promissory notes (2) were not secured against any form of physical collateral. The data constitutes 
approximately 10 per cent of the total number of credit disputes in the same time period. According to civil court 
statistics, the number of cases involving money or movable property was 478,404, 541,486, 554,394, 556815 and 
499,013 in the years 1930 to 1934. See Statistics of Civil Courts 1930-1934. 
 
Why were promissory notes more common than mortgages in the rural credit market? One 
explanation is that the decline in land value during the Depression discouraged creditors from 
attaching mortgage instruments. The value of mortgage was tied to the value of land. The value of 
land declined in crisis years due to deflationary pressures and unpaid tax burdens. As discussed, 
borrowers that defaulted on loans were plausibly tax defaulters in crisis years. Lenders that 
executed land transfers undertook the previous owner’s unpaid tax liability.300 Manikumar shows 
that while the number of auctions increased during the Depression, the government was the 
primary bidder for these lands. There was limited private interest in land auctions during the 
Depression.301 However, this does not explain the persistent low use of mortgage instruments. 
Despite rising prices in the mid-1920s, lenders attached mortgages to less than five per cent of 
credit transactions in court disputes. 
Another explanation, and the focus of the next section of this chapter, is that creditors relied 
on credit instruments that were most cost-efficient, relative to the value of loans. The use of 
promissory notes incurred lower transaction costs, relative to mortgages. The design of contract 
laws made the use of promissory notes lucrative for the moneylender. Court judgements were 
 
300 MELAC Report, 187. 
301 Manikumar, A Colonial Economy, 63. 
Year Disputes (1) 
Disputes with Pro-
Notes (2) 
Disputes with 
Mortgages (3) 
Ratio 2 to 1 
(per cent) 
Ratio 3 to 1 
(per cent) 
1930 47,975 37,859 6096 78.9 12.7 
1931 53,620 44,772 5953 83.5 11.1 
1932 55,857 49,462 9081 88.6 16.3 
1933 52,881 42,918 7442 81.2 14.1 
1934 47,394 37,608 7151 79.4 15.1 
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expedited in cases with signed promissory notes. Lenders were presented with an accelerated 
forum of appeal to enforce the repayment of loans. This was supplemented by lower fees when 
creditors presented pro-notes rather than mortgage contracts in courts. The next section analyses 
the costs of enforcing different contracts and demonstrates the modes of transmission of these 
costs on the price of credit. 
 
3.5 Contract Enforcement and Credit Pricing 
 
Courts were valuable institutions for rural moneylenders. Theoretically, courts offered creditors a 
form of judicial protection. As discussed in the previous chapter, default rates were high in Madras. 
The requirement for judicial protection was, therefore, also high. However, courts did not offer 
creditors time- and cost-efficient legal protection. The cost structure of credit proceedings in 
courts differed by type of contract.  
Indian courts ratified transfers of land through sale or mortgage.302 The government needed to 
record changes in land ownership. Land taxes were a valuable source of revenue for the colonial 
government. As a deterrent to tax evasion, the judiciary enforced title transfers in courts to ensure 
transparent information on landholders and tax assignment.303 As a result, the moneylender’s 
incentive to link credit and land markets was tied to the productivity of legal institutions. Timely 
and inexpensive proceedings could ensure a more effective execution of land transfers as an 
enforced penalty on defaulted borrowers. In contrast, lengthy and expensive proceedings 
incentivised defaulters to extend disputes to delay or reverse the transfer of mortgaged land. The 
incentive structure of the moneylender can be measured by the difference between the period of 
borrowing in year n-1 and the expected duration of a mortgage dispute in year n. Put differently, 
creditors provided mortgage loans if the terms of borrowing exceeded the time required to execute 
the transfer of land in courts.  
Owing to the inefficiency of courts, creditors in Madras did not easily benefit from judicial 
protection. In 1922, the munsiff courts, the lowest courts in the province, reported a backlog of 
52,559 cases of which 11,990 were pending for over one year.304 Cases appealed in the Madras 
High Court in 1923 lay idle for 24 months.305 As shown in Figure 3.7, the ratio of enforcement to 
loan terms simultaneously stressed both the disincentive to approach legal forums and the absence 
 
302 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 15. 
303 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 184. 
304 Foulkes, Local Autonomy, 105. 
305 Foulkes, Local Autonomy, 117-118. 
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of land transfers in defaulted loans.306 As previously mentioned, creditors typically provided short-
term, four to six-month loans to peasants in Madras. Yet, credit disputes were generally heard over 
a period of one to two years in District Courts. The duration of disputes in the High Court showed 
greater unpredictability. Proceedings generally lasted between 20 and 36 months in the 1930s and 
1940s. By 1955, this increased significantly with disputes enduring an interval of between three 
and seven years. The average length of civil disputes in the High Court doubled between 1958 and 
1959 alone. According to the Provincial Banking Enquiry, ‘it is uncommon for the ryot to go out 
of his way to repay a money-lender and the fullest possible advantage is taken of the law’s delays 
by procrastination in court and by evading or circumventing the court’s efforts on behalf of the 
decree holder.’307 
 
Figure 3.7 Average duration of civil disputes in Madras, 1925-59 
 
Source: Statistics of Civil Courts 1925-1959. 
Notes: Duration measured as the average number of days taken between initial hearing and final judgement for civil 
cases in a given year. Data is not available for the years 1940-44, 1948-1953. The data provides an understated account 
of the duration of cases in provincial courts. The data refers to appellate forums and has not considered the duration 
of cases in lower rural courts. The inclusion of disputes in munsiff (village) courts, subdivisional tribunals or small cause 
courts would inflate the current estimation of dispute duration. Similarly, the delays in legal recourse were not restricted 
to the duration of contested suits alone but also in the execution of judgements. The sale and registration of new titles 
was in itself a lengthy process. An all-inclusive estimation of the above analysis widens the difference between the 
duration of court disputes and the time span of cultivation loans. 
 
 
306 Baker, An Indian Rural Economy, discusses the importance of delays in court judgements as a dissuading factor for 
the Chettiar bankers in South India to provide agricultural loans. The lack of legal protection diverted their attention 
away from rural Madras and towards plantations in Burma. 
307 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 84. 
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Lenders and borrowers bore the costs of lengthy legal disputes. The cost of enforcement in 
courts was commonly higher than the size of loans. The lender’s incentive to provide a mortgage-
backed loan was tied to the ratio of the expected cost of enforcement to size of the loan itself. In 
other words, moneylenders provided mortgage loans if the cost of enforcing land transfers in court 
was lower than the size of the loan. This justified the provision of loans that were secured by 
mortgage. Loans of a certain value, which exceeded the provincial average, satisfied the high 
enforcement costs in courts.  
The Provincial Banking Enquiry provides an estimate of the costs incurred by litigants in a ‘City 
Civil Court’ and the Madras High Court in 1930. The model includes an estimate of the bills raised 
by courts and the fees that clients paid to lawyers. Court fees in the lower courts included stamp 
charges on the plaint and the costs incurred to process the following documents: the vakalat or 
affidavits between clients and lawyers, summons to the defendant, subpoenas and witness 
documents, the application documents and the copy of the decree. This, according to the Banking 
Enquiry, cost the disputants 220 rupees and 15 annas. Clients paid, on average, 118 rupees to 
lawyers to litigate in civil courts. The model cost of dispute in the civil court added up to 338 
rupees and 15 annas.308 Disputants at the High Court level incurred higher costs. Stamp charges 
were similar to the civil court but, according to the Banking Enquiry, plaintiffs and defendants 
incurred higher charges for the processing of court documents. Disputing parties also paid higher 
fees to lawyers and paid the High Court a one-time fee for the processing of documents for ‘first 
day hearing.’ The High Court charges included 235 rupees and seven annas for the court fees and 
165 rupees and three annas for the bills raised by lawyers. In total, litigating in the High Court in 
1930 cost approximately 400 rupees and 10 annas. Assuming agents registered credit disputes in 
the civil court and appealed the verdict in the High Court, they incurred an estimated cost of 739 
rupees.309  
These model costs do not account for additional expenses, including transport costs and the 
costs of litigating in rural tribunals and lower district courts. The cost of title transfer and land 
registration generated a set of expenses that are also not presented in the cost tables.310 According 
to one official report in 1935,  
 
Cases brought to court for unsecured loans far exceed those for secured debts. The average 
duration of suits is startlingly high, exceeding 400 days or approaching a period of two years. 
One can imagine the great cost to the parties, incurred in travelling long distances to appear 
 
308 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 183. 
309 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 183. 
310 The Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee’s estimated cost of land registration was 26 rupees and six annas. See 
Provincial Banking Enquiry, 183. 
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at these courts over and over again for a single suit, often to waste their time and money in 
idle waiting because of inevitable adjournments.311 
 
Enforcing promissory notes generated lower legal costs than enforcing mortgages. Loans 
declared on signed promissory notes were charged a flat court fee which was lower than the costs 
of court disputes on mortgage loans. Litigants incurred a flat cost of 270 rupees inclusive of decree 
execution and advocate fees if they presented judges with signed promissory notes.312 Enforcing 
mortgage contracts in civil courts was 30 per cent more expensive than enforcing promissory notes 
in the same forum. Mortgage disputes in the High Court cost lenders and borrowers 1.5 times 
more than promissory note disputes in the same forum. As recorded in the previous chapter, from 
the Provincial Banking Enquiry’s estimates, the average debt per acre was 58 rupees for the 
province in 1929. The costs of enforcing promissory notes and mortgage contracts were five and 
seven times higher than the average debt per acre in the province. These enforcement costs were 
more comparable, being only marginally higher, than the costs of purchasing working cattle in the 
late colonial period.313 In other words, enforcement costs were significantly higher than the average 
size of working capital loans in the 1920s and 1930s. 
In cases where the courts ruled in favour of the lender, judges typically ordered for borrowers 
to bear some or all of the court fees. Judges determined the allocation of costs to plaintiffs and 
defendants, and this allocation differed on a case-by-case basis. Judges could dismiss cases with 
some or all the costs charged to the plaintiff or the defendant. Itemised billing and the charges 
placed by the courts on the litigants were not discussed in the individual case judgements. When 
courts raised bills on the litigants, this only included court fees and fees for document processing. 
Even when confident of victory, creditors needed to budget for other costs, including lawyer fees, 
transport costs and registration charges.  
The costs of judicial proceedings incentivised moneylenders to operate a multi-layered 
enforcement structure in Madras. Primary loans were unsecured. First and second time defaults 
changed the contractual nature of loans. Following a first round of default, lenders upgraded 
unsecured loans to loans secured by promissory notes. Short periods of repayment were fixed on 
pro-notes. Interest rates compounded following rounds of default.314 The law stipulated a 
maximum three-year limitation on each pro-note which necessitated a fresh renewal of a previous 
 
311 Report on agricultural indebtedness, 45. 
312 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 183. 
313 These costs are discussed in Chapter 2. The costs of purchasing working cattle generally varied between 200 and 
400 rupees in the late 1930s.  
314 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 15. 
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note following its expiry. With each renewal, lenders added the compounded interest from 
previous defaults into the principal amount. This process continued until creditors upgraded the 
initial promissory note into a mortgage-backed loan.315 
Contract laws allowed lenders the flexibility to transmit the cost of enforcement into higher 
interest rates in pro-notes. According to Section 79 of the NIA,  
 
When interest at a specified rate is expressly made payable on a promissory note or bill of 
exchange, interest shall be calculated at the rate specified, on the amount of the principal 
money due thereon, from the date of the instrument, until tender or realization of such 
amount, or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover such amount as the court 
directs.316 
 
Judges issued judgements based on terms in signed contracts. Promissory notes were more 
cost-effective in this respect. Contracts, without the added cost of land transfer ratification, 
demonstrated a mutual recognition of default. Lenders used mortgage instruments as a last resort. 
Land transfer was a repayment option when multiple defaults signalled the borrower’s inability to 
repay.317 Put differently, mortgages were cost-effective when the size of compounded debt 
matched the cost of enforcing land transfers in court.   
The price of credit cannot be taken in isolation from the size of the loan in full, principal plus 
interest rate. Data that matches the price of credit alone to the cost of enforcement provides an 
inaccurate result. Moneylenders inflated loan principals in contracts to compensate for charging 
lower-than-desired interest rates. Put differently, lenders attached contracts which declared higher 
loan principals than the principal in the physical transaction. By doing this, lenders could declare 
low interest rates in contracts. As such, the interest rates that moneylenders reported to 
government surveys and other sources were possibly lower than the actual rates charged. One 
reason for this contract manipulation was that moneylenders presented contracts with low interest 
rates in courts to obtain favourable judgements. Indeed, large loans with low interest rates seemed 
less exploitative, and within the gambit of nineteenth century contract laws, than vice versa. 
Sources recorded this method of contract manipulation more thoroughly in the 1940s, following 
government intervention in the late 1930s. To evade the interest rate ceiling, moneylenders inflated 
 
315 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 15. 
316 Section 80 of the NIA allowed judges to enforce interest rates of 18 per cent when pro-notes did not declare a 
specified rate. According to the Act, ‘When no rate of interest is specified in the instrument, interest on the amount 
due thereon shall, [notwithstanding any agreement relating to interest between any parties to the instrument], be 
calculated at the rate of 18[eighteen per centum] per annum, from the date at which the same ought to have been paid 
by the party charged, until tender or realization of the amount due thereon, or until such date after the institution of 
a suit to recover such amount as the court directs.’ 
317 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 15. 
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loan principals on contracts. This arrangement is discussed in more complete detail in the next 
chapter. 
Data from a survey of mortgage loans in 1935 shows that lenders coordinated loan principals 
and interest rates to match the cost of enforcement. Lenders added enforcement costs to the loan 
principals, interest rates or both. Interest rates were low on large loans and high on small loans. 
The number of loans below 100 rupees and yielding rates below six per cent were low. Conversely, 
the number of loans between 26 and 100 rupees and yielding rates above 24 per cent were high. 
As shown in Figure 3.8, there was a linear increase in the number of lowest-priced loans across 
size categories. The number of loans priced nine per cent and higher presented inverted-U graphs. 
The peak number of loans yielding rates between nine and 12 per cent were sized between 100 
and 500 rupees. The peak number of loans yielding rates above 24 per cent was sized between 26 
and 100 rupees.  Creditors charged low interest rates of between 0 and six per cent on loans above 
1000 rupees. 
 
Figure 3.8 Mortgage loans by size and interest rate, 1930-1934 
 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 36. 
Notes:  Government commissioned surveyors collected data on mortgage loans in two villages per district, across 27 
districts. The source categorised data by the annual number of mortgages without possession, mortgages with 
possession and mortgage bonds between 1930 and 1934. This allows an analysis of 12,503 mortgage transactions, 
valued at 6.9 million rupees. The source measures two variables: the number of loans of a certain size and the interest 
rates attached to those loans. The source identifies five loan size categories and four interest rate categories. The graph 
matches the size of loan to interest rates. The author measures the importance of each loan size category, relative to 
the interest rate charged. For example, if 60 per cent of loans priced above 24 per cent were between 26 and 100 
rupees, that is relative to all loans priced above 24 per cent. Therefore, the majority of loans between 26 and 100 
rupees yielded interest rates above 24 per cent. The opposite is the case for loans above 1000 rupees. The source 
provides annual data between 1930 and 1934. The author aggregates the data and does not account for any temporal 
shifts. 
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The moneylenders interviewed in government reports highlighted the relationship between the 
size of loans and enforcement costs. The lenders claimed they would only initiate legal proceedings 
if the size of loan exceeded legal costs. Summarising one interview with a moneylender from the 
Ramnad district, an official report claimed: 
 
Court-fees and court costs are extravagant and the law’s delays are tremendous. He 
(anonymous moneylender) has to incur as much as Rs. 50 to Rs. 100, in costs in a suit for 
Rs. 100. He proposes disposal of civil cases by lots as the ‘decision in civil courts are often 
so frivolous and arbitrary.’ He says that he is compelled to bribe all court officials except the 
Judge!318 
 
The moneylender’s vulnerability to enforcement costs and seasonality added to the price of 
credit. Loans for cultivation expenses were short term, increasing the lender’s costs in times of 
default. Creditors providing longer term loans, usually for the purchase or improvement to land 
or capital, were more willing to collateralise land and charge lower rates of interest.  Loans for 
cultivation expenses were, ‘only six months’ while loans for larger expenditures were ‘more than 
one year.’ In the case of the former, one landowner reported interest rates of ‘2 to 3 per cent per 
mensem’. The same landowner reported rates of ‘1.5 per cent per mensem’ in the case of the latter.319 
Creditors created a minimum cost barrier to account for the expensive legal proceedings following 
default. Substantial loans over long periods surpassed the barrier. Petty, short-term credit did not 
in the first instance. Secondary and tertiary defaults compounded the value of these loans till 
repayment crossed the barrier. According to an interview of one borrower in 1935, an initial loan 
of 40 rupees compounded to 400 rupees after a ‘few years.’ At this point, the creditor took 
possession of the borrower’s land, worth 1000 rupees, in court.320 
The account books of two moneylenders in the Chingleput district note the transmission of 
varied contract enforcement costs on the price of credit. A government report in 1935 summarised 
the amount of lending, type of credit instrument used and price of loans from the two lenders. 
Both creditors provided loans to cultivators in the same village. One had an exposure of over 
100,000 rupees and the other of between 40,000 and 45,000 rupees. Both lenders executed 
promissory notes with defaulting borrowers. The interest rates mentioned on signed pro-notes 
exceeded the rates charged on credit repaid. As such, both creditors charged different interest rates 
for out-of-court settlements and court disputes. Lenders accepted non-court enforced contracts, 
 
318 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 17. 
319 Provincial Banking Enquiry Vol. III, 621. 
320 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 18. 
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where they charged lower interest rates on loans repaid out of court. When informal arbitration 
failed, both lenders charged a ‘penal interest’ on defaulted loans that were recovered in court. 
According to one moneylender, the Depression and subsequent wave of defaults compels them 
to ‘to take his clients to court…which means that the penal rate of interest of 24 per cent comes 
into operation.’321 
 
Table 3.6 Price of credit from two lenders, 1935 
Lender 
Lending Exposure 
(rupees) 
Contracted Loans 
(per cent) 
Contracted Interest 
(annual) 
Settled Interest 
(annual) 
Lender A 100,000 66 18-24 10.5-12 
Lender B 40,000-45,000 100 18-24 10 
Source: Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 15-16. 
Notes: Data extrapolated from qualitative evidence in the source. Contracted loans refer to the ratio of pro-note loans 
to total. Contracted interest refers to the penal rate charged by the moneylender to account for the costs of 
enforcement in court. Settled interest refers to prices charged if borrowers repaid loans out of court. 
 
Moneylenders, from the case study presented in Table 3.6, provided loans for a period of 10 
months. Each lender executed pro-notes defining the repayment of loans in monthly instalments. 
Borrowers defaulted on the majority of the loans provided by both lenders between 1925 and 
1935. Filtered down, the monthly interest rate on privately settled loans was between one and 1.2 
per cent. The monthly rate on court disputed defaults was between 1.8 and 2.4 per cent, or between 
50 and 140 per cent higher than rates on undisputed credit. In other words, the varied costs of 
enforcing different credit contract types explain the variation in the prices of credit at the level of 
the individual loan. Creditors increased interest rates with primary and secondary defaults to 
account for the costs of enforcing contracts in court and court-ordered transfers of the borrower’s 
assets. 
The cost structure of credit proceedings impacted the regional and household variations in 
credit access within the province. Creditors granted extensions to smallholders as land transfers 
were an insurance against the enforcement costs. As such, landless borrowers were most affected 
by enforcement costs. Poor peasants in dry areas, especially tenants and the smallholders that 
owned low-value land, were less likely to receive loan extensions as enforcement costs were too 
high. Indeed, the previous chapter of the thesis shows that creditors were less lenient in famine-
prone districts, such as Bellary, than in the deltas. The average size of loans in these districts was 
 
321 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 16. 
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significantly lower than the size of loans in the deltas. As recorded, the Provincial Banking 
Enquiry’s survey of select villages shows that the average debt per acre was 17 rupees in Bellary 
and 116 rupees in Tanjore in 1929. Enforcing contracts in courts was between 16 and 24 times, 
depending on the type of contract, the value of the debt per acre in Bellary. As recorded in one 
survey of the Bellary district, poor peasants ‘can seldom indulge in the delights of civil litigation.’322 
The size of loans were low and value of collateral negligible, leading to harsher credit terms for 
peasant borrowers in the dry districts. 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
Moneylenders faced an enforcement cost conundrum in Madras. Whereas banks and formal 
financial organizations relied on contracts and courts to recover unpaid loans, these proceedings 
were expensive solutions for informal moneylenders. Yet, in the unregulated credit market in 
Madras, contract laws let moneylenders price credit freely, allowing for some element of leniency 
as lenders granted loan extensions to defaulting borrowers. This leniency came at a high price. 
When unsecured loans remained unpaid for long periods, moneylenders attached contracts to 
these loans while adding the costs of judicial proceedings to the interest rates charged. This chapter 
records the relationship between contract enforcement and credit pricing in a fragile credit market 
in the early 1930s and finds evidence that creditors adopted a three-stage loan upgrading 
arrangement to enforce the repayment of defaulted loans.  
 The size of loans was a decisive factor in determining the use of credit contracts in rural 
Madras. When the combination of principal and interest exceeded legal costs, moneylenders 
attached contracts to loans. Put differently, creditors increased the price of contracted loans to 
satisfy the costs of enforcing contracts. Two commonly used contracts in the 1930s were mortgage 
instruments and promissory notes. Each instrument was governed by a different set of laws. Land 
laws, enforced in the nineteenth and early-twentieth century dictated the use of mortgages while 
the 1881 Negotiable Instruments Act dictated the use of promissory notes. By the 1930s, these 
laws incentivised lending by providing moneylenders a layer of protection. In this context, 
promissory notes were cheaper to enforce and more commonly used than mortgages. Creditors 
upgraded loans following first- and second-time defaults, attaching promissory notes following the 
first and mortgage instruments following the second stage. 
 
322 District Gazetteers: Bellary, 101. 
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This chapter has lessons for the role of institutions in credit markets. The combination of 
expensive judicial proceedings and informal credit markets in colonial India highlights the inverse 
relationship between transaction costs and equity in rural credit. The higher the transaction cost, 
the more inequitable the exchange. Courts were expensive but contract laws protected 
moneylenders. Borrowers bore the costs of high default rates and high enforcement costs in rural 
credit. The problem was more severe for peasants in drier and poorer districts. When loans were 
small and seasonal, the use of contracts was unlucrative. Enforcement was through private 
negotiations and credit terms were harsh for the borrowers. This chapter further demonstrates 
that the isolated act to strengthen property rights had an insignificant impact when courts were 
unproductive. Enforcement was problematic when the costs to enforce contracts exceeded the 
size of loans. 
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Chapter 4. The Impact of Intervention on 
Credit Supply, 1935-1960 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
When studying informal credit markets, economists tend to ask the following question: Do 
informal credit markets operate efficiently or as vehicles of exploitation? One interpretation holds 
that high interest rates signal market failure.323 In the absence of competition, moneylenders 
leverage their monopolisation of credit markets to extract from peasants. Another interpretation 
suggests that lenders responded to market incentives such that lending arrangements, including 
high interest rates, reflect the costs of exchange.324  
The provincial government asked a similar question of rural credit markets in Madras. They 
answered the question by promoting the first interpretation on market exploitation. Explaining 
the key factor driving high interest rates in the informal market, Indian economists and politicians 
suggested that in villages without banks and few moneylenders, credit markets were non-
competitive in the 1930s. In their view, moneylenders deliberately priced loans higher than the 
cost of providing them to extract rents at the expense of the borrower. When the Great Depression 
hit and the wave of subsequent credit defaults made the market seem especially inequitable to the 
borrower, lawmakers in colonial Madras used this version of market failure to justify artificial price 
controls in the form of interest rate ceilings in the late-1930s. The government enforced a series 
of credit regulations from the mid-1930s, culminating in 1938 with the interest rate ceiling of 6.25 
per cent (annualised) on all loans provided by rural moneylenders. 
The success of artificial price controls hinged on the cooperation of moneylenders as the sole 
suppliers of credit. Moneylenders could have responded to the interest rate ceiling in three ways. 
First, they could have obeyed the law and provided credit at lower prices. Second, they could have 
supplied less credit as it was unprofitable to lend at low rates. Third, they could have evaded the 
 
323 Bhaduri, “A Study in Agricultural Backwardness”; Patnaik, “The Agrarian Question”; Thorner, “Semi-feudalism 
or Capitalism”. 
324 Stiglitz, “Chapter 5: Economic Organization”; Besley, “How do Market Failures Justify Interventions in the Rural 
Credit Market?”; Ghosh and Ray, “Information and Enforcement”. 
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law altogether and continued providing credit at high prices. The chapter shows that creditors in 
Madras opted for versions of the second and third responses. 
In the short term, the impact of credit intervention was a contraction in the supply of credit 
and the emergence of a black-market for loans priced above the ceiling. The region-specific 
features of the credit market in Madras allowed creditors to make swift supply changes. The market 
functioned seasonally, enabling creditors to issue fresh loans in one year but withdraw from issuing 
new loans in the following year. From the start of credit legislation in the mid-1930s, and in 
expectation of stronger regulation in the late-1930s, some cultivators stopped allocating disposable 
income to lending in the mortgage and contracted-credit market in the short-term. While data 
shows a contraction in credit supply, primary sources also indicate that creditors continued to lend 
but outside the scope of laws and legal procedure. The interest rate ceiling was only enforceable 
by court judges. Judges lowered the interest rates in credit disputes to the legal limit. To avoid 
adhering to the law, creditors resorted to enforcement arrangements that evaded courts. Indeed, 
this accent on enforcement is a particular contribution of the chapter. Enforcement mechanisms 
have been studied in isolated spheres of courts and banking or crop sharing and financial 
intermediaries.325 The chapter demonstrates that when cultivators were also village bankers, crop 
sharing arrangements were as viable an enforcement option as courts. Intervention increased the 
enforcement costs of formal arrangements but not informal arrangements, resulting in a transition 
in the supply of credit. The attempt to formally regulate the credit market, paradoxically, aided the 
shift of the market from formal to informal.326 
If the goal was to create a more equal footing between moneylender and borrower then results 
from 1930s credit intervention were disappointing. There were few winners and several losers 
from credit intervention in Madras. Creditors that exited the market potentially lost, especially as 
the period after intervention was more economically stable than the period before. The borrowers 
lost as an already liquidity-constrained credit market became more inaccessible after intervention. 
The borrowers that accessed credit following intervention continued to pay high prices. The only 
potential winners were the lenders that operated outside the law. This situation resembles the type 
of welfare loss economists describe as ‘deadweight loss’. Following the artificial price ceiling, the 
 
325 For formal credit and courts, see La Porta et al., “Law and Finance”; Djankov et al., “Courts”; Moro et al., “Creditor 
Protection”.  For informal enforcement and interlinked factor markets, see Bardhan, “Interlocking Factor Markets”; 
Braverman and Stiglitz, “Sharecropping”. 
326 Schwecke, in a recent article on moneylending in nineteenth century Banares, distinguishes between a ‘monetary 
inside’ and a ‘monetary outside’. Regulation seems to be at the centre of this distinction. Regulated capital markets 
where the law defined money transactions, in this case the monetary inside, co-existed with unregulated ‘economic 
arenas’ where money transactions occurred outside the scope of the administrative machinery. This study on Madras 
suggests that credit shifted to a similar version of a monetary outside following the interest rate ceiling in the 1930s. 
See Schwecke, “A Tangled Jungle of Disorderly Transactions”.  
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market operated less efficiently as credit supply declined and prices were less transparent than 
before. The market also operated either as or more inequitably as the remaining creditors provided 
loans at pre-intervention prices. 
This chapter provides new lessons for case studies of similar credit interventions in other Indian 
provinces. Recent studies by Chaudhary and Swamy show that government-imposed restrictions 
on land transfers in Bombay (1879) and Punjab (1900) had a significant impact on the supply of 
mortgage credit.327 Supply contracted in the short term. Surprisingly, Chaudhary and Swamy find 
that this credit contraction had an insignificant impact on investment and development in both 
provinces. However, by focusing on the mortgage market alone, the authors do not consider the 
rural credit market fully and overestimate the contraction in supply. The mortgage loans market 
accounted for one part of the entire rural credit supply. Reduction in mortgage loans, therefore, 
does not necessarily suggest that credit supply contracted. More likely, and as shown in this 
chapter, creditors avoided mortgage loans after interventions. Courts were required to enforce 
mortgage contracts but court judges also enforced lending restrictions. Mortgages declined because 
moneylenders avoided courts which does not imply that credit supply contracted. Indeed, 
Chaudhary and Swamy also find that the dominant moneylenders in Punjab shifted from 
professional to agriculturist after land transfer restrictions in 1900. This chapter suggests that this 
shift occurred because cultivator-cum-moneylenders had greater enforcement flexibility to operate 
outside the scope of laws and formal procedures. By looking at the market for mortgage loans, 
land sales, pro-note and unsecured loans, this chapter finds that the actual outcome from state-
imposed restrictions on rural credit was a partial supply contraction combined with a shift in 
lending arrangements that allowed creditors to operate outside the law. 
This chapter proceeds in four stages. The first looks at debates in the Legislative Council and 
key publications from economists and policymakers in colonial Madras to discuss the design of 
credit intervention, focusing on the arguments made by key political actors justifying the 
importance of the interest rate ceiling. The second uses new data from land registration offices in 
the rural districts to examine the impact of intervention on the market for mortgage loans. The 
third uses case judgements and credit surveys in the 1940s to examine the conflict between the 
interest rate ceiling and nineteenth century contract laws and its resulting impact on the supply of 
contracted loans. The fourth uses credit surveys and contemporary studies to explore the 
relationship between enforcement costs and the shift in lending arrangements after intervention. 
 
 
327 Chaudhary and Swamy, “Protecting the Borrower”, “A Policy of Credit Disruption”. 
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4.2 Designing Credit Intervention 
 
The colonial government, both federally and provincially, protected borrowers throughout the 
colonial period as it perceived high ‘agricultural indebtedness’ a barrier to development and 
effective governance in rural areas. State officials believed that cultivators needed to moderate their 
exposure to credit. From the mid-nineteenth century, the colonial headquarters delegated 
policymaking in rural credit to governments in the individual provinces. The government in 
Madras did not regulate rural credit until the 1930s.  
The 1875 riots marked a transition in colonial attitudes towards moneylenders. The riots were 
not long after the 1857 rebellion, a time in which the colonial government feared peasant uprisings. 
The riots sparked the first of many legislative measures to counter the market power of 
moneylenders and protect borrowers.328 Safeguarding the interests of the cultivator was 
determined a necessity to maintain peace in colonial India. As summarised by G S Forbes, member 
of the Madras Legislative Council in the early 1900s, ‘it is a universal proverb in this country that 
the prosperity of the ryot is the prosperity of the raja.’329 In this context, the ryot refers to the 
cultivator while the raja, literally translating to ‘ruler’, refers to the colonial administration.  
Governments in Bombay and Punjab regulated rural credit in the late nineteenth century. The 
provincial government in Bombay enforced the 1879 Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act (DARA) in 
response to the riots. The DARA regulated rural credit in two ways. First, the government 
regulated land alienation. The government considered the Deccan Riots of 1875 a backlash from 
peasant cultivators to the market power of urban moneylenders in the Bombay Presidency. 
Lenders in rural Bombay were commonly urban traders. Loans were underwritten by mortgage 
instruments and default rates were high. As such, policymakers were concerned about the 
frequency of land transfers to non-cultivating moneylenders.  Second, and a common theme of 
credit intervention in colonial India, the government empowered court judges to protect 
borrowers when credit terms favoured the moneylenders.330 Judges granted loan extensions and 
imposed interest rate reductions in credit disputes. The government in late nineteenth century 
Punjab followed a similar strategy to the one in Bombay. The government enforced the Punjab 
 
328 Strickland, “Cooperation and the Rural Problem of India”, 510-511. 
329 Proceedings of the Council of the Governor of Fort St George, (Madras 1905), Appendix III. 
330 Chaudhary and Swamy, “Protecting the Borrower”, shows that the 1879 Act led to a significant contraction in 
credit available to smallholder and tenant cultivators in the short and medium term. Kranton and Swamy, “The 
Hazards of Piecemeal Reform”, shows that court protection disincentivised lenders from granting loan extensions to 
defaulters. Lenders preferred recovering loans in courts instead. 
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Land Alienation Act in 1900. This law regulated mortgages, especially restricting land transfers 
from cultivators to professional moneylenders.331 
The government in Madras did not directly regulate rural credit markets until the late-1930s. 
Rural credit did not worry colonial officials in nineteenth century Madras the same way it did in 
Bombay or Punjab. The governments in Bombay and Punjab regulated credit to regulate land 
alienation. They acted on a belief that investment in land was poor because urban moneylenders 
took ownership and leased land to tenants at high rents. In Madras, cultivators were the 
moneylenders. Colonial officials did not regulate the market in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century as land alienation was not a concern.  
The first attempt at regulating moneylenders in this region was in response to the impact of the 
Depression in the 1930s. According to Naidu and Vaidyanathan, wholesale prices of rice, cotton 
and groundnut declined by 52, 42 and 61 per cent between 1928 and 1933.332 A shock to the market 
for credit, the halving of commodity prices in the early-1930s increased the number of defaults on 
agricultural loans. Cultivators were unable to repay credit bills as income from cultivation saw 
significant decline in the early-1930s. In order to finance this defaulted debt, cultivators 
supplemented ongoing obligations with extensions or secondary loans while the instability of 
prices persisted until the mid-1930s.333 A government-commissioned survey of 141 villages in 1935 
warned about the dangers of the post-Depression rural credit market. The survey reported the 
rising number of over-leveraged borrowers with unrepayable debt obligations.334 As shown in 
previous chapters, borrowing for the purpose of repaying previously undertaken debt increased in 
the Depression period. Price deflation in the early 1930s had an especially detrimental impact on 
the borrowers with pre-1930 debt obligations. As suggested by Manikumar, the halving of 
commodity prices during the Depression doubled the real value of debts between 1930 and 1935.335 
The crash in prices of commodities and subsequent defaults on loans prompted the provincial 
government to implement a series of legislative measures to shield borrowers from compounding 
debt burdens.  
Political changes, including the devolution of powers to Indian governments, further explains 
the timing of intervention. The inclusion of Indian policymakers in the provincial government in 
 
331 Chaudhary and Swamy, “A Policy of Credit Disruption”, show that the law led to a reduction in the supply of 
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phases from 1909 motivated a more interventionist state. The colonial government devolved 
policymaking in select sectors to legislatures run by elected officials from Indian political parties. 
Rural credit was part of the devolved policy sector. There were three key political transitions in the 
early twentieth century: the 1909 India Councils Act (Morley-Minto Reforms), 1919 Government 
of India Act (Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms) and the 1935 Government of India Act. The 1919 
and 1935 reforms were more significant in increasing the administrative powers of local 
government. Prior to 1919, the provincial government constituted a unicameral legislature. The 
legislature operated as a board of governors and the British government appointed members to 
the Madras Legislative Council. The reforms in 1919 created a quota for elected members, from 
local political parties, on the Council. The first Council elections took place in 1920. The 1935 
reforms created bicameral legislatures in the provinces. The Madras Legislative Assembly was the 
lower house and constituted elected members from local political parties. The government ran the 
first Provincial Legislative Assembly Election in 1937. The Legislative Council remained and 
formed the upper house. 
Two political parties, the Justice Party and the Indian National Congress, competed for elected 
positions in the provincial legislature during the colonial period. Both parties put forward different 
profiles, ran dissimilar campaigns and sought distinctive mandates between 1920 and 1937. The 
Justice Party was founded in 1916 and ran campaigns to diminish caste prejudices in local 
government. The party aimed to disconnect from broader nationalist campaigns in a bid to draw 
attention to Tamil- and Telugu-specific interests and to detach from its perception of the Congress’ 
nationalist campaign as a proponent of upper caste, Brahmin interests.336 The Justice Party won 
the majority of seats reserved for local parties in the Council from 1920 to 1937. Zamindars and 
landowners dominated the leadership of the Justice Party which invited criticism and claims of 
hypocrisy in the contradiction between its anti-prejudice campaign and its ignorance of peasant 
interests in the early 1930s. The Indian National Congress extended its Swaraj or Indian self-rule 
promotion to its campaign expansion in Madras. In the 1920s and 1930s, the party extended its 
campaign to increase nationalist sentiment in the south by promoting the synonymity between 
colonial rule and the vested interests of elite landowners. In doing so, Congress leaders claimed 
the leaders of the Justice Party supported the aims of colonial rulers. From the early-1930s, 
Congress leaders established a large support base in rural districts by promoting tenancy reforms 
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and debt relief laws in a larger campaign to rid the province of colonial rulers.337 The party 
legitimised itself as a representative of peasant interests in the fight against the British and their 
landowner allies. Following the 1935 Government of India reforms, the Indian National Congress 
party won the majority of seats in the Assembly elections in 1937. The Congress won 159 out of 
the contested 215 seats in the Legislative Assembly. 
The focus on reducing economic inequality in villages cut across party lines, to some extent. A 
speech delivered by K V Reddy Naidu, a member of the Justice Party in 1924, emphasised the 
dangers of colonial forms of property rights, ‘The English and Scotch land systems were based 
upon the Roman conception of Dominium. According to these systems, the landlord is the 
absolute owner of the soil. The tenant has no proprietary interest in it, and has no rights 
whatsoever.’338 P J Thomas, a member of the Indian National Congress, echoed the need for dual 
intervention in land and credit markets. Prior to winning a seat in the Madras Legislative Assembly 
Election in 1937, Thomas argued, 
 
The Indian Banking Committee points out that where the moneylenders are mostly 
landholders (chiefly in the Punjab and Madras), changes in the ownership of land are not 
detrimental to agricultural efficiency, but this is a highly questionable view, seeing that such 
transfers lead to the increase in tenants and tenant-farming, which is not desirable in many 
ways.339 
 
In Reddy Naidu’s and Thomas’ view, the exploitation of peasants persisted through inequities in 
factor markets. The view, agreed by members of the different political parties, concluded that 
landowners extracted from permanent tenants through their control on the supply of credit. The 
Congress party, however, enforced stronger borrower protection measures after their electoral 
victory in 1937. Indeed, Washbrook’s study of provincial politics demonstrates that voters 
considered the Justice Party more elite-favouring than the Indian National Congress. According 
to Washbrook, the Justice Party lost favour in the rural districts during the 1920s and 1930s. Rural 
voters believed that the Congress would implement policies that were not elite-favouring.340 The 
protection of borrowers against rich moneylenders was one example of this policy approach. 
The federal government and the Justice Party-controlled provincial legislature regulated credit 
markets but with limited impact on protecting borrowers. The colonial headquarters in Delhi 
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introduced an interest rate ceiling in the early-twentieth century, but designed this policy to 
reinforce the terms in nineteenth century contract laws. The 1918 Usurious Loans Act instructed 
judges, across colonial India, to cap interest rates on agricultural loans at 18 per cent per annum. 
This initially challenged Section 79 but sustained the position recorded in Section 80 of the NIA. 
The federal government had changed their tune, only marginally, to the preservation of contract 
laws. After 1918, judges upheld promissory notes in courts as long as they defined an interest rate 
lower or equal to 18 per cent per annum. Moneylenders did not dispute the Usurious Loans Act 
as they continued to benefit from pricing flexibility. Section 80 of the NIA allowed moneylenders 
to increase interest rates, up to 18 per cent, to compensate for the costs of contract enforcement. 
Indeed, the preservation of Section 80 of the NIA ensured that promissory notes continued to be 
a popular legal instrument in the rural credit market in the early 1930s. However, usury laws 
enforced by the provincial government in the 1930s complicated this arrangement. 
Government reports advocated for credit intervention in the early 1930s. The Provincial 
Banking Enquiry Committee in 1930 and the Report on Agricultural Indebtedness in 1935 
recommended new policy measures to protect borrowers from credit exploitation. The first in a 
series of legislative measures by the Madras provincial government was the 1936 Debtors 
Protection Act. C Basudev, a member of the Justice Party-controlled legislature, introduced the 
Debtors Protection Bill in 1932. The Bill underwent several revisions and, when enacted,  
eventually enforced an interest rate ceiling of 9 per cent on secured and 15 per cent on unsecured 
loans.341 The Debtors Protection Act also recommended that lenders present courts with ledgers 
and more formal accounting methods in credit disputes.342 The law only regulated loans below 500 
rupees.  
Following this, the government introduced the 1936 Debt Conciliation Act. This watered-down 
law constituted a board of judges in the Madras High Court to ‘amicably’ resolve disputed loans 
with values above 100 rupees.343 The Conciliation Act recommended the existing interest rate 
ceiling and limited the total repayment of loans to double the initial principal loaned. This 
reinforced the ancient Hindu law of Damdupat.344 First located in the Hindu Manusmrti texts, the 
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law was enforced to protect against the practice of usury and exploitative interest rates.345 By 
placing a cap on the total value of repayment, the government believed it limited any scope for 
borrower exploitation. However, the law did not empower judges on the Debt Conciliation Boards 
to execute changes to contracts or previously agreed credit arrangements. Debt Conciliation 
Boards dismissed cases with suggested remedies that were not legally enforceable. In practice, 
creditors did not implement the changes recommended by the Debt Conciliation Boards. 
Recognizing the law’s failure to have the desired impact, the Congress-led provincial government 
dissolved Debt Conciliation Boards in 1942.346 
The Indian National Congress’ electoral victory in 1937 encouraged policymakers to act more 
strongly on their appeal towards the protection of peasant cultivators from exploitation, 
particularly rent-extraction through predatory credit pricing. Following the Congress’ landslide 
victory, the government implemented a Moratorium Bill in September 1937. The law banned 
creditors from suing indebted cultivators for one year. T S S Rajan, a member of the Congress 
party and Minister for Public Health in the provincial Assembly, went further to carry out the 
party’s campaign promise to aggressively intervene and protect poor borrowers in credit markets. 
Rajan introduced the Debt Relief Bill in December 1937. The Bill carried stronger market 
intervention than the policies before. When introducing the Bill in the Assembly, Rajan stated,   
 
Now we have been returned by a large number of voters many of whom are pre-eminently 
agriculturists and to whom we have given the word of honour and to keep the word of 
honour we put before the two Houses of legislature this Bill which is intended to relieve the 
agriculturists of his debts.347 
 
The Bill progressed and the Congress-led government eventually enforced the landmark 
Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (MARA) in September 1938. The primary objective of the MARA 
was to regulate compounding unproductive debts accumulated during and immediately after the 
Depression. The provincial government believed that amicable and voluntary settlements, such as 
those encouraged by the Debtors Protection Act, did not go far enough. Stronger intervention 
was needed to see results in the market.  The MARA empowered judges to not just recommend 
fair credit terms but to discipline moneylenders and strongly enforce credit regulations in order to 
protect borrowers. 
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The MARA placed a ceiling on loans to cultivators and implemented provisions for loans 
borrowed during and after the Depression period. When designing the law, the government 
deliberated how best to arrive at a ceiling price. The government decided to enforce an interest 
rate ceiling that was marginally above the rate at which local government borrowed but below the 
rate at which cooperative banks were lending. Pricing below the rate charged by cooperative banks 
was strategic. The fear, according to government officials, was that moneylenders could borrow at 
low rates from cooperatives and charge a higher rate for their clients.348 In doing so, moneylenders 
could crowd-out the credit market for poor peasants. The government arrived at the rate of six 
per cent per annum, marginally above the five per cent that local government borrowed and below 
the rates that cooperatives charged in the same period.349 The Congress Party then increased the 
rate to 6.25 per cent per annum.350 They believed this rate was easier to calculate as it translated, in 
currency terms, to one pie per rupee borrowed.351 The law also distinguished between debts 
undertaken before and after 1 October 1932. The government enforced different ceilings to 
account for deflationary pressures during the Depression. The MARA enforced a ceiling of 5 per 
cent annual interest on all loans undertaken between 1932 and the implementation of the Act in 
1938. In a bid to cement the Damdupat rule, the law wrote off partially repaid debts if the amount 
repaid matched double the initial principal loaned. The government enforced the Damdupat rule to 
moderate the size of compounding interest following multiple defaults. The government 
administered the MARA through the judiciary. The law empowered court judges to intervene in 
credit disputes where interest rates charged exceeded the ceiling declared in the law. 
Congress party-led intervention in the late 1930s invited criticism from political opposition and 
some provincial lobbyists. Views opposing intervention are reflected in debates within the 
provincial Legislature following the introduction of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Bill in 1937. 
Opponents to this form of agrarian intervention can be placed in two groups. The first group 
consisted of landowners ideologically resisting policy shift to an interventionist left. This group 
argued against the benefits of the MARA. Landowners disagreed with the view that tenant 
cultivators were victim to forms of credit exploitation. The officials that echoed this view in the 
Assembly advocated for less radical legislation on the grounds that landowners showed leniency 
to rent defaulters. Supporters of this position disagreed with any existence of exploitation as they 
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believed that landowners had a ‘hereditary love for their tenantry.’352 In opposition to laws that 
protected peasants C Muttukumaraswami Mudaliyar, a landowner and zamindar in the Chunampet 
village, opposed the Debt Relief Bill on the grounds that it unfairly defined the interests of a group 
of rural landowners in the province. According to Mudaliyar, 
 
There is an assumption pervading the Bill all through that the interests of the zamidnars and 
those of the tenants are antagonistic, that the zamindar is ever bent upon encroaching upon 
the rights of the tenants and unless the rights of the tenants are buttressed by  all the 
safeguards which the legislature can devise, they will be annihilated by the insatiable ambition 
and cruel exactions of the zamindar. It is very much to be regretted that this feeling of distrust 
is unjustly entertained towards the zamindars as a class.353 
 
The second group consisted of pro-market enthusiasts. This group was concerned about the 
future legislative capacity of government. The elections in 1937 formed the first legislative 
assembly in Madras with a more robust mandate given to local political parties than before. In this 
context, pro-market officials considered the Relief Bill a move towards socialist intervention. This 
opposing group, led primarily by members from the Justice Party, pointed to the conflict between 
debt relief and the nineteenth century laws that protected the freedom of contract. Reddi Nayudu, 
for example, echoed this hesitation by stating that, ‘The Bill treats the sanctity of contracts with 
contempt….there are large amounts of debts on promissory notes and the contention has been 
raised, and I believe there is a good deal of force in that contention.’354 Members of the ruling 
administration also recognized the potential contradiction of federal contract laws. Rajan, who 
introduced the Relief Bill, acknowledged the infringement of borrower protection on the freedom 
of contract. During an eight-hour debate among legislators on the Relief Bill, Rajan conceded that 
the law might conflict with an adapted institutional structure supporting free enterprise. According 
to Rajan, 
 
As regards sanctity of contracts, this question has been discussed threadbare. I am not 
speaking as a lawyer but I am going to speak as an ordinary citizen and I know certainly the 
obligations of a contract. That a man who has borrowed has got to pay back what he has 
borrowed is a fundamental law which even the meanest of our citizens does understand and 
which even the most ignorant citizen will not repudiate.355 
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However, the debate was won by interventionists. Key members of the Congress believed more 
strongly in the backlash to market exploitation than in supporting free enterprise. Naidu and 
Vaidyanathan, economists and members of the provincial legislature in the Congress government, 
criticised the pro-contract stance. According to them, contract laws protected moneylenders at the 
expense of the borrowers. Moneylenders used contracts, and the judicial protection contracts 
carried, to exploit poor peasants in rural credit. Naidu and Vaidyanathan argued in 1939, 
 
A revision of contract with every change in the volume of money is necessary. Even nations 
were obliged to violate contracts entered into when, owing to various economic causes, they 
were unable to respect such obligations. What is true of nations is true of individuals also. 
After all, men are responsible for these contracts and when these contracts threaten the 
economic position of the individuals, it is but right that these contracts should be abrogated. 
 
C Rajagopalachariar, leader of the Congress government in the 1930s and later President of 
independent India, supported the pro-borrower stance and believed that market intervention was 
more important than the protection of contract laws. Commenting on the Relief Bill, 
Rajagopalachariar claimed, ‘it was said that one of the main attacks on this Bill was that this is 
introducing communism or revolution; let us not put the thin end of revolution in a thing like this 
because it is a dangerous thing.’356 Responding to wider regional criticisms over credit intervention 
across provinces, Rajagopalachariar believed that ‘credit will not be lost. The scare will disappear 
and the country will have the previous industry standing on its own legs.’357 Rajagopalachariar 
recognised the dangers of regulation affecting the supply of credit but predicted that the market 
would return to its original state following an initial shock. 
Other left-leaning politicians, and members of the Congress party in the colonial period, 
supported the government’s approach. Despite the recognition that lenders could withhold credit 
as market monopolists, some legislators believed that laws in the joint spheres of land and credit 
was a solution to the trade-off between efficiency and equity. Sivaswamy, a member of the 
Legislative Council and later member of the Socialist Party in post-colonial Madras, praised the 
Congress government’s credit intervention. Sivaswamy claimed the intervention was a success for 
regulating exploitation without noticeable consequences on credit provision.358 According to 
Sivaswamy, the strengthening of property titles in the early twentieth century provided sufficient 
incentives for creditors to lend despite restrictions on interest rates. In other words, Sivaswamy 
 
356 Madras Legislative Debates. 
357 Madras Legislative Debates. 
358 Sivaswamy, Legislative Protection, 97-102. 
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expected stronger property rights to mitigate default risk through collateral requirements hence 
avoiding a backlash to the regulation of interest rates.  
Did intervention restrict the supply of credit in Madras? Was the credit market more equitable 
in the short term? These are the central questions dismissed by policymakers in late 1930s Madras. 
The chapter tackles these questions and shows that the design of intervention made regulated 
moneylending unprofitable. The credit market contracted and moneylenders evaded the law in the 
short term. 
 
4.3 Intervention and The Mortgage Market 
 
Recovery from the Depression began in the mid-1930s. Commodity prices and the number of 
mortgage loans increased from 1934. However, the mortgage market was exposed to a second 
shock in the form of state intervention. Moneylenders faced three choices following the 
intervention. First, lenders adhered to the law and continued to provide credit that met the legally 
imposed conditions. Annual changes in the supply of credit would continue to respond to prices 
under this regime. Second, lenders rejected the law and stopped lending to peasants. Commodity 
prices would have limited bearing on the supply of mortgage credit under this regime. Third, 
lenders evaded the law and continued to provide credit on the same terms as the pre-regulated 
market. Evidence shows that the market contracted and the remaining lenders seemed to have 
evaded the law entirely.  
Mortgage lending did not respond to the upward swing in prices in the late 1930s. McAlpin’s 
commodity price index indicates a 28 per cent increase in commodity prices between 1934 and 
1941. An official report commissioned by the provincial government estimated an increase in the 
prices of rice, cotton and groundnut by 2.2, 2.3 and 4.8 times between 1939 and 1944.359 However, 
the number of mortgage loans, in wet and dry districts combined, in 1941 was 10 per cent lower 
than the same number in 1930. The steepest decline in the annual number of mortgages was 
between 1937 and 1938, coinciding with the enforcement of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act. 
The number of mortgage loans in wet districts declined by 14 per cent between 1937 and 1938. 
The same number declined by 16 per cent in dry districts. Figure 4.2 shows that the increase in 
commodity prices did not reflect in the expected increase in mortgage lending. Adjusting for 
inflation, the value of mortgage loans experienced a steep decline between 1935 and 1941. The 
real value of loans in dry districts declined by 33 per cent between 1934 and 1939. The real value 
 
359 Report of the Economist, 47. 
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of loans in wet districts declined by 40 per cent between 1934 and 1939. The Registration 
department in the provincial government attributed this decline to credit intervention. Explaining 
the causes of the decline in mortgage lending, the department’s annual report in 1938 suggested 
that, ‘the fall is attributed to the reluctance of the moneyed class of people to advance loans 
consequent on the operations of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act 1938.’360 
 
Figure 4.1 Number of mortgage loans, 1929-1941 
 
Source: Report on the Administration of the Registration Department, 1929-1941. 
Notes: The data estimates the number of mortgages registered in a given year. The Registration Department in the 
government set up offices in the districts to register land transfers. Each district had at least one Registration office. 
The source provides data from each Registration office. Data aggregated by the author. Division between ‘Mostly 
Wet’ and ‘Mostly Dry’ conducted in the same format as Table 2.3 in Chapter 2. The graph excludes the South Kanara, 
Malabar and Nilgiris districts. 
 
Figure 4.2 Real value of mortgage loans, 1934-1941 
 
Source: Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1934-1941; McAlpin, ‘Price Movements”.  
Notes: The data estimates the nominal value of mortgage loans registered in a given year. The author deflates this data 
using McAlpin’s commodity price index. Analysis of the data conducted in the same format as Figure 4.1. 
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Due to gaps in source material, it is difficult to predict the duration of this supply-side shock. 
Land registration records from the early 1940s are unavailable. However, data from 1947 suggests 
that the diminishing trend persisted. The number of mortgage loans in wet districts declined by 13 
per cent between 1941 and 1947. The number of loans in the dry districts declined by 10 per cent 
in the same period. The real value of mortgage loans also declined between 1941 and 1947. The 
value of mortgage loans was 40 per cent lower in both wet and dry districts.361 How did credit 
intervention affect the settlement of old debts?  
One impact of intervention was an increase in the number and value of land sales across 
Madras. The number of land sales increased consistently between 1935 and 1941, with a 
particularly large rise after 1938. The number of sales in 1941 was 12 per cent higher than the 
number of sales in 1929 and 15 per cent higher than the same in 1934. Officials in charge of land 
registrations recognized the juxtaposition in declining mortgages and rising sales. According to a 
report from the Registration Department in 1940, the mortgage market saturated while the ‘rise in 
the number of sales’ was ‘due to the Madras Debt Conciliation Act, 1936, and the Madras 
Agriculturists Relief Act, 1938.’362 The number of sales rose because the MARA encouraged 
creditors with overdue loans to recover these in one-time settlements in courts and cultivators 
with disposable income invested in land purchase rather than in the credit market. 
Courts ordered the transfer of land where borrowers were unable to repay loans under the 
interest rates specified in the MARA. As protection for the lender, rules in the MARA allowed 
one-time settlements for previously unpaid loans. The MARA did not contain provisions for the 
repayment of loans in instalments. While interest rates were capped and loan sizes re-configured 
by judges, the law expected swift rather than drawn out settlements. Under these conditions, judges 
ordered debtors, without the capacity to repay their scaled-down debts, to transfer land to lenders 
as a method of repayment. 363 Section 7 of the MARA allowed for land sales as long as the quantity 
of land transferred matched the value of the reconfigured, discharged loan.364 This design changed 
the incentive structure for lenders in the short term. Whereas lenders in the pre-regulated market 
commonly extended defaulted loans or agreed instalments out of court, the MARA encouraged 
creditors to recover defaulted loans through land sales. The Registration Department attributed 
 
361 Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1947. 
362 Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1940.  
363 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 21-22. 
364 Courts determined the value of a plot of land by extrapolating from the net annual value of tax assessed on said 
plot. 
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the rise in the number of new land registrations in the Coimbatore district after the MARA to the, 
‘disposal of immovable properties by sale for discharging the debts.’365 
In these settlements, the courts favoured creditors as long as the value of the sale matched the 
value of the unpaid loan. The judgement in the 1943 case Kruttiventi Mallikharjuna Rao and ors. Vs. 
Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao and anr is proof of this. In this dispute, the lender provided the borrower 
a mortgage loan of 1500 rupees at 12 per cent interest per annum in 1927. The borrower repeatedly 
defaulted on the loan until it compounded to 3400 rupees in 1934. Both parties then agreed to an 
oral contract, in which the borrower would sell the mortgaged land to the creditor for the value of 
the defaulted loan. A written contract was not drawn up. The creditor took possession of the 
property in 1935, leased a part of it and cultivated the rest. In the early 1940s, the borrower 
petitioned the courts to reverse the sale. The appeal in the Madras High Court claimed that the 
creditor earned the value of the loan in the rents and cultivation profits made since the transfer. 
The borrower arrived at this conclusion after deducting the size of the loan to fit the parameters 
in the MARA. As written sale deeds did not accompany the original transfer, the borrower claimed 
the transaction was still a mortgage and since the debt was repaid, the property could return to the 
original owner. Judges in the High Court ruled in favour of the creditor, stating that the sale in 
1934 was a settlement offer for the repayment of unpaid loans. A sale deed was drawn up and the 
creditor took formal possession of the property.366 
Problems occurred when creditors attempted to use the sale arrangement to inflate the value 
of the unpaid loan. When the courts were able to identify this, judges placed injunctions on the 
sale until they arrived at the appropriate figure, accounting for debt reductions from the MARA. 
In the 1938 case, P.R. Govindaswami Naicker Vs. C. Javanmull Sowcar and anr, for example, judges 
found that the creditor was, ‘about to recover by the sale of the debtor’s property, mortgages to 
him the full amount of the debt, that is to say, without deducting the amount by which it has 
become reduced by the operation of the Agriculturists Relief Act.’367 The judges placed a temporary 
injunction on the sale. The potential for moneylenders to disguise sales as inflated loan repayments 
and the rise in sales following intervention indicates an important difference between the impact 
of credit laws in Madras versus other Indian provinces. Indeed, Chaudhary and Swamy’s study of 
land restrictions and credit in Punjab suggests that the number of sales declined at a similar rate as 
the number of mortgages in the short term. In their view, land alienation policies in Punjab applied 
 
365 Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1941, 2. 
366 Kruttiventi Mallikharjuna Rao and ors. Vs. Vemuri Pardhasaradhirao and anr. (1943 2 MLJ 584, Madras, 12 October 
1943). 
367 P.R. Govindaswami Naicker Vs. C. Javanmull Sowcar and anr. (1938 2 MLJ 918, Madras, 21 May 1938). 
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to sales as well as mortgages, therefore explaining the immediate decline in both markets.368 In this 
context, the government’s encouragement of sales in Madras provides a unique outcome of 
intervention, in which creditors settled unpaid debts without committing to the interest rate 
restrictions. 
Creditors’ ability to mask inflated loan repayments as land sales and borrowers’ ability to injunct 
or reverse transfers and repayments caused confusion in the courts. Judges questioned whether to 
challenge the value of the sale on the borrower’s behalf or protect the moneylender and allow the 
sale as a means of ensuring the repayment of loans. In one case, judges reduced the repayment 
amount but ruled in favour of the sale, suggesting the MARA did not apply to agreed debt 
settlements before 1 September 1937.369 In another, the creditor and borrower agreed to sale as a 
settlement of unpaid debts before 1937 but judges cited the MARA and stopped the sale to ensure 
the value of the sale matched the value of the loan with the imposed interest rate ceiling.370 On the 
MARA causing confusion in courts, the judge in the latter case remarked,  
 
I must remark that contentions like the one advanced are rendered possible by the language 
of the various provisions of the Act. The Act is one of the most ill-drafted enactments now 
existing on the statute book. Every section bristles with difficulties and it is no wonder that 
the Act has become a fruitful source of litigation.371 
 
The next section of this chapter considers similar such areas of confusion, focusing on legal 
disputes that highlighted contradictions between MARA and contract laws. 
The rise in sales was not only because of the encouragement from the law and courts. Following 
intervention, cultivators invested their disposable income in land purchase rather than 
moneylending.372 On the nature of land and credit substitution after intervention, Naidu and 
Vaidyanathan suggested that, ‘money lenders will begin to hoard or buy lands. When the investor 
becomes a burnt cat, it will take a long time for him to recoup and one cannot expect the money 
lender to lend easily to the agriculturists in the near future.’373 Whether it is because creditors are 
settling old debts or avoiding the provision of new mortgage loans, the rise in sales demonstrates 
that lending contracted following the MARA. 
 
368 Chaudhary and Swamy, “A Policy of Credit Disruption”, 4. 
369 B.K. Narayanaswami Chettiar Vs. Gurukkar Rudrappa and anr. (1943, Madras, 26 November 1943). 
370 V. Sreenivasachariar and anr. Vs. Krishniah Chetty and ors. (1939, 1 MLJ 860, Madras, 04 September 1939) 
371 V. Sreenivasachariar and anr. Vs. Krishniah Chetty and ors. (1939, 1 MLJ 860, Madras, 04 September 1939) 
372 This trend continued in the early 1940s as investors found land a safe investment in wartime. See Report on the 
Administration of the Registration Department 1947. 
373 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 25. 
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Figure 4.3 Number and nominal value of land sales, 1921-1941 
 
Source: Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1921-1941. 
Notes: The source estimates the number and value of land sales registered in each district in a given year. Aggregations 
made by the author. The graph excludes data from the Malabar district. 
 
The relationship between the number and value of transactions requires some clarification. The 
number of sales increased earlier and at a much quicker rate than the value of sales. The same is 
true of mortgages. Whereas the number of mortgages either stagnated or saw a partial increase in 
the early 1940s, the nominal value of mortgages declined. This could suggest that declining land 
prices are skewing the data for the decline in mortgages. However, a closer comparison between 
mortgages and sales eases this concern. Land sales increased rapidly in the mid-1930s while 
mortgages stagnated below pre-Depression levels. Moreover, the nominal value of sales increased 
while the nominal value of mortgages declined from 1937. Therefore, low land prices are not 
driving the results in the graphs above. The data demonstrates that mortgages declined and sales 
increased concurrently. 
The decline in mortgage credit was evident across districts. This is reflected in a study of 
mortgages and sales in three districts: Bellary, Cuddapah and West Godavari.  These districts 
provide a representative sample owing to the distinct features in each. West Godavari was a 
naturally irrigated, primarily rice producing region. Bellary and Cuddapah were dry regions, 
primarily producing cereals. Bellary, with black soil in some areas, produced cotton while 
Cuddapah endured poor irrigation and low-quality soil. The land tenure system across the majority 
of the acreage in each district was ryotwari or government-cultivator. As such, the data is not 
affected by inconsistencies in land titles within and across the sample districts. Following credit 
400000
450000
500000
550000
600000
650000
700000
750000
150000000
170000000
190000000
210000000
230000000
250000000
270000000
290000000
310000000
1
92
1
1
92
2
1
92
3
1
92
4
1
92
5
1
92
6
1
92
7
1
92
8
1
92
9
1
93
0
1
93
1
1
93
2
1
93
3
1
93
4
1
93
5
1
93
6
1
93
7
1
93
8
1
93
9
1
94
0
1
94
1
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
sa
le
s
V
al
u
e 
o
f 
sa
le
s 
(r
u
p
ee
s)
Value of sales Number of sales
134 
 
policies, the number of mortgages declined sharply and stagnated in the short-term thereafter. This 
occurred despite rising prices and crisis recovery. The number of sales increased following 
intervention, and continued to rise in the short-term. Comparing Figures 4.4 and 4.5, mortgages 
and sales showed opposing temporal trends in the late 1930s. The value of mortgages saw a larger 
decline than the number of mortgages. The value of mortgage loans declined by 30 per cent in 
West Godavari and 40 per cent in Bellary between 1937 and 1938.374 
 
Figure 4.4 Number of mortgages in 3 districts, 1934-1941 
 
Source: Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1934-1941. 
Notes: Data estimates the number of mortgages registered in the select district’s land registration office.  
 
Figure 4.5 Number of land sales in 3 districts, 1934-1941 
 
Source: Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1934-1941. 
Notes: Data estimates the number of land sales registered in the select district’s land registration offices.  
 
In short, this section suggests that the mortgage market contracted after the MARA. Though 
sale instruments as court settlements for unpaid debts and the rise in commodity prices allowed 
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creditors to recover overdue loans, evidence shows that intervention contracted the mortgage 
market in the short-term. Debt settlements increased while creditors attempted to skirt the law by 
acquiring lands worth more than the size of the loan, while the provision of new mortgage loans 
declined. The previous chapter shows that new loans were commonly unsecured in the rural credit 
market. Lenders commonly executed debt instruments, including mortgages, only following initial 
defaults. The chapter now turns to transitions in the supply of unsecured and contracted loans to 
fully analyse the impact of intervention on the credit market.  
 
4.4 Intervention and Promissory Notes 
 
The interest rate ceiling enforced in the 1930s generated two administrative threats to nineteenth 
century contract laws. First, credit laws conflicted with the 1872 India Contract Act and the 1881 
Negotiable Instruments Act, and questioned the legitimacy of promissory notes as contracts. 
Second, credit laws blurred the boundaries between the provincial assembly and the federal 
legislature. Policymakers questioned whether the enforcement of interest rate ceilings was ultra vires 
of the provincial legislature. Though the federal government delegated some policymaking powers 
to the provinces, contract laws remained a federal concern.375 Opposition to borrower protection 
claimed the MARA affected the use of contracts and was thus ultra vires of the provincial legislature. 
Moneylenders challenged the legality of credit laws in lower courts, with appeals eventually 
leading to the Madras High Court. Following the enforcement of the MARA, one moneylender 
initiated a dispute against the provincial government in a lower district court, questioning the 
conflict between laws protecting the freedom of contract and laws protecting borrowers. The judge 
invalidated the MARA on grounds of its conflict with prior contract laws. According to the final 
judgement issued on 19 September 1938, 
 
Considering the relevant sections of the Government of India Act 1935 together with the 
legislation in respect of promissory notes and bills of exchange under the Negotiable 
Instruments Act, it seems to me clear that the promissory note is a subject matter which is 
outside the province of the legislative powers of the provincial legislature and therefore it is 
we do not find any mention of promissory notes or other documents representing notes 
while we find the word ‘debt’ alone in the Act IV of 1938. The question is whether ‘debt’ 
coming within that definition of the act will cover a debt under a promissory note or any 
negotiable instruments and upon this point there can be no doubt that all debts affected by 
the provisions of Act IV of 1938 of the Madras Provincial Legislature cannot comprise the 
 
375 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 22-23. 
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debts due under a promissory note or other negotiable instrument coming under the 
provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act.376 
 
The district court judge restricted the policy scope of the MARA by ruling that changes to 
contract laws were outside the legislative scope of provincial government. Following the 
decentralisation of policy making in 1919 and the Government of India Act in 1935, a Concurrent 
Legislative List determined the scope of law making for federal and provincial governments.377 
The provincial legislative list included agricultural credit, while federal government was responsible 
for changes to contract laws. As such, the court ruling did not invalidate the MARA but it did 
allow promissory notes to operate outside the scope of the MARA. According to the judge, the 
vague wording of provisions in the MARA left room for misinterpretation. The law did not 
explicitly mention ‘promissory note’ and instead broadly defined the scope of regulation as ‘debt’. 
The judge interpreted this to include unsecured, non-contracted credit transactions. The ruling 
declared that credit transactions ratified by contracts were regulated by nineteenth century contract 
laws and not targeted policies in the 1930s. The lower court restricted the scope of the interest rate 
ceiling to loans without promissory notes. The judgement, therefore, reinforced the freedom of 
contract by stressing failure in the design of MARA in its lack of consideration for the frequent 
use of promissory notes in rural credit.378 
In fear of watered-down credit regulation, district court judges appealed the decision to remove 
promissory notes from the scope of the MARA in the Madras High Court. Judges from three 
regional courts, the District Munsiff in Guntur, the District Munsiff in Cuddalore, and a Subordinate 
Judge in Coconada, collectively referred to a High Court Bench to revisit the legal capacity of the 
MARA. Writing in the six-month period between the lower court’s verdict and the final decision 
in the High Court, Naidu and Vaidyanathan stated that, ‘if the Act is held not to apply to negotiable 
instruments the relief to agriculturists becomes so small as to make the Act practically a dead 
letter….Everything depends on the decision of the High Court which is keenly awaited by many 
debtors and creditors.’379  
The High Court’s decision, issued on 7 February 1939 in the landmark case Mada Nagaratnam 
Vs. Puvvada Seshayya, repealed the previous judgement on the scope of borrower protection. The 
 
376 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 22-23. 
377 Mada Nagaratnam Vs. Puvvada Seshayya and Anr, (1939, IMLJ 272, Madras, 7 February 1939). Section 100 of the 
Government of India Act defined the areas of legislation devolved to federal and provincial legislatures. 
378 An eventual reversal of this initial judicial response constrains our ability to accurately predict the counter-factual 
history of the role of promissory notes in the credit market. However, considering the incentives that justified its use 
prior to the MARA, the chapter postulates a continued use of contract in the event of its exclusion from usury laws. 
379 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 22-23. 
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case was heard by a bench of three judges and the final judgement was issued by the Chief Justice 
of the Madras High Court, Alfred Lionel Leach.380 Leach overturned the lower court’s verdict by 
declaring the MARA as compatible with prior contract laws. Invalidating the respondent’s 
argument on the legal protection of contracted debts by the 1881 Negotiable Instruments Act, the 
High Court Bench summarised their judgment as, 
 
Negotiation of a promissory note is not prohibited nor is it said that a maker or an endorser 
shall not be liable. The only effect of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act so far as 
Negotiable Instruments are concerned is to reduce liability where the maker or endorser is 
an agriculturist.381 
 
The High Court sought to maximise the scope of the MARA. Judges took a clear position on 
the role of contract relative to usury laws. In the conflict between contract laws and borrower 
protection, courts prioritised the latter. The High Court Bench predicted that the MARA would 
have an insignificant impact if contracts were excluded from its scope. According to Leach, 
excluding promissory notes would render the Act inconsequential given, ‘the practice of lending 
money on promissory notes being so widespread.’382 Leach enforced the Act with the recognition 
that the protection of borrowers would have little effect had promissory notes been excluded from 
intervention. In adopting this position, the Madras High Court legitimised the increased policy 
sphere of the provincial legislature. Judges disagreed with the respondent’s petition that the MARA 
allowed the provincial government to interfere in a policy space outside its jurisdiction. The 
judiciary granted the provincial government powers to implement debt relief measures without 
concern for its impact on the role of contract.  
Despite attempts to challenge the MARA, the judiciary sustained the decision made by the 
Madras High Court in 1939, until the Act was eventually amended in 1976. The case of 
Subramaniam Chettiar Vs. Muthuswami Goundan appealed against the 1939 verdict by questioning the 
validity of the MARA in reference to its conflict with legislative authority. The appellants 
approached the Federal Court in 1940 to question the validity of the MARA given that the federal 
government, according to the Government of India Act in 1935, held the powers to make 
amendments to contracts laws. The Federal Court admitted the case, however, the provincial 
courts in Madras could enforce the interest rate ceiling while the case proceeded. Federal court 
 
380 Alfred Henry Lionel Leach qualified as a British barrister in 1907. Leach spent the majority of the 1930s and 1940s 
in South Asia, first as a judge in the Rangoon High Court in Burma, and then the Chief Justice of the Madras High 
Court from 1937 to 1947. 
381 Mada Nagaratnam Vs. Puvvada Seshayya and Anr, (1939, IMLJ 272, Madras, 7 February 1939). 
382 Mada Nagaratnam Vs. Puvvada Seshayya and Anr, (1939, IMLJ 272, Madras, 7 February 1939).  
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judges dealt specifically with the scope of the provincial legislature and not the conflict with 
promissory notes. The Chief Justice of the Federal Court, Maurice Gwyer, ruled in favour of Lionel 
Leach’s High Court decision.383 According to Gwyer, 
 
It must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation though purporting to deal with 
a subject in one list touches also on a subject in another list …. I am clear that the pith and 
substance of the Madras Act, whatever it may be, cannot at any rate be said to be legislation 
with respect to negotiable instruments or promissory notes, which are central subjects. And 
it seems to me quite immaterial that many or even most of the debts with which it deals are 
in practice evidenced by or based upon such instruments. I am of the opinion, therefore, 
that the Act cannot be challenged as invading the forbidden field of the Federal Legislative 
List.384  
 
Eventually, the Federal Legislature issued an ordinance in 1945, enforcing the interest rate 
ceiling prescribed in the MARA. Credit disputes in provincial courts were subject to judicial 
intervention after 1937. In the case of N S Sreenivisa Rao Vs. G M Abdul Rahim Sahib, for example, 
High Court judges amended interest rates. The creditor and borrower contractually, on signed 
promissory notes, agreed an interest rate of 12 per cent per annum in 1944. The creditor, in this 
case also the plaintiff, approached the courts to enforce repayment at the agreed terms. The lower 
court ruled in favour of the defendant, prompting the creditor to appeal this decision in the High 
Court. Citing Section 13 of the MARA, High Court judges enforced repayment at an interest rate 
of 5.5 per cent per annum in 1956.385 Did the inclusion of contracts into the scope of judicial 
intervention impact the supply of credit? 
Credit supply contracted following the enforcement of similar laws in various provinces in the 
1930s. According to an official report, ‘consequent on the legislation to abolish the system, the 
landlords (across India) have completely given up their practice of advancing loans to 
cultivators.’386 Approximately three-quarters of the total number of licensed moneylenders 
operating in rural United Provinces exited the market between 1936 and 1949.387  
 
383 Maurice Linford Gwyer was a judge and academic in late-colonial India. Gwyer was the Chief Justice of India’s 
Federal Court between 1937 and 1943 as well as Vice Chancellor of Delhi University between 1938 and 1950. 
384 "Federal Court", The Times of India, 7 December 1940. 
385 N S Sreenivisa Rao Vs. G M Abdul Rahim Sahib, (1956 2 MLJ 189, Madras, 20 March 1956). In the time between 
the date of loan issue and the case hearing, the borrower repaid a part of the loan to the creditor. Judges took this into 
account and therefore enforced the interest rate of 5.5 per cent rather than 6.25 per cent on the remaining amount. 
386 S Thirumalai, Post-war Agricultural Problems and Policies in India, (Bombay, 1954), 190. 
387 G D Agarwal, Reorganisation of Agricultural Credit, (Kanpur, 1952), 129. 
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The credit contraction in Madras was evident in the decline in borrowings between 1939 and 
1945. This reflects a supply problem as the demand for credit persisted.388 The abrupt contraction 
in credit supplied by moneylenders resulted in an increase in the demand for Taccavi loans (a limited 
number of which were granted by district governments).389 Yet, this was not supplied at a scale 
large enough to match the decline in informal credit. The market contracted as the diminishing 
presence of the village moneylender was not matched by alternative sources. The Madras Estates 
Land Act Committee summarised this supply disruption soon after the MARA was implemented. 
According to the committee, 
 
The government has not been able to create money for complete discharge of the scaled 
down debts.…Naturally the agriculturist finds himself in trouble with regard to credit. The 
old sowcars (moneylenders) whose debts have been cut down under the Act (MARA) would 
not be enthusiastic and ready to lend moneys to the agriculturist to the extent to which they 
were doing before the Act was passed.390 
 
Economists in the 1940s and 1950s reported similar findings. C. W. B. Zacharias, Professor in 
Economics at the University of Madras, claimed in 1950 that the MARA, ‘had the baneful effect 
of drying up the sources of credit in village areas.’391 G. D. Agarwal, an agricultural economist, 
suggested that ‘rapid changes in debt legislation have made creditors less certain of their future 
position.’392 C. F. Strickland, economist and member of the Indian Village Welfare Association, 
stated that intervention ‘impaired the credit of an agriculturist.’393 Strickland was not a promoter 
of free markets nor opposed to intervention. Writing in a non-legislative role, Strickland believed 
that intervention did not achieve a balance between protecting peasants and maintaining an active 
credit market. Lending, according to Strickland, was unprofitable post-intervention. In an excerpt 
of one publication, Strickland compares borrower protection to medical surgery where excessive 
legislation did more harm than good for the rural economy, 
 
Creditors may acknowledge the necessity of making sacrifices in a crisis, but they will not 
give credit in the future unless they are assured of repayment. Even a single surgical 
operation causes a shock to the system, and there is much evidence to show that conciliation, 
an inevitable process at the moment, has impaired the credit of an agriculturist. Credit has 
no doubt been excessive in the past, and some contraction is beneficial. The process should 
 
388 Agarwal, Reorganisation of Agricultural Credit, 129. 
389 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 23-24. 
390 MELAC Report, 223. 
391 C W B Zacharias, Madras Agriculture, (Madras, 1950), 167. 
392 Agarwal, Reorganisation of Agricultural Credit, 129. 
393 C F Strickland, The Relief of Agricultural Debt, (London, 1939), 15.  
140 
 
not, however, be unduly prolonged; a good surgeon works quickly and leaves the patient 
thereafter to return to normal life.394 
 
Commissioned by the provincial government, Narayanaswamy Naidu compiled a report after 
conducting a credit survey of 8530 families in 160 villages across the Madras province in the mid-
1940s. The report explains that village investigators carefully selected villages that reflected 
differences in geographical and socio-economic features, surveying rich and poor cultivators in 
wet and dry regions within the province. Naidu’s team of investigators surveyed villages to estimate 
the extent of borrowing in two years, 1939 and 1945. Naidu grouped villages into 10 zones and 
aggregated the household-level data zonally. The report anonymised the villages and the zones. 
The data does not specify type of loan instrument. However, as Naidu collected data from 
households across income classes, the chapter assumes that the data is a representative sample of 
unsecured and contracted loans. 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the data by zone, adjusting for commodity price inflation between the two 
years. The data shows that the value of credit borrowed per household declined by a significant 
margin. Zone 3 showed the largest decline where the real value borrowed per household was 76 
per cent lower in 1946 relative to 1939. The government report celebrated this reduction. Officials 
believed that the reduction was evidence of diminishing exploitation as borrowers were no longer 
held in perpetual debt bondage, under the market power of monopolist lenders.395 However, as 
discussed, the reduction was not a demand-driven transition but instead reflected a supply-side 
shock where credit became more inaccessible after intervention.  
Policymakers within the provincial administration disagreed on the drivers of credit reduction. 
Some administrators expressed concern over the contraction in credit supply following the interest 
rate ceiling. Indeed, in a co-authored a report in 1939, Naidu previously commented on the MARA, 
claiming that, ‘the first effect of the Act will be a drastic curtailment of credit and the seasonal 
agricultural operations will suffer through the drying up of credit.’396 From a survey of villages in 
the Cuddalore municipality after intervention, Naidu and Vaidyanathan find that ‘a good number 
of agriculturists have left their land fallow on account of their inability to get credit.’397 This 
contradicts Naidu’s subsequent position in the 1946 report, which translates declining household 
debts to freedom from ‘the disease of indebtedness’ and rising prosperity.398 
 
394 Strickland, The Relief of Agricultural Debt, 15. 
395 Report of the Economist, 43. 
396 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 23. 
397 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 23. 
398 Report of the Economist, 38. 
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Figure 4.6 Real value borrowed per household in 10 zones, 1939 and 1945 (1939 prices) 
 
Source: Report of the Economist, 43; McAlpin, “Price Movements”. 
Notes: The source aggregated individual observations of 8530 families into anonymised regional zones. The data 
shows the real value of credit borrowed divided by the number of families in each zone. The graph deflates nominal 
credit data using McAlpin’s commodity price index. Total borrowing in 1945 is adjusted to 1939 prices.  
 
Figure 4.7 Growth rate in nominal debt per capita, 1939 and 1945 
 
Source: Report of the Economist, 109. 
Notes: The report aggregated individual observations of 8530 families by borrowing class. The report defined each 
borrowing class as follows. Class I was defined as ‘Big Landholders’ where borrowers owned land above 25 acres. 
Class II was defined as ‘Medium Landholders’ where borrowers owned between 5 and 25 acres. Class III was defined 
as ‘Small Landholders’ where borrowers owned less than 5 acres. Class IV borrowers were tenants and Class V 
borrowers were landless labourers. The number of families chosen in the survey differed by class. Of the total 8530 
surveyed families, 240 belonged to Class I, 2097 belonged to Class II, 3784 belonged to Class III, 1130 belonged to 
Class IV and 1279 belonged to Class V. The graph indexes each class for ease of comparison between the classes. The 
base year in the graph is 1939. 
 
As illustrated in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, household surveys show that the real value of credit 
borrowed contracted across income categories. When deflated by prices, the value of loans across 
borrowing categories declined between 1939 and 1945. However, the wealthier borrowers were 
more affected than the poor. Nominal borrowings declined for the top 3 income classes, with a 
substantial decline for the richest households. In contrast, nominal borrowings increased for 
households in the lowest income classes. Indeed, the average debt per capita among 1130 
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smallholders in Class IV increased from 20.5 rupees to 21.3 rupees between 1939 and 1945. The 
debt per capita increased by larger margin, prior to price adjustments, for tenants and labourers. 
In contrast, the average debt per capita decreased from 188.5 to 113.3 rupees for Class I borrowers 
and 91.7 to 64.1 rupees for Class II borrowers. While the surveyors suggest that rising wartime 
prices benefitted the rich more than the poor and this reflects in the distinctive amounts borrowed, 
a more plausible explanation seems to be in the type of loans provided. As the next section of the 
chapter will show, unsecured loans and crop sharing arrangements operated outside the scope of 
the MARA. Mortgages, promissory notes and other loans that were sized high enough to warrant 
enforcement in courts were most affected by the MARA. Therefore, small loans to the poor 
remained informally enforced and untouched by government regulations.  
In short, credit intervention led to a judicial conflict between the protection of free enterprise 
and more equitable markets. Judges prioritised the latter, limiting the scope of contract laws and 
expanding the scope of credit laws. This section has demonstrated that state intervention led to a 
contraction in the supply of unsecured and contracted loans. The disruption in credit supply 
reinforced the contentious nature of the MARA. The MARA triggered a loss in efficiency as 
borrowers had restricted access to credit following the state-imposed artificial price ceiling. 
However, the decline in lending differed by class of borrower. Credit to high-income borrowers 
saw a larger decline than credit to low-income borrowers. The next question to consider is whether 
moneylenders in the post-MARA period provided loans in accordance with regulation. We turn to 
whether the credit market operated more equitably after the MARA. 
 
4.5 Intervention and Enforcement Costs 
 
This section shows that after intervention the use of contracts declined and a black market for 
rural credit emerged. Creditors inflated the value of loans in unpaid and new contracts to account 
for higher interest rates than legally permitted. Creditors operated outside the legal structure where 
interest rates charged exceeded the imposed restriction. Indeed, from a survey of moneylenders in 
the early 1950s, half of all loans in the Coimbatore district reported interest rates of between 10 
and 12.5 per cent in 1954 while only a quarter reported rates below 7 per cent.399 This data was 
collected as part of a survey commissioned by the Indian government in 1954. Despite the official 
status of this report, lenders testified to charging higher interest rates than legally permitted.  
 
399 Rural Credit Survey District Monograph: Coimbatore, 16. 
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Lenders resorted to fraud and law evasion. The Rural Banking Enquiry Committee reported in 
1950 that, ‘such legislation has already had the effect of driving a large number of moneylenders 
out of business or encouraging them to resort to evasive practices resulting in restricted and costlier 
credit, particularly to the small agriculturist.’400 Writing in 1952, Dantwala, an agricultural 
economist, argued that debt relief laws had an insignificant impact on equity in rural credit. ‘Honest 
moneylenders’ opted out of the market as they were not prepared to lend with new interest rate 
restrictions.401 The ‘dishonest moneylender’ then dominated the market by endorsing methods of 
law evasion.402 This is supported by a report in the same year which stated that, ‘their (the 
cultivator’s) dire need for credit has given encouragement to a class of unscrupulous moneylenders 
who can effectively evade the provisions of the debt legislation by practicing dishonest means.’403 
How did creditors manage to continue lending and ignore the law? Moneylenders sustained a 
previous practice and evaded laws through the manipulation of contracts and ledgers. Lenders 
inflated loan principals on promissory notes to include higher rates of interest. In cases of default, 
creditors renewed promissory notes to include previously unpaid interest.404 Interest rates 
compounded, through inflated contracts, ultimately matching those charged prior to the 
enforcement of MARA.405 Legal records provide evidence of this contract falsification. In the case 
of Garimella Mallikharjuna Rao Vs. Mangipudi Tripura Sundari, for example, a credit contract in 1936 
contained a rate of interest higher than the legal ceiling. Following defaults, the creditor renewed 
the promissory note in 1939, 1942 and 1945 where the principal recorded was inflated to include 
a higher rate of interest. The renewed promissory note recorded an interest rate lower than the 
ceiling. The creditor refused to renew the promissory note beyond 6 April 1945 and expected the 
repayment of overdues, valued at 1072 rupees and 5 annas. The borrower sued the creditor in the 
District Court in Amalapuram for attempting to recover unpaid loans with interest rates exceeding 
the legal limit. The court ruled in favour of the creditor, where judges claimed there was no 
evidence of contract falsification or unwillingness to conform to the law. The decision was 
appealed in the High Court where judges ruled in favour of the borrower. The court reduced the 
repayment value to 650 rupees and 2 annas and attached an interest rate of 5.5 per cent per annum, 
 
400 Report of the Rural Banking Enquiry Committee, (Delhi, 1950), 52. 
401 M L Dantwala, "Agricultural Credit in India-The Missing Link." Pacific Affairs 25, no. 4 (1952), 351-352. 
402 Dantwala, “Agricultural Credit”, 351-352. 
403 Agarwal, Reorganisation of Agricultural Credit 129.  
404 Rural Problems in Madras, 351. 
405 Zacharias, Madras Agriculture, 179. 
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to apply to the loan from the date of the District Court’s decision in 1947 to the final High Court 
verdict in 1953.406  
Following the MARA, judges forced some moneylenders to present account books and ledgers 
in court disputes.407 Similar to the above, lenders manipulated ledgers through principal inflation 
following the MARA.408 In one dispute, A. L. Vr. St. Veerappa Vs. Chinnasamy Alias Samba Goundan 
and ORS, the creditor inflated three promissory notes attached to loans provided to the same 
borrower in the 1920s. The lender recorded inflated principals in ledgers, while the borrower 
signed and thumb-printed the ledgers. The parties executed the first promissory note in 1922, the 
second in 1923 and the third in 1925. The third recorded an unpaid value of 2500 rupees. The 
creditor attempted to enforce the repayment of this loan in the District Court in the Coimbatore 
district in 1944. The borrower accepted that loans in 1922 and 1923 were unpaid and the 1925 
promissory note was a loan extension. However, the borrower argued that the loan extension 
violated the MARA as it allowed the creditor to recover more than double the initial principal 
provided. Indeed, as previously discussed, repayments that exceeded double the original principal 
violated the Damdupat rule in the MARA. The borrowers claimed that the lenders deliberately 
‘suppressed all the account books’ which would indicate the inflation of the loan beyond the legal 
value.409 The district court judges ruled in favour of the borrower and wrote-off the majority of 
the unpaid loan for exceeding double the initial principal. When the creditor appealed this decision 
in the High Court, the judges subpoenaed the ledgers to estimate the value of loans unpaid, 
accounting for regulatory deductions. The creditor ultimately presented three ledgers, with loan 
accounts that did not record the borrowing in dispute. The high court judges sustained the lower 
court’s decision. 
In the longer term, the MARA discouraged the use of contracts altogether. Government reports 
in the 1930s commonly describe the use of pro-notes as ‘widespread.’410 However, similar reports 
in the 1940s and 1950s sparsely mention the use of this instrument.411 According to the Rural 
Credit Survey, the majority of rural lending in Madras was unsecured. Creditors secured some 
loans with mortgage instruments, but none by promissory notes. As shown in the previous chapter, 
 
406 Garimella Mallikharjuna Rao Vs. Mangipudi Tripura Sundari, (1953, 2MLJ 313, Madras, 27 March 1953). 
407 The case A. L. Vr. St. Veerappa  v. Chinnasamy Alias Samba Goundan and ORS, (1950, 2MLJ 328, Madras, 5 April 
1950), provides an example where principals were not recorded on contracts prior to the borrower’s signature. The 
creditor inflated the principal without the borrower’s consent following default.  
408 Rural Problems in Madras, 351. 
409 A. L. Vr. St. Veerappa  v. Chinnasamy Alias Samba Goundan and ORS, (1950, 2MLJ 328, Madras, 5 April 1950). 
410 This is especially apparent in the 1930 Banking Enquiry and 1935 Report on Indebtedness. 
411 The instrument is sparsely mentioned in Report of the Economist and Rural Credit Survey. 
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co-applicant guarantees were a universal feature of credit contracts. The Rural Credit Survey 
reported in 1954 that co-applicant guarantors were not part of any of the loans surveyed in six 
districts.  
Table 4.1 Ratio of secured loans to total, 1954 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Rural Credit Survey, 553. 
Notes: The source estimates the value of loans owed to agriculturist moneylenders, classified by security provided. 
The primary security mentioned in the source is immovable property. The other form of security recorded is referred 
to in the source as ‘Guarenteed by Third Party’, reflective of the use of promissory notes. The survey listed the number 
of loans guaranteed by a third party as 0 for all districts and hence of no value. Calculations made in the source. 
 
Figure 4.8 Number of credit disputes in civil courts, 1925-57 
 
Source: Statistics of Civil Courts in the Madras Presidency 1925-1958. 
Notes: The data estimates the total number of registered disputes involving money in all civil courts across the 
province. Data is unavailable for the following periods: 1940-1945, 1948-1952. 
 
The decline in the use of contracts reflected the moneylender’s aversion to courts more 
generally. Creditors avoided formal procedure, restricting the impact of the MARA on more 
0
100,000
200,000
300,000
400,000
500,000
600,000
1926 1936 1946 1956
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
d
is
p
u
te
s
District Immovable Property (per cent of total) 
Coimbatore 26.8 
Cuddapah 0 
Kurnool 0 
West Godavari 1.4 
Chingleput 23.7 
Ramanathapuram 50.6 
146 
 
equitable outcomes in the credit market. Disputes resolved outside the formal legal structure were 
excluded from the effects of borrower protection laws. The provincial government delegated the 
enforcement of the MARA to judicial discretion. Using direction provided in the MARA, judges 
evaluated the incidence of borrower exploitation based on rates of interest in credit disputes. The 
potential for the act to enforce more equitable outcomes for borrowers was then conditional on 
the resolution of credit disputes in courts. As shown in the previous chapter, creditors were 
reluctant to approach courts and formal procedures in the unregulated market. The enforcement 
of the MARA only accentuated this pattern. 
Figure 4.8 highlights key transitions in the number of disputes between 1925 and 1960. The 
Depression period witnessed an increase in the amount of credit related litigation. This process 
corrected as the number of disputes in 1933 returned to its previous position in the late 1920s. 
Coinciding with the onset of legislative measures (the 1935 Madras Debtors Protection Act), there 
was an initial decline in the number of credit proceedings in the late 1930s. The most significant 
shift occurred between 1939 and 1946.412 The number of credit disputes in courts more than halved 
in this period. This trend continued throughout the 1950s. Data from the Rural Credit Survey 
supports the hypothesis that creditors were reluctant to approach courts. According to the survey, 
29 out of 31 surveyed lenders in a group of coastal districts reported defaulted loans. However, 
fewer than 10 per cent of lenders reported involvement in legal litigation in the same region.413 
The provincial courts recorded credit disputes, where interest rate ceilings exceeded guidelines, 
as cases under the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act.414 The number of registered cases measures 
the number of transactions that judges altered under the new law. In this context, Table 4.2 
estimates the scope and impact of credit intervention. As illustrated, few credit disputes 
approached the courts following MARA. The number of MARA cases between 1938 and 1945 
was 10 per cent of the number of mortgage loans provided between 1938 and 1941 alone. The 
value of credit under dispute between 1938 and 1945 was 20 per cent of the value of mortgage 
loans between 1938 and 1941. Pre-MARA provincial reports suggest that mortgages accounted 
for half of the rural credit market size. The Provincial Banking Enquiry also suggests that default 
rates of 30 per cent were typical of credit markets in 1929. Assuming this trend continued into the 
early 1940s, the number of MARA disputes in courts between 1938 and 1945 was only 20 per cent 
of defaulted credit transactions between 1938 and 1941. Furthermore, if we had access to mortgage 
 
412 With the unavailability of data between 1940 and 1945, it is difficult to determine the exact date of this transition. 
413 Rural Credit Survey, Part I, 474. The data represents ‘East Coast’ districts from Madras, Mysore and Hyderabad. The 
survey included the following districts:  Nizamabad, West Godavari, Chingleput and Ramnathapuram. 
414 Hereafter referred to as ‘MARA cases.’ 
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data for the entire 1939 to 1945 period, it would only corroborate this claim that judges managed 
to intervene in a marginal number of credit disputes after the MARA. 
 
Table 4.2 MARA Cases relative to mortgage loans  
Cases 1938-
1945 (1) 
Case value 
1938-1945 (2) 
Mortgages 
1938-1941 (3) 
Mortgages value 
1938-1941 (4) 
Ratio 1 to 3 Ratio 2 to 4 
204,528 95,466,104 1,479,302 433,147,259 0.1 0.2 
Source: Report of the Economist, 53; Report on the Administration of the Registration Department 1939-1941. 
Notes: The data on legal cases runs from March 1938 to September 1945. The first column measures the total number 
of registered disputes under the MARA. By September 1945, courts disposed of 203,874 cases while 654 disputes 
were still pending. The second column measures the value of credit transactions (rupees) involved in the registered 
cases. The third and fourth column measure the number and value (rupees) of mortgage loans between 1938 and 
1941. We do not have access to mortgage data for the 1941 to 1945 period. Ratios calculated by the author. 
 
Loan sizes were high, relative to the average, in MARA cases. As argued in the previous chapter, 
the size of mortgage loans was higher than unsecured loans as creditors priced enforcement costs 
into loans when executing legal instruments. Yet, the ratio of the value of credit transactions under 
review in Table 4.2 to the value of mortgages was higher than a comparison of the number of 
transactions. This suggests that the value of loans under dispute were higher than the value of the 
average mortgage loan. In other words, the chapter suggests that the size of loans under judicial 
intervention exceeded the size of both mortgage and unsecured loans in the same period. 
Following the MARA, creditors either avoided courts or seemed to approach courts when the size 
of loans far exceeded the average. Increased enforcement costs after the MARA explains this 
result. 
The decline in courts and contracts was driven by enforcement costs. The obligation to report 
lower interest rates on signed contracts increased the costs of this method of enforcement. Put 
differently, dispute costs could no longer be transmitted to reported interest rates on promissory 
notes. This raised the minimum loan size required to justify the use of this instrument. More 
generally, creditors responded to intervention by operating outside the limits of legal procedure. 
The MARA imposed a conflict between formal and informal enforcement arrangements where 
moneylenders were incentivised to adopt the most cost-efficient procedure. In this context, lenders 
evaded the artificial price control by avoiding courts and adopting alternate enforcement 
arrangements instead. Informal dispute resolution substituted for this decline in the role of formal 
procedure as an enforcement mechanism. Creditors relied on alternate forms of loan securities to 
evade legal procedure. From a cast study of villages in 1939, for example, Naidu and Vaidyanathan 
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claim that creditors demanded jewellery or household furniture as forms of credit security.415 The 
MARA did not regulate these methods of lending.  
Crop was a common substitute for contract or land as a form of collateral in the regulated 
market. The ease of this substitution was driven by the distinctive features of the credit market in 
Madras. Homogeneity in the occupations of lenders and borrowers, and increasing commodity 
prices in the 1940s, lowered the costs of interlinked transactions. In the absence of formal 
contracts, crop was a viable article of collateral for lenders that were also cultivators. 
Sources suggest that sharecropping arrangements between landlords and tenants were common 
in non-commercialised regions, but these sources do not indicate that there was a rise in this 
particular credit arrangement after the MARA. Under sharecropping contracts, landlords advanced 
loans exclusively to tenants. Borrowers repaid by sharing produce at the end of the harvest, where 
the transactions of rent and credit were interlinked.416 In each structure the value of crop obtained 
by the moneylender included repayment of the principal and interest on the loan provided.417 There 
were two reported structures of sharecropping in Madras during this period. The Kuthugai 
arrangement relied on fixed rent cash transactions. The Varam arrangement functioned as a joint 
venture with a pre-determined crop allocation to both agents. In general, both arrangements 
involved a payment at the end of the production cycle which included rent and credit. However, 
the fixed rental structure relied on cash.418 In order to purchase the inputs required, landlords 
provided cash loans at the start of the production cycle. Creditors pre-determined a fixed rent 
which borrowers paid at the end of the production cycle.419 Under the crop allocation arrangement, 
landlords and tenants shared the final produce in kind at a pre-determined ratio by both parties. 
The sharing ratio at the end of the production cycle depended on the ratio of inputs supplied by 
landlord and tenant.420 According to the District Gazzetteer, landlord-creditors provided tenant-
borrowers ‘30 or 33 per cent’ of the total produce through the varam system in the Tanjore 
 
415 Naidu and Vaidyanathan, The Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, 23. 
416 Anthropological studies by Kathleen Gough and Joan Mencher discuss sharecropping arrangements in the Tanjore 
and Chengleput districts in Madras. See Kathleen E Gough, "Brahman Kinship in a Tamil Village 1." American 
Anthropologist 58, no. 5 (1956): 826-53; Joan P Mencher, Agriculture and Social Structure in Tamil Nadu : Past Origins, Present 
Transformations and Future Prospects, (Durham, 1978). 
417 Zacharias, Madras Agriculture, 152-154. 
418 Zacharias, Madras Agriculture, 148. 
419 It was common for transactions at the end of the production cycle to have been in kind under sharecropping 
regimes. Creditors pre-decided the amount of produce shared at the end of the harvest at the start of the cultivating 
season according to a predicted market price of the final commodity. Lenders determined the volume shared according 
to the market price of the commodity. In a bad year, cash transactions increased the likelihood of default whereas a 
sharing of the final produce in kind perhaps decreased this risk. 
420 Landlords provided inputs into cultivation as loans in kind.  Landlords filtered the principal and interest of the loan 
into the amount of produce owed to the landlord creditor at the end of the cycle. 
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district.421 This demonstrates the second difference between both arrangements which was the role 
of the tenant. Cultivation was pursued as a joint venture by both landlord and tenant under the 
crop distribution arrangement.422 
Creditors were more likely to rely on informal sharecropping arrangements in districts where 
cultivators commonly transacted in kind. The proportion of produce provided by tenants to 
landlords in terms of total expenditure in kind suggests that sharecropping was increasingly 
common in these areas. This was higher in the East Coast districts as close to half of total 
expenditure in kind was spent on the sharing of produce with landlords. 
 
Table 4.3 Landlord-tenant cash and kind expenditure, 1954 
Region 
Cash Expenditure 
(per cent) 
Cash Contributions 
(per cent) 
Kind Expenditure 
(per cent) 
Kind Sharing 
(per cent) 
South Deccan 69.2 1.4 30.8 33.6 
East Coast 62.3 1 37.7 43.8 
Source: Rural Credit Survey, Part II, 834-854. 
Notes: Cash Expenditure estimates the proportion of cultivation expenditure paid in cash. Cash Contributions then 
sub-divides this cash expenditure by the amount spent by landlords on cash contributions to tenants and co-sharers. 
Kind Expenditure estimates the proportion of expenditure in kind to total cultivation expenditure. Kind Sharing 
estimates the share of produce shared with the landlord or co-sharer as a proportion of the total expenditure in kind.  
Payments solely for rent are excluded from this table. The table documents the amount of produce shared between 
landlords and tenants apart from rents. South Deccan districts include Hassan, Bangalore, Coimbatore and Cuddapah. 
East Coast includes Nizamabad, West Godavari, Chingleput and Ramnathapuram. 
 
However, sharecropping was a supplement to, rather than substitute of, formal procedure as 
an enforcement mechanism. According to an official report of the unregulated market in 1935, 
landless labourers and tenants commonly borrowed using sharecropping arrangements.423 As such, 
sharecropping was an arrangement exclusive to the landlord-tenant relationship and thus 
unaffected by the MARA. This could explain the rise in the nominal value of loans to tenants and 
labourers between 1938 and 1945, as depicted in Figure 4.7.  
Contemporary studies in the 1940s suggest that forward contract crop sharing arrangements 
became more common for the lenders and borrowers that were not tied to tenancy arrangements. 
When executing the forward contracts, creditors and debtors agreed on a predicted value of crop 
prior to the harvest. Borrowers promised the repayment of loans in cash or a volume of crop. 
 
421 Madras District Gazetteers: Tanjore, 111. 
422 P J Thomas and Ramakrishnan K C, Some South Indian Villages: A Resurvey, (Madras, 1940), 346. 
423 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 18. 
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Creditors determined the repayment amount according to predicted commodity prices. Through 
this structure, the moneylender benefitted from the price differential of the commodity at sale and 
the commodity at attachment. Lending through forward contracts was common for trade but not 
agriculture in the unregulated credit market. Different markets serviced loans for cultivation and 
loans for trade in the 1920s and 1930s. Borrowers used agricultural credit to finance cultivation 
expenses and borrowed at the start of the production cycle. Borrowers used trade credit to finance 
the costs of storage, transport and marketing.424 The Provincial Banking Enquiry distinguished 
between the suppliers of trade credit and the suppliers of agricultural credit.425 Trade creditors were 
commonly ‘traders and commission agents’, or ‘petty merchants’ including shopkeepers or local 
retailers. Merchants with storage facilities that benefitted from the price differential of 
commodities, tended to provide trade credit.426 In other words, suppliers of trade and marketing 
loans differed from those provided credit for cultivation expenses. However, according to 
Thirumalai, crop sharing arrangements increased in popularity in the 1940s. Previously isolated 
credit markets merged in the 1940s. Referring to credit in the late 1940s, Thirumalai notes, ‘in the 
present unorganised set up, the finance for marketing is unwittingly merged in the ordinary loans 
extended to cultivators at the time of sowing.’427 
Lenders charged an interest rate calculated by the difference between the predicted price and 
market price. Creditors bore a considerable price-driven risk in this method of lending. Market 
price fluctuations impacted the value of commodities as collateral. Writing in 1950, Zacharias 
suggested that creditors successfully mitigated the risk of price shocks by pre-negotiating the value 
of crop at a much lower rate than the predicted market price. According to Zacharias, some 
creditors provided loans against the borrowers’ entire produce as collateral.428 The flexibility 
available to lenders to claim the borrower’s entire produce acted as an insurance against both failed 
harvests and commodity price shocks. In this context, increase in commodity prices in the early 
1940s made the use of forward contract crop arrangements more lucrative. According to one 
report, the price of rice and cotton increased by three times between 1938 and 1945.429 Groundnut 
prices increased by four times in the same period. According to a government report in 1946, the 
 
424 Rural Problems in Madras, 314. 
425 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 30. 
426 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 30. 
427 Thirumalai, “Post-war Agricultural Problems”, 197. 
428 Zacharias, Madras Agriculture, 152-154. 
429 Report of the Economist, 47. 
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price hike prompted cultivators to colloquially refer to groundnut as the Chitukilichan nut.430 
Literally translated to ‘tearing to pieces contracts nut’, this reflects the impact of rising prices on 
the changing attitudes towards commodity as a valuable unit of collateral in rural credit. 
 The structure of village administration lowered enforcement costs in crop sharing 
arrangements. Avoiding courts and legal procedures, creditors enforced social sanctions on 
defaulting borrowers. Creditors and borrowers transacted in the same village, allowing the former 
to easily identify the creditworthiness of the latter. Lenders excluded risky borrowers, in this case 
previous defaulters, from participating in the local credit market.431 In this market structure, the 
debtor’s fear of credit being withheld in the future enforced the timely repayment of loans. 
According to accounts from anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s, elite networks colluded to 
enforce social sanctions in villages. Villagers with socio-political power enforced sanctions on 
credit defaulters without similar influence. Collectives of ‘headmen’, usually representing large 
landowners in villages, arbitrated small credit disputes. These forums were generally a final court 
of appeal and the collectives enforced the repayment of defaulted loans.432 The collectives enforced 
harsh punishments for repeated defaulters, especially when the defaulters relied on village 
landowners to make a living. Observing villages in the Tanjore district, Kathleen Gough argued in 
the mid-1950s that village collectives, or groups of landowners in villages, evicted tenants or 
withheld wages for labourers. Caste networks, according to Gough, reinforced social sanctions on 
defaulted borrowers. Despite the existence of village, district and provincial courts, a network of 
village headmen belonging to the same caste frequently formed the final court of appeal in small 
credit disputes. Gough reported that landowners, headmen, shopkeepers, moneylenders and 
panchayat committees belonged to the same caste within a village in the Tanjore district.433 Lenders 
were able to leverage on this caste network to ensure the exclusion of defaulted debtors from 
future loans, tenancy or employment. The role of caste in this instance was the strengthening of 
social sanctions on defaulters. 
In policy terms, the interlinking of commodity and credit markets diminished the impact of 
intervention. The MARA increased the costs of formal procedure. The MARA raised dispute costs 
on defaulted mortgage loans yielding interest rates above 6.25 per cent. The MARA also increased 
the costs of enforcing promissory notes. Courts invalidated pre-1938 contracts that declared rates 
higher than 6.25 per cent and lenders could not legally issue new contracts that transmitted 
 
430 Report of the Economist, 22.  
431 Rural Credit Survey, Vol. II, 172. 
432 Rural Credit Survey, Vol. II, 56. 
433 Gough, “Brahman Kinship”. 
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enforcement costs onto interest rates. Creditors recovered a higher interest rate on forward 
contract loans, benefitting from the difference between the market price of crops and the predicted 
prices at the time of lending. These lending arrangements were enforced informally and outside 
courts. Interest rates were unregulated as loans were not subjected to judicial review. In short, the 
chapter corroborates Dantwala’s observation that the credit market operated either as or more 
inequitably after intervention. 
 State officials did retrospectively identify the problem in the design of intervention. The 
amended Madras Agriculturists Relief Act (The Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act) in 1976 contained a 
specific provision for loans paid in cash but repaid in kind.434 Lawmakers attempted to include 
crop sharing arrangements within the regulatory scope of courts and debtor protection laws. 
However, this amendment did not solve previous failures in design. The challenges of regulating 
informal exchange constrained the regulatory sphere of the amended credit laws. Lending 
regulation continued to be administered through courts. As a result, the amended law expanded 
the scope of judicial discretion and not the sphere of the regulation itself. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
Credit intervention in the 1930s aimed to bring moneylenders within the sphere of formal 
administration. The government attempted to control credit exploitation through laws enforced 
by courts. This design contradicted the previously formal nature of the unregulated credit market. 
A market left to its own devices for much of the colonial period, evidence shows a symbiotic 
relationship between informal exchange and formal institutions in the unregulated rural credit 
market in Madras. Creditors relied on contracts and courts, pricing the costs of accessing these 
formal institutions to the borrower. Focused credit policy in the late 1930s caused a reversal in this 
form of exchange. Paradoxically, state intervention disassociated the market from the regulatory 
capacity of the state and administrative machinery. Whereas most historians think that the credit 
market was always informal and that was the source of its problem, this account suggests that the 
informal was, if not created, recreated and strengthened by regulation. Regulation was part of the 
problem of market failure. 
The provincial government interpreted high interest rates as a sign of exploitation, elite capture 
and peasant distress. The policy response was direct interest rate regulation supplemented with a 
strengthening of property rights. The aim was an undisrupted supply of credit on more equitable 
 
434 Section 8, Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act 1976. 
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terms for the borrower. In practice, laws not only failed to make equity gains but also triggered 
losses in efficiency. The credit market contracted and unsecured loans were provided at illegal rates 
of interest. The intervention was a superficial attempt at targeting inequities in rural credit. 
Environmental challenges reduced profitability and increased default rates. Enforcement costs 
exceeded the average size of loans, leading to high credit prices. The interest rate ceiling led to 
supply contraction which exacerbated illiquidity in rural Madras while also increasing enforcement 
costs, placing further upward pressure on credit prices. In a series of enforcement trade-offs, state 
intervention increased the costs of some arrangements but not others. The ceiling on interest rates 
increased the costs of mortgage and contracted loans with limited impact on crop sharing 
arrangements. Accordingly, a subsequent decline in the supply of credit and shift in the preferred 
lending arrangement limited the impact of credit intervention. Peasants accessed credit through 
illegal black markets with constrained supply and non-transparent prices. In these black markets, 
crop substituted land as a valuable form of unregulated collateral. Increasing commodity prices in 
the early 1940s made this shift lucrative for the creditors. 
If the price ceiling did not work, then did the government’s attempt to increase competition in 
the credit market bring more successful results? Indeed, interest rate ceilings formed one approach 
to the credit problem while establishing credit cooperatives to compete with private moneylenders 
formed another. Cooperatives had the potential to produce better results as it offered a combined 
solution to enforcement and liquidity constraints. However, as the next chapter demonstrates, 
cooperatives did not produce the desired results in rural Madras. 
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Chapter 5. Regulating Raiffeisen Cooperatives, 
1930-1960 
  
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in previous chapters, the colonial government acted on a belief that investment rates 
were low and the price of credit was high because markets were supply-constrained and non-
competitive in rural India. One aspect of state intervention was the regulation of moneylenders in 
the 1930s. Another aspect was the establishment of competing sources of credit. Policy initiatives 
from the early twentieth century established competing creditors to rival private moneylenders. 
Officials in the colonial government expected greater market competition to increase the supply 
of low-cost rural credit. However, the high risk of lending in the Indian countryside was a barrier 
to entry for commercial banks. Cultivation was seasonal and dependent on unpredictable rainfall 
patterns. Crop failure was common, leading to high default rates. Inefficient courts restrained 
institutional development in the market for agricultural credit. 
Cooperative banking offered a potential solution to the problem.435 Contemporary studies on 
Raiffeisen cooperatives in Western Europe referred to these as models to follow.436 Present-day 
scholarship endorses that view. Cooperatives in Germany and the Netherlands provided credit to 
the poor and reported profits in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.437 Scholars explain 
their success by highlighting two key pre-conditions for successful cooperative banking.438 First, 
cooperatives were self-funded within small membership groups. Rich and poor peasants saved in 
local cooperatives, while a high ratio of savings to external borrowing ensured banks were not 
 
435 Stiglitz, “Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets."; Besley and Coate, "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and 
Social Collateral”; Ghatak, "Screening by the Company You Keep”; Jonathan DeQuidt, Thiemo Fetzer, and Maitreesh 
Ghatak, "Group Lending without Joint Liability." Journal of Development Economics 121 (2016): 217. Each article broadly 
agrees that group lending arrangements can, under certain conditions, deliver a structure of risk sharing that reduce 
information and enforcement costs. 
436 Malcolm Darling, Some Aspects of Co-operation in Germany, Italy and Ireland, (Lahore, 1922). 
437 Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane, "Thy Neighbor’s Keeper”; Ghatak, and Guinnane, "The Economics of Lending 
with Joint Liability”. This scholarship shows that the structure of Raiffeisen banks in nineteenth century rural Germany 
contained the fundamental principles for profitable group lending. 
438 Guinnane, "A Failed Institutional Transplant”; Guinnane, "Cooperatives as Information Machines”; Guinnane, "A 
‘Friend and Advisor’”; Colvin, and McLaughlin, "Raiffeisenism Abroad”; Colvin, "Banking on a Religious Divide”. 
This scholarship demonstrates the benefits of localised membership, savings and supervision as the drivers of success 
in German and Dutch banks but failure in Irish cooperatives.  
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over-leveraged. Second, governments in Western Europe implemented regulatory and supervision 
structures that ensured cooperatives were well managed. In the context of high savings and strong 
regulation, members absorbed the risk of lending which not only allowed German and Dutch 
cooperatives to form a source of low-cost credit for peasants but also guaranteed their profitability 
and resilience to crisis.439  
 
Table 5.1 Principles of a Raiffeisen cooperative 
Feature Outcome 
Self-
funded 
Rich and poor save in banks. Defaults diminish savings. 
Self-
supervised 
To prevent losing savings to bad loans, members identify creditworthy borrowers 
and enforce the repayment of loans through social sanctions. 
Externally 
Regulated 
Regulators hold managers accountable. 
Source: Theoretical framework of Raifeissen cooperatives in Germany presented in Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane, 
“Thy Neighbor’s Keeper”; Ghatak and Guinnane, “The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability”.  
 
Early to mid-twentieth century India presents a useful case study of cooperatives. Cooperatives 
were a state-driven initiative in India and the colonial government set up the first Indian 
cooperative in the Madras province in 1904. The success of rural cooperatives in Europe inspired 
this initiative. According to an Indian economist in the 1930s, ‘the study of the small village banks 
in Germany towards the close of the last century attracted the attention of those who were eager 
to solve the problem of rural poverty.’440 Policymakers in colonial and post-colonial India 
continued to invest their confidence in the cooperative movement as a solution to the credit 
problem. They believed that, ‘great things were expected of the cooperative movement in India, 
on the analogy of its phenomenal success in Europe.’441  
The chapter shows that the transplanted cooperative banking model did not perform well in 
South India. The cooperative sector grew exponentially in the early to mid-twentieth century. The 
size of the cooperative sector in 1950s Madras mirrored that of Germany at the turn of the 
 
439 Colvin, “Banking on a Religious Divide”, emphasises the importance of religious institutions in supervising the 
allocation of loans thus protecting Dutch cooperatives from a banking crisis in the 1920s. 
440 Krishna K. Sharma, The Indian Money Market, (Bangalore, 1934), 63. 
441 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 58. 
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century.442 However, cooperatives failed to displace the village moneylender. Managers of 
cooperatives selectively allocated loans and despite this selective allocation, the cooperative sector 
was unprofitable.  
 Why did the experiment fail to achieve its main aims? The chapter answers that administrators 
in late-colonial and early post-colonial India designed a cooperative model that differed from the 
European model in important ways. Prevailing political objectives prioritising equity over 
efficiency led to a cooperative structure operating with low savings and weak regulation. The 
regulatory problem ultimately led to exclusion of poorer peasants from accessing credit and over-
leveraged cooperative banks. 
What was the problem with regulation? The stylized model of Raiffeisen banking in Europe 
suggests that cooperatives could succeed because savings rates were high. In Madras, however, 
poor peasants did not raise enough capital while rich peasants refused to save in village 
cooperatives. Depositors were few and members cum borrowers were plenty, restricting the role 
of social capital and self-supervision as regulatory mechanisms. Contrary to the European model 
where poorly resourced banks could succeed if they were well regulated, cooperatives in rural 
Madras were regulated by administrative bodies which did not enforce competent banking 
regulation. The Indian government created the first Banking Regulation Act in 1949 and it did not 
cover cooperatives. Specific laws passed by the governments in the provinces regulated 
cooperatives in the colonial and early post-colonial period. Political and organizational interest 
overlapped, leading to the mismanagement of cooperative banks. Post-colonial Indian 
governments injected public money into the cooperative sector in the belief that this would 
increase credit access for poor borrowers. However, flaws in regulatory design persisted, allowing 
managers to falsify accounts, embezzle and insider-lend.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first summarises the evolution and key features 
of the state-designed cooperative model in the province. The second traces the expansion of the 
cooperative sector and its lack of profitability in the early to mid-twentieth century. The third 
demonstrates that cooperatives were mismanaged because of low savings and weak regulation. 
The fourth shows that state financing in the 1940s sustained failing cooperatives but prolonged 
flaws in the sector’s regulatory structure.  
 
 
 
442 Guinnane, “A Friend and Advisor”; 237, estimates that 19,000 cooperative banks operated in Germany in 1914. 
Over 17,000 banks operated in Madras in 1952. 
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5.2 Designing the Cooperative Model 
 
The colonial government established credit cooperatives from 1904, however, these were not the 
first type of group lending arrangements in Madras. Mutual credit associations operated prior to 
the cooperative movement. Rotating credit and savings organizations were common in the 
Malabar district of western Madras in the nineteenth century.443 Groups of peasants within villages 
collected their savings into Chit Funds. These funds were informal, organized and managed within 
groups of friends or relatives. One member of the group managed the fund and collected a 
minimum deposit from the other members. Once collected, the manager issued a chit, a form of 
negotiated instrument, that defined the contents of the fund. The manager provided loans, by 
discounting the chit, to one borrower at a time. This was done by auction or lottery. When 
auctioned, the fund provided loans to members that offered the highest discount rate. 
Alternatively, in the prize chit format, each member of the group discounted the chit, the order of 
which was random and defined by drawing from a lot.444 
Mutual saving and credit associations were also common among colonial officers. British 
officials in Madras city and some town centres in the districts operated nidhi funds from the mid-
nineteenth century.445 These funds functioned similar to English Building Societies in the 
nineteenth century. Groups of friends or colleagues formed an informal association and each 
member contributed a portion of their savings each month to a fund. Managers of the fund 
allocated loans to members of the group at interest rates that were lower than the rates charged by 
moneylenders. The fund remained intact for a set number of months, after which it was liquidated 
and each member received a contribution larger than their investment. The share of the fund 
received depended on the size of the initial investment. Nidhi funds in Madras were started and 
operated by the British officers. Officials restricted participation in the nidhis to members of the 
government with fixed monthly incomes.446 
The colonial government believed that Chit and Nidhi funds contained problems as they were 
unregulated and serviced a small portion of the wealthy population. These were informal 
associations and operated outside the sphere of government regulation. Government reports 
suggested that managers of these funds typically embezzled from them. The other members did 
not have laws or legal support to enforce repayments and punishments on the embezzling 
 
443 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 34-35. 
444 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 34-35. 
445 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 33. 
446 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 33. 
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managers.447 Furthermore, these funds catered to a small section of the rural population. Poor 
peasants continued to rely on moneylenders for credit. As a result, serious discussions on 
establishing regulated competitors to moneylenders began in the late nineteenth century. 
Colonial administrators began highlighting the cooperative banking structure, mirroring the one 
that operated in central Europe, as a solution to rural credit problems in late nineteenth century 
India. Following the Deccan Riots in 1874, William Wedderburn, a District Judge in the Sind 
province, circulated a proposal in 1882 for the creation of cooperative banks in India.448 The 
British-ruled government rejected Wedderburn’s proposal.449 Instead, the government 
implemented the 1884 Agriculturists Loans Act, which allowed provincial governments to provide 
Taccavi, or short-term working capital loans, to rural cultivators. However, this was not at a large 
enough scale to make an impact.450 Lawmakers sought alternative solutions to the problem of 
imperfect competition in credit markets. From the early 1890s, the government began re-
considering cooperative banks as a potential solution. The provincial government in Madras 
commissioned Frederick Nicholson to compile a report on successful cooperative models in 
Europe.451 Orchestrating a path for regulated finance to replace moneylenders was the central 
purpose of the report. According to Nicholson, ‘the substitution of organized credit for that of 
the money-lender is a necessary development of civilisation.’452 While Nicholson travelled to 
Europe to write on the cooperative banking model in the early 1890s, cooperative credit 
organizations emerged in select Indian villages. In 1894, groups of villagers pooled savings and 
provided loans at low interest rates in 64 villages in Mysore.453 Similar banks operated in Punjab 
and the United Provinces in the 1890s and early 1900s. From the turn of the twentieth century, 
the government undertook the responsibility of establishing and regulating credit cooperatives. 
 
447 Eleanor M. Hough, The Co-operative Movement in India: Its Relation to a Sound National Economy, (London, 1932), 50-52. 
Eleanor Hough was a doctoral candidate in George Washington University in the early 1930s. Hough wrote a thesis, 
involving a large amount of field work, on the failures of the cooperative movement in India. 
448 William Wedderburn joined the Indian Civil Service in 1860. Wedderburn’s served in the judiciary until retirement 
in 1887. Wedderburn was a District Judge until 1885, and a judge in the Bombay High Court for two years thereafter. 
Following retirement, Wedderburn was a prominent political figure. Wedderburn and Allan Octavian Hume were 
founding members of the Indian National Congress. Wedderburn served as president of the party in 1889 and 1910. 
449 Hough, The Co-operative Movement in India, 52. 
450 Hough, The Co-operative Movement in India, 52. 
451 Frederick Augustus Nicholson, educated in the Royal Medical College and Lincoln College, Oxford, joined the 
Indian Civil Service in 1869. He was stationed in the Madras Presidency throughout his career and was promoted 
from the lower ranks of district administrator to member of the Legislative Council in 1897. Nicholson is credited for 
his reports on rural development including works on famine and banking. Colonial and post-colonial administrators 
refer to Nicholson as the ‘father of the cooperative movement in India.’ 
452 Report Regarding the Possibility of Introducing Land and Agricultural Banks into the Madras Presidency, (Madras, 1897), 3. 
453 Hough, The Co-operative Movement in India, 52. 
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This was not a bottom-up initiative. The government managed the size and scope of the 
cooperative movement in twentieth century India. 
Nicholson eventually circulated the finished report to the Madras Legislative Council in 1895. 
In the report, titled ‘Report on the possibility of introducing land and agricultural banks into the 
Madras Presidency’, Nicholson used the survey of cooperatives in Europe to suggest the 
conditions required for the transplant of a similar banking experiment in India. Nicholson asserted 
support for rural cooperatives and concluded the report with the phrase ‘Find Raiffeisen.’454 
Nicholson identified three essential principles of Raiffeisen cooperation in Europe. First, the 
membership of each cooperative bank remained small and localised. Second, cooperative banks 
were self-funded through members’ savings deposits. Third, cooperative banks determined the 
creditworthiness of borrowers by ‘personal character’ rather than land or physical collateral.455 
Nicholson’s report convinced the government of the benefits of cooperative banking.  
The British-ruled government in India set up one more committee, under the leadership of 
Edward Law in 1903, to advise them on the ideal legal structure to support the development of 
cooperative banking.456 Nicholson was part of the committee but retired from government service 
the year after, the same year that the British-ruled government designed laws that defined the 
conditions for the establishment of new cooperative banks. Following the recommendations of 
Edward Law’s committee, the colonial government in India implemented the first Cooperative 
Societies Act in 1904, which it later amended in 1912. With the responsibilities of designing and 
enforcing laws came an expansion in the administrative machinery to support cooperatives. The 
government created Cooperative Departments at the federal level and in each of the provinces. 
The Registrar, typically a senior member of the Indian Civil Service, chaired the Cooperative 
Department in the provinces. 
In India, cooperatives could not be formed without legal authorization. This authorization did 
not come from banking or company law. Laws executed by the Cooperative Department 
determined the guidelines for credit cooperatives to operate. Credit outfits operating within these 
guidelines could register, with the Cooperative Department, as credit cooperatives. Government 
and laws, therefore, were significant drivers of the growth of the cooperative movement in India. 
Indeed, Section 47 of the 1912 Cooperative Societies Act prohibited organisations other than those 
 
454 Report Regarding the Possibility of Introducing Land and Agricultural Banks, 185. 
455 Report Regarding the Possibility of Introducing Land and Agricultural Banks. 
456 Edward FitzGerald Law was a British diplomat in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The British 
government in India appointed Law as a financial advisor in 1900. Law advised the government on currency reforms 
and tax policies. In 1903, Law led a committee to determine the framing of laws that would ultimately govern 
cooperative banks in the early 1900s. 
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registered by the Cooperative Department from using the name ‘cooperative.’ The government 
framed the cooperative structure such that it could only develop under the control of the state.   
In this context, the 1904 and 1912 Cooperative Societies Acts identified key principles for the 
registration of individual cooperatives. These did not change during the period.457 The law 
differentiated between urban and rural cooperatives. Cooperatives were rural if 80 per cent of the 
members were employed in agriculture. To register a rural cooperative, the establishment needed 
a minimum membership of 10 people in the same village or town. If these requirements were 
satisfied, prospective cooperatives applied to the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies 
Department in the provincial government to register. Cooperatives could not form without the 
Registrar’s approval.458 If approved, the Registrar provided the new cooperatives a registration 
certificate. The new cooperative registered an official building address with the Cooperatives 
Department.459 With the expansion in the number of cooperative banks in the early twentieth 
century came an increase in the number of employees in the Cooperatives Department. The 
Registrar appointed Assistant Registrars, who also had the power to register new cooperatives. By 
1920, there were nine Assistant Registrars in the Cooperatives Department in Madras.460 
When the laws were vague in instruction, they strengthened the legislative capacity of provincial 
government. On capital structure, for example, the 1912 Cooperative Societies Act defined the 
process for registration and requirements for share subscription, but did not specify financial 
linkages between cooperatives. Similarly, the Act did not contain details on the regulation of the 
cooperative banks. The Act provided vague instructions on the rights of members, using phrases 
such as ‘mutual watch’ to define management accountability. Sections 35 and 36 of the Act 
provided Registrars the powers to inspect and supervise the affairs of each cooperative and 
instructed managers to comply with the Registrar’s enquiries. The provincial governments, under 
the Registrar’s leadership, had the flexibility to mould the cooperative structure. Each cooperative 
had its own set of by-laws. Prospective cooperatives could not register unless the Registrar 
approved its by-laws.461 The managers of cooperatives drafted these laws in accordance with 
guidelines provided by the Cooperatives Department. In other words, federal laws did not always 
design the cooperative structure. Provincial policymakers played a significant role. 
 
457 In India, laws referred to cooperatives as ‘banks’ and ‘societies.’ The chapter follows this terminology and uses the 
terms interchangeably. Commercial banks did not lend in rural Madras before 1960. 
458 A Short Introduction to Cooperation in the Madras Presidency, (Madras, 1920), 11-12. 
459 Section 15, 1912 Cooperative Societies Act. 
460 A Short Introduction to Cooperation in the Madras Presidency, 11. 
461 A Short Introduction to Cooperation in the Madras Presidency, 11-12. 
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Eventually, the federal government delegated the power to legislate in the cooperative sector 
to the governments in the provinces. Following the 1912 Cooperative Societies Act, the colonial 
government set up a committee under the leadership of Edward Maclagan to make 
recommendations for the ideal policy structure to support expansion of cooperatives.462 The 
committee suggested that the provincial governments take control of legislating in the cooperative 
sector. Five Years Later, and as part of the 1919 political reforms, the federal government officially 
delegated power to the provincial governments. The provincial governments enforced laws that 
regulated the cooperative movement. The government in Bombay enforced laws in 1925. The 
government in Madras, using the recommendations of the 1928 Townsend Committee report, 
implemented the Madras Cooperative Societies Act in 1932. Using examples of the initiatives taken 
in the provinces, the Maclagan Committee made recommendations for capital and management 
structure in the rural cooperatives. These were later included in the laws enforced by provincial 
governments. Did this model facilitate rural cooperation in Madras? 
If the aim was to expand the supply of credit in villages, that aim was initially met to a small 
extent. Cooperatives accepted deposits from members and non-members, hoping these deposits 
would finance the expansion in credit supply.463 By 1905, it became clear to policymakers that 
cooperatives struggled to raise savings from villages alone.464 The government, still focused on 
expanding credit supply, created a three-tier banking structure to compensate for the low level of 
savings in villages. The provincial government established the Madras Central Urban Bank 
(MCUB) which accepted deposits from members and non-members in metropolitan Madras. The 
MCUB provided credit to primary banks.465 The number of primary banks increased in the early 
twentieth century, exceeding the financial scope of the MCUB. The government created district 
banks to provide loans to primary banks in 1909. District banks were funded by three groups. 
First, members and non-members saved and owned shares in district banks. Second, primary 
banks deposited reserves into district banks. Third municipal and district level government 
departments saved public money in district banks. District banks did not lend to individual 
borrowers but exclusively to primary banks. As such, the cooperative three-tier structure included 
primary banks as creditors to cultivators in villages, apex district banks and an apex provincial bank 
 
462 Edward Douglas Maclagan joined the Indian Civil Service in 1883. Maclagan was stationed in Punjab as Chief 
Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Secretary to the Revenue Department, Secretary to the Education 
Department, Lieutenant Governor and finally Governor of the province. Maclagan compiled the report on 
cooperatives while being the Secretary to the Revenue Department in 1914. 
463 Cooperatives, as per law, could only provide loans to members. 
464 The Madras Co-operative Manual, (Madras, 1921), 7.  
465 The MCUB later changed its name to the Madras Provincial Cooperative Bank. 
162 
 
as feeders to primary banks. The provincial bank played a comparatively insignificant role as the 
majority of lending from primary banks was funded by loans from district banks. Though 
operating beforehand, the Maclagan Committee recommended the three-tier structure to expand 
lending in rural areas. The 1932 Madras Cooperative Societies Act entrenched the three-tier 
structure. In developing this cooperative model, the government succeeded in expanding the 
supply of credit, but made internal supervision challenging, as a later section will show. 
 
Table 5.2 Structure of cooperative banking in Madras 
Organization c. 1930 Role 
Government Enforced laws and regulated cooperative banks. 
Provincial Bank 
Savings bank in the city. Provided a small amount of credit to district 
and primary banks. 
District Bank 
A savings bank for members, non-members, primary banks and local 
government. Provided credit to primary banks. 
Primary Bank 
A savings bank for members and non-members. Lending bank for 
members in rural villages. 
 
The government supplemented the expansion in credit supply with rules that stipulated the 
participation of poor peasants in the management of primary banks. The government needed rich 
peasants to participate in order to keep savings high and cooperatives self-funded. Yet, it also 
needed to ensure that banks were not hijacked by richer cultivators that wielded greater social and 
political power in the country-side. The Cooperatives Societies Acts in 1904 and 1912 did not 
specify management structure.466 The Registrar in Madras enforced rules on the election and 
supervision of cooperative bank managers. When prospective cooperatives fulfilled the guidelines 
to register, the Registrar or Assistant Registrar scheduled a meeting for the ten applicant members. 
The members voted in a governing board of five managers, or a panchayat, to manage the 
cooperative. The managers drafted by-laws and approved applications for new membership and 
loans.467 Each panchayat included one president and one secretary. Once elected, managers were 
 
466 Hough, The Co-operative Movement in India, 86-87. 
467 A Short Introduction to Cooperation in the Madras Presidency, 11-12. 
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either honorary or professionally employed and paid an annual remuneration by the bank itself.468 
In the colonial period, primary banks held annual general meetings where members elected 
managers. Laws in the post-colonial period stipulated elections every three years. Though already 
operational for almost three decades, the 1932 Madras Cooperatives Societies Act entrenched 
these rules for the election of cooperative managers.  
The provincial government in Madras established Supervising Unions in 1910 to ensure 
transparency in the management of primary banks. The provincial government grouped primary 
banks, that were in close proximity to each other, in Unions. The aim was for managers from one 
primary bank to supervise and advise managers from another. The government implemented this 
policy to avoid the additional expenses of appointing external supervisors.469 Unions did not audit 
primary banks. The government undertook this responsibility in the 1920s, as discussed in a later 
section. Supervising Unions performed two tasks. First, Unions reviewed the lending operations 
of primary banks and reported on the profile of borrowers. Second, Unions judged applications 
made by primary banks for loans from district banks.470 Unions submitted annual reports of 
primary banks to their district bank creditors. In theory, reports from Supervising Unions 
identified management problems, including banks where rich managers discriminated against poor 
peasants.  
The caste system was one potential barrier to cooperation in the Indian countryside. The 
government considered the diversity of membership a vital determinant of the success of the 
cooperative movement. Official reports classified members of primary banks by religion and caste. 
Surveyors recorded six categories including, ‘Non-Brahmins, Brahmins, Adi-Dravidas, Christians, 
Muhammadans and other classes.’471 Reports that classified members by groups of ‘Brahmin’ and 
‘Non-Brahmin’ attempted to create a clear distinction between socio-economic classes. 
Government officials considered Brahmins as richer landowners and lower castes as smallholders 
and tenants. According to one provincial report in 1929, 12 per cent of members were Brahmins, 
63 per cent were ‘Non-Brahmin’ and 25 per cent were from other religions and castes.472 The 
provincial government celebrated this outcome. From these numbers, there was diversity in the 
voting membership group of each primary bank. However, contrary to the government’s view, the 
presence of diversity alone was not enough to suggest cooperation. External supervision was 
 
468 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 441. 
469  The Madras Co-operative Manual, 36. 
470 Annual Report on the Working of the Co-operative Credit Societies Act 1929 (Madras, 1928-1939), 25-26. 
471 Annual Report 1929, 10. 
472 Annual Report 1929, 10. 
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needed to ensure one group did not discriminate against another. As subsequent sections will 
show, the Supervising Unions did not perform this role successfully. 
We now turn to how the cooperative model performed. 
 
5.3 Performance Puzzle: Expansion but Unprofitable   
 
By all measures, the size of the cooperative banking sector increased by a significant margin during 
the first half of the twentieth century. Between 1907 and 1929, the number of cooperative banks 
increased from 63 to 15,238.473 By 1952, there were 17,201 primary banks where 16,616 banks 
operated with unlimited liability and 88 banks operated with limited liability.474 Membership, total 
working capital and the value of loans provided by primary banks more than doubled between 
1928 and 1953. Total membership in primary banks increased from 652,285 in 1929 to 1,537,000 
in 1953.475 The number of district banks remained stagnant at between 14 and 16 throughout the 
period, whereas the number of primary banks linked to each apex bank doubled between 1940 
and 1955.476 There was also a rise in the average number of members per primary bank between 
1928 and 1955.477 The Rural Credit Survey estimated that primary banks had an average 
membership of 88 in the 1950s.478 This was lower than similar estimations in nineteenth century 
Germany.479 The rise in the number of village banks was supplemented by a rise in membership, 
implying that there was an increase in the number of cultivators with access to cooperatives. 
The price of credit from cooperatives was an added success. Cooperatives charged lower 
interest rates than moneylenders. The government enforced a ceiling on the interest rates charged 
by primary banks. Rates fluctuated between 7.5 and 9.5 per cent per annum in the early 1930s. As 
discussed, moneylenders in the same period charged rates of 2 per cent per month. Under these 
conditions, the data suggests that there was an expansion in the supply of low-cost credit during 
the early to mid-twentieth century.  
 
473 B. V. Narayanaswami Naidu, "The Co-operative Movement in the Madras Presidency." Indian Journal of Economics 
14 (1934), 426. 
474 Rural Credit Survey, 220; Report of the Committee on Co-operation in Madras, (Madras, 1956), 425. 
475 Annual Report 1928-1939; Report of the Committee 1956. 
476 Report of the Committee 1956, 425. 
477 Annual Report 1928-39; Report of the Committee 1956.  
478 Rural Credit Survey Vol. II, (Bombay, 1954), 216. 
479 Guinnane “A Failed Institutional Transplant”, shows that the average membership size of Raiffeisen cooperatives 
in Germany fluctuated between 75 and 200. 
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It is surprising then that cooperatives failed to capture a sizeable share of the credit market. A 
survey in 1935 estimated that credit from cooperatives accounted for just 6 per cent of all loans to 
cultivators.480 A similar report in 1956 provides a figure of just 3 per cent across India while 
confirming similar results for the market in Madras.481 B. V. Narayanaswamy Naidu, a provincial 
legislator in the Madras government, suggested that 7.9 per cent of rural households were members 
of credit cooperatives in the mid-1930s.482 Similarly, 23.5 per cent of the provincial rural population 
were, ‘within the fold of rural credit cooperatives’, with a small share of this group actually 
borrowing from cooperative banks in 1956, demonstrating that the lack of market penetration 
persisted throughout the period.483  
Cultivators did not benefit equally from the expansion of cooperative credit. Borrowers were 
concentrated in a small sub-section of the rural population. Primary banks selectively allocated 
loans to richer peasants. Government reports in the 1950s recognized this problem. According to 
the Rural Credit Survey, ‘small owners, tenants-at-will and labourers, the cultivators of areas with 
poor rainfall and the backward agricultural communities are hardly members of societies.’484 Data 
on loan sizes and collateral requirements on those loans signal the income profile of borrowers. 
Loans exceeding 250 rupees accounted for nearly half of all cooperative credit provided in 1929 
and 1956.485 Loans from moneylenders were significantly smaller, suggesting that moneylenders 
rather than cooperatives were servicing the credit needs of the poor. Indeed, from a survey of 
moneylender-serviced credit markets in six villages in the Bellary district, the average debt per acre 
was 17 rupees in 1930.486 Assuming the size of loans increased proportionally to the size of land 
ownership, these numbers suggest that cooperatives showed a preference for high income 
borrowers.  
Furthermore, cooperatives shifted from non-asset-based to mortgage lending from the 1920s. 
In the mid-1920s, mortgages accounted for 40 per cent of loans while borrowers accessed the 
majority of cooperative credit by attaching a co-signer to their loan applications. By 1938, 60 per 
cent of loans were secured by mortgage instruments. The government recognized that this was a 
departure from the original aims of the cooperative movement. Commenting on foreclosures in 
 
480 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 40. 
481 Report of the Committee 1956, 41. 
482 Naidu, “The Co-operative Movement”, 420. 
483 Report of the Committee 1956, 40. 
484 Rural Credit Survey, 223. 
485 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 152; Report of the Committee 1956, 29. 
486 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 62-63. 
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1936, the Cooperative Department in Madras stated, ‘these properties are undoubtedly a source 
of embarrassment to societies and it must be their anxious concern to dispose of them in 
consultation with their financing banks at the earliest opportunity.’487 Cooperatives that acquired 
land from their members contradicted Nicholson’s principles of Raiffeisen banking. Collateral 
requirements excluded poor peasants from accessing cooperative credit.  
 
Figure 5.1 Security on loans, 1928-1939 
 
Source: Annual Report 1928-1939. 
Notes: Figure shows the value of loans attached to three credit instruments. Mortgage refers to loans secured by land. 
Co-signatory refers to loans contractually secured by third-party guarantors. Movables refers to loans secured by crop. 
The source provides the total volume of lending by primary banks in a given year, disaggregated to the volume of 
loans under the three types of credit instrument in a given year. Ratios calculated and converted to percentage in the 
source. 
 
The Great Depression explains the shift from co-signatory lending to mortgages.488 The co-
signatory method proved unsustainable during the 1930s crisis. Repayment rates were generally 
low in cooperatives. From loans issued in the late 1920s, primary banks declared 30 per cent of 
expected interest inflows as overdue. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, recovery rates continued to 
decline as overdue interest increased by a further 30 per cent between 1930 and 1934. Primary 
banks shifted to mortgage lending in the hope that auctioning the land acquired from defaulters 
would help mitigate losses. The colonial government enforced rules that ensured each cooperative 
limited the total value of loans to the net value of properties held in the cooperative’s possession.489 
Cooperatives enforced this parameter to moderate the difference between the value of the 
properties securitised and the value of overdue loans. The rules entitled cooperatives to liquidate 
 
487 Annual Report 1936, 12. 
488 Homogeneity in the occupation of borrower members spread the impact of the crisis. Cultivators constituted 89.1 
per cent of the total membership of primary banks (Annual Report 1929, 9). The commodity price crash in the early 
1930s led to a rapid short-term decline in the membership of primary banks (Annual Report 1929-1934).  
489 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 151. 
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properties in times of default. The provincial government expected cooperatives to generate 
positive net balances by auctioning land they acquired from defaulters. 
The recovery from the Depression started from 1937. Membership in primary banks increased 
by 2.6 per cent between 1937 and 1938, with a larger increase of 8.3 per cent in the following year. 
Primary banks expanded lending operations in the same period. The value of loans provided by 
primary banks in 1939 was 1 per cent shy of the same measure in 1929. This was supported by 
rising commodity prices in the early 1940s.490 However, cooperatives did not fully recover from 
the crisis. As demonstrated in Figure 5.2, primary banks reported net losses until 1950. The upward 
swing in commodity prices and the shift to mortgage lending had a limited impact on the 
profitability of cooperative banks. Why did cooperatives endure losses despite the move to more 
selective lending? 
 
Figure 5.2 Profitability of primary banks, 1929-1955 
 
Source: Annual Report 1928-1939; Report of the Committee 1956, 425-435. 
Notes: Figure shows that primary banks made losses throughout the period. The government collected data from 
each primary bank and aggregated this to the provincial level in the source. Profit and loss calculations made by the 
author. ‘Net Profit’ takes the difference between divisible profit and non-recouped loss in a given year. Net Profit 
plotted on the left y-axis. The dotted line indicates when primary banks break-even. ‘Overdue Interest’ is a calculated 
in the source and plotted on the right y-axis. It measures default rates in a given year by estimating the ratio of unpaid 
interest to total interest obligations. For example, in 1934 the ratio of overdue interest to interest due was 0.64, which 
means that primary banks only recovered 36 per cent of their expected interest inflows that year. 
 
One potential answer is that cooperatives were constrained by enforcement costs. Institutional 
barriers prevented banks from acquiring land in a timely and cost-efficient manner. Land transfer 
 
490 Michelle McAlpin, “Price Movements and Fluctuations in Economic Activity (1860–1947),” in The Cambridge 
Economic History of India, edited by Dharma Kumar and Meghnad Desai, (Cambridge, 1983), Appendix Table 11A.1. 
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required the ratification of legal authority while court disputes were lengthy and expensive.491 The 
colonial government created a legal structure, for cooperative banks, that functioned outside the 
scope of civil courts. The 1932 Madras Co-operative Societies Act specified that cooperative 
disputes were to be resolved by representatives of the Registrar, as chair, of the cooperative 
department in the provincial government.492 The government created special arbitration courts 
within districts to enforce land transfers following defaults.493 These forums failed to solve the 
problem. The rising number of pending disputes in the early 1930s triggered concerns among 
policymakers that arbitration courts were also a costly and inefficient method of enforcing 
repayments.494  
The parallel functioning of courts and special arbitration forums, chaired by the Registrar of 
the Cooperatives Department in government, led to conflicts between the judiciary and executive, 
ultimately causing enforcement inefficiencies. Borrowers that defaulted on loans to cooperatives 
commonly also defaulted on tax bills and loans to moneylenders. Different courts adjudicated each 
of the cases, leading to confusion on how best to enforce repayments. In Govada Balabharathi Co-
operative Credit Society Vs. Alapati Venkatakrishnayya, for example, a borrower defaulted 
simultaneously on loans to a cooperative and a moneylender. The arbitration forum ordered for 
the borrower to transfer land to the cooperative while the civil court independently ordered for 
the transfer of the debtor’s land to the moneylender. This motivated debates on whether ‘the 
Registrar deciding cases under sections 51 of the Act is a court.’495 Borrowers regularly questioned 
the decisions made by the special arbitration forums in civil courts. The outcome was a 
complicated enforcement structure that was a barrier to the efficient execution of mortgages. 
According to one report, ‘the Government do not tend to lessen the difficulties of societies which 
have obtained decrees against defaulters and are executing them through the department.’496 This 
conflict contributed to the inefficiency of arbitrations between cooperatives and defaulters. Land 
transfers were difficult to execute in the informal and cooperative credit markets.497  
 
491 Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy. 
492 Section 51 of the Madras Cooperative Societies Act (VI of 1932). 
493 Arbitration forums were the preferred formal forums of appeal for banks and defaulters. The number of 
cooperative disputes in arbitration forums exceeded appeals in Civil Courts by a significant margin in the 1930s. 
494 Annual Report 1937, 10. 
495 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1935, 560. 
496 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1935, p. 562. 
497 Cooperatives struggled to auction the land they did acquire during the Depression period. Land markets were 
sluggish in the crisis years as cultivators did not invest in buying land. The acquired lands typically went idle under the 
ownership of the cooperatives. Primary banks were forced to bear the costs of maintaining the lands they acquired. 
See Annual Report 1937, 10-11. 
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Some primary banks responded to the enforcement problem by collateralising commodities 
instead of land. Though capturing a small share of lending operations, Figure 5.1 shows that the 
number of loans against crop security increased six-fold between 1936 and 1939. The 1930s saw a 
rise in the registration of Loan and Sale Societies. These primary banks provided loans 
collateralised by commodities. When borrowers defaulted, the primary banks stored the 
commodities and traded them on the market. To mitigate the risk of price fluctuations, the primary 
banks provided working capital loans valued at 60 per cent of the borrower’s produce prior to the 
harvest.498 Primary banks collateralised the storage receipts of the warehoused commodities to 
obtain loans from district banks.499 This arrangement became more popular in the late 1950s. 
Credit and marketing primary banks were more rigorously differentiated from each other in this 
latter period. 
However, enforcement barriers do not fully explain losses in the cooperative sector. According 
to Nicholson’s prototype, self-help should have substituted external enforcement in the first 
instance. The requirement for courts in itself represents a failure in cooperation among members. 
The next section of the chapter shows that cooperatives shifted to mortgage lending and incurred 
persistent losses because of flaws in capital structure and regulatory design.  
 
5.4 Low Savings and Weak Regulation 
 
Primary banks were not self-funded and borrowed from district banks to fund their lending 
operations in Madras. High savings in district banks and low savings in primary banks entrenched 
a banking structure of debt dependence. As a result, primary banks were poorly regulated. Low 
savings restricted the capacity for mutual supervision in primary banks. Top-down regulation did 
not substitute for the absence of this bottom-up supervision. As mentioned before, the entire 
banking system in India did not have a formal regulator until the 1949 Banking Regulation Act, 
and even that act did not cover cooperatives.500 The outcome of the flawed design, this section 
demonstrates, was weak regulation and mismanagement.  
 
 
 
498 Report of the Committee on Co-operation in Madras, (Madras, 1928), 14. 
499 Report of the Committee 1956, 8-9. 
500 The 1949 Banking Regulation Act was modified to include cooperatives only in 1965. For laws and private banking 
in the colonial period, see Roy and Swamy, Law and the Economy. For a discussion on the Banking Regulation Act, see 
Autar K. Koul and Mihir Chatterjee, "International Financial Institutions and Indian Banking: a Legal Profile" in India 
and International Law, edited by Bimal N. Patel, (Leiden, 2008). 
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Figure 5.3 Capital structure of the cooperative sector, 1930-1960 
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Figure 5.4 Ratio of savings and share capital to working capital in primary banks 
  
Sources: Annual Report 1928-1939; Report of the Committee 1956. 
Notes: Figure shows savings and share capital constituted a small share of the working capital in primary banks. The 
sources provide data on the total working capital of primary banks with the value of savings, investment and debt. 
For ease of comparison, the author rounds all numbers to the nearest ten-thousand. The reports exclude data from 
the Ganjam district in 1936-37. Data scope shifts from ‘composite’ to ‘residuary’ state in 1953 to reflect the changing 
of state borders after independence. These two factors do not bias the results in any way.  
 
Figure 5.3 sketches the multi-layered banking structure of cooperatives in Madras. This banking 
structure operated throughout the period. However, the volume of capital flows between the layers 
changed in the late 1940s. From 1905 to the end of colonial rule, capital flowed in a two-tiered 
structure, between district banks and primary banks. As previously discussed, the provincial apex 
bank did not play a significant financial role in the cooperative movement. Primary banks were 
funded by savings deposits, investments in share capital and loans from district banks. District 
banks were funded by savings deposits and investments in share capital. Loans from government 
constituted a small share of cooperative operations. Governments financially participated by 
saving in district banks in the 1930s and early 1940s. As a subsequent section will show, the role 
of government changed in the late 1940s. Government loans to district banks increased 
exponentially from 1947 onwards. While the three-tier capital structure did not change much, the 
top-tier played a more significant role in the post-colonial period. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.4, primary banks in Madras raised most of their working capital 
through external borrowing.501  Loans from district banks financed between 70 and 80 per cent of 
 
501 There was a decline in this ratio during the 1930s which is explained by the rise in the reserve funds of each society. 
The ratio of external borrowings declined from 74 to 60 per cent between 1928 and 1935, coinciding with a rise in the 
ratio of the reserve fund from 6 to 16 per cent in the same period. Banks were either liquidated or more risk-averse 
during the Depression. The temporary decline in the ratio of external borrowings in the 1930s does not infer greater 
self-sufficiency. 
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the required working capital in primary banks. Members’ and non-members’ deposits accounted 
for between 5 and 11 per cent of total working capital. The ratio of savings to loans presented 
similar results. The volume of savings in primary banks was between 4 and 11 per cent of the 
volume of lending throughout the period. Share capital played a marginally more important role 
than savings in primary banks. However, share capital included investments from members and 
district banks. The majority of this investment was from district banks in the 1930s, accentuating 
the external funding problem.502  
Why were savings low in primary banks? Colonial officials maintained that peasants were ill-
informed about the benefits of saving such that disposable income was rarely saved and instead 
spent on extravagant ceremonies.503 In practice, savings rates were low because harvest failure was 
common and cultivation was unprofitable in bad years. An indirect confirmation of the claim that 
volatile seasonal incomes depressed rural savings is that the ratio of saving to working capital was 
higher in urban cooperatives during the same period.504  
When the rich did have money to save, they did not deposit their savings in primary banks. 
Wealthy cultivators either allocated their disposable income in the credit market as moneylenders 
or to deposits in district banks. According to Panikar, ‘90 per cent of rural credit (in the 1950s) 
seems to come from the saving of rural families.’505 Moneylending presented a more lucrative 
option to saving. As mentioned, there was a gap between the interest rates charged on loans from 
moneylenders and those offered by cooperative banks. When money was being saved, cultivators 
chose to deposit in district rather than in primary banks. There was a marked increase in the 
number of individual depositors in district banks in the late 1920s.506 The ratio of savings to loans 
in district banks was significantly higher than the same ratio in primary banks. At the peak of the 
Depression in 1933-34, savings deposits accounted for 62 per cent of the total working capital of 
district banks. A combination of share capital and savings contributed 72 per cent of total working 
capital in the same year.507  
Rich peasants chose to save in district banks because, based on the government’s design, the 
deposits of members and non-members in district banks had a stronger guarantee than deposits 
in primary banks. Individual depositors were not the only savers in district banks. Local 
 
502 Annual Report 1936, 30-31. 
503 See Darling, The Punjab Peasant. 
504 Annual Report 1928-1939. 
505 Panikar, Rural Savings in India, 59. 
506 Annual Report 1936, 19. 
507 Annual Report 1934, 24. 
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government departments saved as did groups of primary banks. The colonial government framed 
laws to ensure that primary banks maintained a reserve ratio, physically deposited in district banks. 
According to the laws, primary banks deposited this ‘statutory contribution’ in the district bank 
that they were indebted to.508 This required reserve increased the value of deposits in district banks. 
When primary banks defaulted on loans to district banks, the reserve fund diminished before 
savings. Moreover, groups of primary banks borrowed from and deposited reserves in one district 
bank. District banks offset the defaults from one primary bank with the reserves of another.509 
District banks also restricted the volume of lending to failing primary banks. Indeed, district banks 
maintained higher reserves and reduced lending to primary banks in the 1930s.510 Deposits from 
primary banks and risk-averse lending in crisis years, both enforced by government regulation, 
protected member and non-member deposits in district banks. 
The Depression had a larger impact on primary than on district banks. Between 1929 and 1939, 
district banks reported a decline in net profits from 1.1 million rupees to just over 300,000 rupees. 
In the same decade, primary banks transitioned from earning a net profit of 60,000 rupees to 
reporting net losses of 1.62 million rupees.511 Reserves and higher savings in district banks 
moderated the transmission of primary bank losses up the cooperative ladder. The combination 
of share capital, savings and reserve deposits constituted 77 per cent of the total working capital 
of district banks in 1933-34.512 Deposits insured defaults, restricting losses incurred. In contrast, 
primary banks were funded by external borrowing. Defaults were high and deposits were small, 
leading to persistent losses. 
Low savings posed a problem for supervision in primary banks. Members of cooperative 
panchayats, including presidents and secretaries, were commonly neither savers nor shareholders. 
The incentive for self-contained supervision diminished as the burden of default was not borne by 
the deposits or share-capital of governing members. According to Eleanor Hough’s thesis on the 
management of Indian cooperatives in the early 1930s, ‘the cooperative safeguards of mutual 
watchfulness and supervision are absent and everything depends on the committee’s honesty and 
business ability’.513 This problem persisted throughout the period. On the management of primary 
banks, the Rural Credit Survey in 1954 reported that, ‘there is a paucity of members who are 
 
508 Annual Report 1930, 16-17. 
509 Annual Report 1936, 19. 
510 The volume of district bank to primary bank loans halved between 1929 and 1935 (Annual Report 1929-1935). 
511 Annual Report 1928-1939. 
512 Annual Report 1934, 50-51. 
513 Hough, The Co-operative Movement in India, 60.  
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actually cultivating lands themselves. The agricultural finance by the co-operatives would be more 
efficient and smooth if ways and means are devised to secure invariably the presence of some 
actual cultivators on the board of management.’514 The employment of professional managers 
rather than shareholders resulted in a lack of monetary incentives to increase the profitability of 
primary banks. The provincial government reported the following in 1929, 
 
 Though the objects of co-operative banks and commercial banks may be different, the one 
seeking to increase the shareholders’ profit being ruled by shareholders who have generally 
no other interest in the concern, while the other seeks to benefit the borrower shareholder, 
whose interest as borrower is far greater than his interest as shareholder.515 
 
In other words, the governance structure in primary banks did not foster sound management 
through self-regulation.516  
Supervising Unions did not solve the problem either. The number of Unions did not match the 
size of banking operations. An estimated 8,191 primary societies were affiliated to 262 supervision 
unions, at an average of 31 banks per union, in 1937.517 The 262 Supervision Unions employed 
432 supervisors in 1937. Furthermore, the ratio of banks to employees in unions amounted to 19 
banks per individual supervisor in the same year. Each supervisor monitored the operations of 19 
primary banks in the late 1930s, leading to inefficiencies in oversight. These inefficiencies increased 
transaction costs for members and primary banks. Primary banks underwent lengthy 
administrative processes before the disbursement of loans. The demand for credit, in turn, 
involved elaborate applications from participating members. Supervising unions often vetted 
these. Similarly, loans from apex banks were conditional on applications from primary banks which 
were again open to scrutiny from unions. The subsequent delays in the processing of loans 
conflicted with the seasonal demand for credit from cultivators.518 According to the Provincial 
Banking Enquiry, ‘So long as all this process is essential and it is essential for every loan that is 
applied for and sanctioned by the central bank it is useless to expect cooperative societies to meet 
 
514 Rural Credit Survey, 263. 
515 Annual Report 1929, 17. 
516 One barrier to self-regulation could have been illiteracy. Members needed a basic understanding of loan accounting 
and contracts to effectively supervise banks. However, certain institutional arrangements solved the problem in 
Madras. The Provincial Banking Enquiry reported in 1930 that cultivators approached local school teachers and clerks 
competent in simple accounting methods to assist in analysing loan documentation. Moreover, the provincial 
government established cooperative training institutes in districts. The institutes provided free assistance to illiterate 
members. 
517 Annual Report 1937, 25. 
518 See Roy, “The Monsoon”, for the seasonal reliance of the rural credit market in India 
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the entire cash requirement for financing agriculture.’519 The inefficiencies in supervision further 
restricted savings in primary banks. Unions monitored savings withdrawals to ensure primary 
banks remained liquid. Depositors needed to make applications, which were vetted by Supervision 
Unions, to withdraw their savings from primary banks. This was a time-consuming process. 
According to one government report, ‘no one will put his money in a savings bank deposit if it 
takes a month or two to get the money back.’520 
Moreover, there were conflicts of interest between the supervisors and primary bank managers. 
The government did not design Unions to hire external supervisors. Officials were concerned that 
external supervision would lead to the cooperative movement departing from its aims of being 
self-contained within villages. In his capacity as President of one primary cooperative in Madras, 
Deivasikhamani Mudaliar stated in 1937, ‘for the efficient administration of village societies local 
knowledge and help is essential. The money lent to the villagers can be recovered easily only with 
their help. Nothing can be done in a village without the help of the villagers.’521 Accordingly, the 
government implemented policies to ensure that supervision remained within the scope of the 
managers of primary banks. Members of Supervising Unions constituted representatives from the 
panchayats of primary banks. As a result, the governance structure of Supervising Unions extended, 
rather than corrected, the lack of management accountability in primary banks. Supervising unions, 
as recorded in an official report in 1935, ‘cannot be independent and disinterested bodies, as they 
are run mostly by representatives of the very societies, which have to be supervised. Is it any 
wonder then that the supervisor is often forced, if he is to keep his job, to collude with the 
managements of credit societies in all their misdemeanours?’522  
The reference to misdemeanour is significant. The government supplemented supervision with 
annual audits of primary banks. Audits were initially voluntary and paid for by the banks 
themselves.523 This changed with the rising number of defaults in the late 1920s. From the early 
1930s onwards, annual government audits were compulsory for all primary banks. Regular audits 
exposed the frequency of fraudulent lending practiced by the managers of primary banks. The 
frequency of management fraud became more apparent during the Depression. According to one 
 
519 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 155. 
520 Annual Report 1928, 20. 
521 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1936, 510. 
522 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 60. 
523 Section 17 of the 1912 Co-operative Societies Act allowed for panchayats to conduct the audit of banks. 
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official report in 1931, ‘in the prevailing tightness of the money market defaulting secretaries were 
no longer able to restore the stolen funds on the approach of an inspection.’524  
Auditors provided certificates to all banks at the end of every audit. Certificates contained a 
grade, running from ‘A’ to ‘D’. Government auditors branded Class A banks ‘thoroughly good 
societies’ while class D banks were ‘bad societies which probably have to be liquidated.’ In the 
financial year 1932-1933, the government audited 13,425 banks, of which 1735 banks were in the 
‘D’ group.525 Auditors carried out additional scrutiny on banks with the largest defaults to identify 
areas of mismanagement or, in severe cases, fraud. In the same year, 77 cases of fraud were pending 
criminal prosecution. Arbitration forums charged 87 individuals in total, of which 77 were in 
management positions in primary banks.526 There were consistent numbers of criminal 
prosecutions for the misappropriation of funds throughout the 1930s. As recorded in 1936, ‘There 
are no signs of diminution in cases of defalcation; the department does its best to purge the 
movement of dishonest members but obviously can do little unless honest men come forward to 
run the societies.’527  
On discovery of misconduct, employees from district banks or the provincial government 
superseded the management board of the mismanaged primary bank. In 1935, audit reports from 
the Krishna district exposed mismanagement in a regional cluster of primary banks. Employees 
from its financing district bank, the Krishna District Co-operative Bank, subsequently took control 
of the management of these banks.528 The Krishna District Co-operative Bank placed a cap on 
new deposits and enforced more extensive application procedures for withdrawals of existing 
deposits from its member primary banks in 1936. In the absence of adequate reserves and 
increasing withdrawal applications, the district bank showed concern that ‘the whole movement 
will lose credit.’529 Following the supersession, the provincial government liquidated banks that 
failed to achieve a grade above ‘D’.  
Managers practiced two types of misconduct, one more serious than the other. The first, and 
less serious of the two, was insider lending. Evidence shows managers provided loans to members 
of the same caste. The social composition of management boards in the cooperative sector in the 
North Arcot district in the early 1920s provides evidence of this form of discriminatory lending. 
 
524 Annual Report 1931, 17. 
525 Annual Report 1933, 8. 
526 Annual Report 1933, 14. 
527 Annual Report 1936, 17. 
528 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1935, 324. 
529 The Madras Journal of Co-operation, (Madras, 1935), 272. 
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There were 30,000 members of primary banks in the district, 2700 or 9 per cent of which were 
Brahmin. According to one report, 6 out of 7 directors of the district bank and 12 out of 14 
supervisors of primary banks were from the Brahmin caste.530 The managers of primary banks in 
the district allocated the majority of loans to Brahmin members, while default rates saw a steady 
increase in the 1920s. By the early 1930s, the government liquidated 11 out of 30 Supervising 
Unions in the district for ‘inefficient supervision and mismanagement of affairs.’531 
The second type of management malpractice was embezzlement. Bank managers siphoned 
money for personal benefit. Legal records from the 1930s provide evidence of managers who 
issued loans either to themselves or to a network of their relatives. In the 1933 dispute Re: Patri 
Venkata Hanumantha Vs. Unknown, for example, the Secretary of a cooperative in the Guntur 
district was found to have issued large sums to either himself, his brother or his cousin in regular 
intervals in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Managers forged contracts, declaring fake names and 
mortgage securities. Borrowers did not repay loans and managers declared these loans as 
unrecovered principal in the bank’s account books. The prosecution argued that ‘while the 
depletion in the resources of the bank was taking place on account of the series of 
misappropriations slyly committed by the 1st accused, the financial equilibrium of the bank became 
patently unstable and on account of the large overdues there was pressure from several quarters.’532 
Recipients of loans, including the Secretary of the bank, were indicted with prison sentences of 10 
years while those convicted of abetting the crime were charged with 7-year imprisonments.533  
Managers channelled embezzled capital into two forms of expenditure.534 First, managers 
embezzled to fund election campaigns. Elected administrators of cooperative banks were also 
candidates for elections in local governments. According to one administrator’s address at a Co-
operative Conference in 1935,  
 
office bearers of co-operative societies have been found in several places to have used co-
operative money obtained by means of benami (embezzling by lending to kin or third party) 
 
530 Directors of Supervising Unions were appointed from directors of primary banks in the district. 
531 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1936, 88. 
532 Re: Patri Venkata Hanumantha vs Unknown, (1934 66 MLJ 193, Madras, 6 October 1933). Case records report 
similar methods of misappropriation throughout the period. In the case, Most Revd. Dr. L. Mathias, S.C., the 
Archbishop of Madras and the President of the Catholic Indian Association and anr. Vs. Kilacheri Agricultural Co-
operative Bank (1938 1 MLJ 241, Madras, 5 October 1937), the secretary of the Kilacheri Agricultural Co-operative 
Bank accepted deposits on behalf of the bank. The secretary subsequently embezzled these funds. 
533 Re: Patri Venkata Hanumantha vs Unknown, (1934 66 MLJ 193, Madras, 6 October 1933). 
534 Managers who embezzled might have also channelled additional income into savings. However, this is not reported 
in the evidence. 
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or direct loans for the purposes of their elections in Local Bodies or Legislatures. It is a 
tragedy; the result is that they find difficulty in repaying the same.535  
 
Managers provided loans to supporters of some political groups but not others. According to 
a legislator in 1935, ‘faction, favouritism and nepotism,’ was a frequent feature in the 
administration of primary banks.536 Cooperatives became a platform to launch political ambitions 
from the early twentieth century. According to Robert, members of the Justice Party and the Indian 
National Congress in the 1920s and 1930s had strong links to the cooperative movement.537 
Lending for political gain persisted throughout the period. An official report in 1956 commented 
that, ‘local rivalries and factions tend to assume disproportionate importance and affect adversely 
the working of societies.’538   
Bank managers embezzled to lend at high interest rates in the informal credit market. Members 
of the managing committee were either ‘trader, moneylender or shopkeeper’ in 7 out of 19 
surveyed primary banks in the Coimbatore district in 1957.539 Similarly, members of the 
management board were moneylenders in 8 out of 19 surveyed banks in the West Godavari district. 
The Rural Credit Survey reported that the vested interests of administrators cum moneylenders 
‘worked against the interests of the society’ they were managing.540 From the recorded banks in 
Table 5.3, the report on bank W3 in the West Godavari district stated that the ‘President was very 
powerful and used to take benami loans – traders and landlords were on the managing committee.’541 
The bank reported a 100 per cent ratio of overdue repayment to outstanding loans. The 
government disbarred the bank from lending in 1954. Similarly, the Rural Credit Survey also 
reported the following on a primary bank in the Coimbatore district,  
 
Society C5, organised in 1919, was dominated by landowners. The ex-president 
misappropriated funds by making unreceipted collections. Since then, the members lost 
confidence in the society which gradually stopped functioning. Improper management, lack 
of proper supervision and timely help from the central bank and Co-operation Department 
resulted in misappropriation and consequent deterioration in the financial position of the 
society.542 
 
 
535 Madras Journal of Co-operation 1936, 366. 
536 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 60. 
537 Robert, “Agricultural Credit Cooperatives in Madras”. 
538 Report of the Committee 1956, 34. 
539 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 446. 
540 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 446. 
541 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 731. 
542 Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 363. 
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Table 5.3 Survey of primary banks in two districts, 1956-1957 
District Banks 
Legible 
Accounts 
Erroneous 
Accounts 
Failed 
Audit 
Coimbatore 19 9 10 8 
West 
Godavari 
19 17 2 3 
Source: Rural Credit Follow-up Survey, 687-696.  
Notes: The ‘Legible’ result in this survey measures the number of banks with account books without any errors. The 
‘Erroneous’ result measures the number of banks that had errors in their account books. ‘Failed Audit’ measures the 
number of banks with audit certificates of ‘C’ grade and below. Savings were either negligible or non-existent in all 
banks. The survey anonymised the names and management board of all banks. 
 
Audits failed to restrict embezzlement for two reasons. First, siphoned money was left 
undetected as managers falsified accounts. Audits of primary banks commonly yielded inaccurate 
reports.543 As one official report in 1956 suggested, ‘as a result of its inability to employ paid staff, 
account-keeping leaves much to be desired and naturally demands more of the time of the 
supervisory and audit staff.’544 This feature of primary banks persisted throughout the period. 
Approximately 92 per cent of audited banks in 1934 were reported to have defects in their account 
books.545 Similarly, as shown in Table 5.3, 10 out of 19 surveyed primary banks in the Coimbatore 
district in 1957 were reported to have errors in accounting. Managers recorded defaults as 
extensions rather than overdue repayments in the balance sheet of primary banks. This lack of 
accounting transparency was a barrier to efficient regulation.  
Second, the provincial government did not supplement audits with effective enforcement. 
Scholarship on cooperatives in Germany demonstrates that the publication of management 
dishonesty to various stakeholders ensured that managers did not resort to fraud.546 Some 
government officials in 1930s Madras also recognized the importance of this form of social 
enforcement. One report in 1935 suggested that, ‘the maximum of publicity is required. This was 
Raiffeisen’s (in the German context) great maxim.’ The report proceeded to comment that, ‘Audit 
reports are not even opened and read for years together, meetings are not held to consider such 
reports and members are not kept informed of their financial position.’547 Managers were unafraid 
 
543 Strickland, "Coöperation and the Rural Problem of India". 
544 Provincial Banking Enquiry, 151. 
545 Annual Report 1934, 16. Auditors reported that 12,550 out of 13,552 banks had defects in their account books. 
546 Guinnane, “A Friend and Advisor”. 
547 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 63. 
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of failed audits. According to one report, ‘if panchayats who know their duties and responsibilities 
deliberately abuse their position, it cannot be effectively prevented. You may close the society for 
this reason but the mischief is already done. Therefore, supervision alone may not bring about the 
reform necessary in societies.’548 Proposals were considered to increase the frequency of audits. 
The government attempted to solve the problem by increasing the number of audits to bi-annually. 
However, this policy change had an insignificant impact when enforcement remained weak. As an 
official report commented in 1935, ‘audit is done only once in six months. In six months much 
can happen.’549 
The chapter has so far shown that primary banks reported persistent losses due to low savings 
and weak regulation. However, the expansion of the cooperative sector in the 1940s and 1950s 
presents a paradox. A new level of state intervention explains this puzzle.  
 
5.5 State Intervention: Prolonging Banking Failure 
 
The provincial government did not lend to cooperatives and restricted its participation to 
conducting annual audits in the colonial period. District and municipal government departments 
saved unspent revenue in district banks. However, the value of government deposits was lower 
than the savings of members and non-members in the district banks.550 The post-colonial 
government adopted a more interventionist stance in the late 1940s. While state officials did 
identify a problem in the failure of cooperative banks to be both equitable and profitable, the newly 
formed government believed that capital injections into the cooperative sector was the solution.  
The risk of participation in a fragile banking sector motivated the colonial government’s passive 
stance. Loans from government accounted for a negligible share of the working capital of primary 
banks in the 1930s. The ratio of government loans to the total working capital of primary banks 
fluctuated between 0.7 and 1.7 per cent between 1928 and 1939.551 Government loans were not 
provided to either district banks or the provincial bank in the same period. The Indian central 
bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI), in particular, played a limited role in the cooperative movement 
during the colonial period. Deposits from commercial banks formed the majority of the reserves 
held by the RBI. Rather than lend the savings of large commercial banks to risky rural cooperatives, 
 
548Madras Journal of Co-operation 1936, 511. 
549 Report on Agricultural Indebtedness, 60. 
550 Report of the Committee 1928, 18-22. 
551 Annual Report 1928-1939. 
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the RBI adopted a non-interventionist approach to the cooperative movement. Justifying this non-
interventionist stance in the Bombay Co-operative Quarterly in 1938, the RBI stated that, 
 
The sum and substance of the lengthy memorandum is that while the Reserve Bank is willing 
to offer advice and even to direct and control co-operative finance it is not willing at present, 
for various reasons, to deal with provincial co-operative banks – in the case of some because 
they are not creditworthy, in the case of others because they have established their credit 
and possess resources themselves.552 
 
The end of colonial rule marked a turning point in the role of the RBI in the cooperative 
movement. The government’s First (1951) and Second (1956) Five Year Plans focused on 
increasing intervention in rural credit through greater participation in cooperatives. The 
government attributed the limited success of cooperatives to displace informal sources of credit 
before 1947 to liquidity constraints in primary banks. Accordingly, the First Five Year Plan 
proposed large capital injections into the cooperative machinery to drive out moneylenders from 
rural credit markets. This increase in state participation did not translate to a direct interaction with 
primary banks.  
The RBI extended large volumes of credit to district banks from the late 1940s. The first 
disbursement of loans to district banks was in 1947. Between 1947 and 1951, the value of state 
financing to district banks increased by over five times.553 The capital injection into district banks 
did translate into an increase in the loans provided by primary banks. Indeed, there was a significant 
rise in membership and working capital in primary banks from the late 1940s.554 
Government officials perceived the growth in membership and lending as a success. It was a 
sign that cooperatives were able to capture a greater share of the credit market from village 
moneylenders. Accordingly, government reports in the early 1950s sustained the position that 
undercapitalisation was a primary driver of cooperatives’ failure in the pre-1947 period.555 The 
desire for increased capitalisation led to a further enhancement in state financing to district banks 
in the late 1950s. The government established various initiatives, involving the allocation of public 
funds to rural cooperatives to achieve two aims. First, as mentioned, to enhance the capitalisation 
of rural cooperatives in general.556 State governments significantly increased their subscription of 
 
552 History of the Reserve Bank of India, (Bombay, 1970), 207. 
553 History of the Reserve Bank of India, 782. 
554 Report of the Committee 1956, 425-428. 
555 Report of the Committee 1956, 8-10. 
556 The National Agricultural Credit Fund, managed by the RBI, provided loans to state governments. The 
governments used the loans to invest in district bank shares.  
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share capital in district banks during this period. Second, the government allotted public funds to 
some cooperatives in crisis years, particularly the banks incurring losses because borrowers were 
impacted by environmental shocks and crop failure.557 
However, the level of savings in primary banks did not increase at the same rate as the level of 
state financing. The rate of growth in central bank loans exceeded the growth rate in savings during 
the late 1940s. Between 1947 and 1952, the ratio of savings to working capital in primary banks 
declined from 7 per cent to 4 per cent.558 In other words, the transition in 1947 did not change the 
legacy of low savings. The ratio between savings and external borrowings widened as primary 
banks were less self-funded than they were before receiving financial assistance from the RBI. 
According to data from the 1940s and 1950s, loans from district banks continued to finance the 
loans provided by primary banks. Data on the primary banks shows that the ratio of external 
borrowings accrued to loans issued varied between 90 and 130 per cent between 1947 and 1955.559  
In short, problems in the cooperative sector in the colonial period were carried forward in the 
post-colonial period. Governments intervened in cooperatives through financial contributions 
with limited impact on capital structure and regulation. Low savings perpetuated the lack of 
bottom-up supervision. Managers of primary banks continued to be held accountable by 
ineffective top-down regulation. To make matters worse, public revenue was being allocated to a 
failing banking sector in the post-colonial period. This added moral hazard to the list of problems 
in cooperative banking in post-colonial South India. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Policymakers in colonial India identified market failure in rural credit as the driver of persistent 
rural impoverishment. They believed that cooperative banking would solve the problem by both 
expanding the supply of credit and restricting the monopoly power of the moneylender. Tested 
success of Raiffeisen banks in Europe inspired the government to create a structure of self-help 
banking in India from the early twentieth century. This intervention, however, failed to deliver the 
desired outcome. Cooperative banks rationed credit for many poor borrowers; despite expansion 
in size, cooperatives captured a small share of the business; and they were unprofitable throughout. 
The chapter investigates the reasons behind the persistence of these problems by showing where 
 
557 The National and State Cooperative Development Funds, also managed by the RBI, extended credit to cooperatives 
that reported high default rates because of harvest failures. 
558 See Figure 5.3. 
559 Report of the Committee 1956, 425-430. 
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the Indian model departed from the stylized Raiffeisen one in the province where the experiment 
began.   
One part of the explanation consists of showing how low savings reduced the role for self-
supervision. The government created a three-tier banking structure including primary banks, 
district banks and a provincial cooperative bank. In the primary banks, depositor and shareholder 
members were few while borrower members were many. Richer peasants crowded the top-end of 
the cooperative hierarchy as depositors while poorer peasants crowded the bottom-end as 
borrowers. Deposits in district banks had a stronger government guarantee than deposits in 
primary banks. This design flaw allowed the rich to refuse to cooperate with the poor. There was 
limited mutual supervision as managers were not held accountable by members. 
External regulation could potentially solve the problem. The government established 
Supervising Unions and a top-down regulatory structure including annual audits and a defined 
process for the liquidation of insolvent banks. However, embezzlement and insider lending 
persisted as the interests of the supervisors, auditors and managers conflicted. Although the 
sources used do not deal with the details of the problem, these suggest that the flaws lay in its 
design. The laws governing regulation were designed not by the banking regulator but by the 
provincial government. Enforcement was compromised, especially where bank managers carried 
social and political influence. 
Though dysfunctional, the cooperative structure survived. The state allocated public revenue 
to cooperative banks. Local government departments deposited unspent revenue in district banks 
during the 1920s and 1930s. The state expanded its financial participation in the cooperative sector 
in the 1940s. Large capital injections were made into primary banks from 1946. State intervention 
altered the capital structure of the cooperative sector. Whereas primary banks were debt dependent 
to apex banks in the 1930s and 1940s, the 1950s introduced the government as the source of 
lending in the rural credit market. Financial contributions from the state entrenched the problem 
of moral hazard into cooperative banking in post-colonial India. The problems of dependence on 
external funds, regulatory failure, and losses, therefore, persisted. 
The study offers larger lessons on the challenges of top-down cooperative banking promotion 
in poor agrarian societies. One lesson is that economic inequality and unequal socio-political 
influence among rich and poor peasants prevented cooperation in Indian villages. The chapter 
goes further, analyses institutional and policy regimes, to suggest that thanks to a lack of 
management accountability, a small section of the rural population benefited from loss-making 
cooperative banks. Cooperative transplants required a regulatory structure that supported efficient 
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banking.560 Additional capital injections into a fragile transplant extended rather than solved 
structural failures. For the governments in colonial and post-colonial India, providing easy access 
to credit was the central objective. The cooperative organization was a casualty of this policy. 
Further research could expand on the impact of banking regulation by the executive, rather 
than independent regulators, on the performance of cooperatives. In group lending arrangements, 
the expectation is that local and insider supervision would ensure efficient management. This case 
study of Madras suggests that internal supervision was not a sufficient condition, especially when 
savings rates were low. External regulation was needed. Cooperative banks in India continued to 
report losses after 1960, suggesting that the lessons drawn from early-twentieth century Madras 
are indeed robust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
560 This supplements prior research on the role of external auditing unions in Germany and monitoring by religious 
establishments in Netherlands in explaining the success of cooperatives in these regions. 
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
 
 
This dissertation studies rural credit markets in South India during the early to mid-twentieth 
century. The period was one of weak economic development. Landholding was small and unequal 
while production processes did not change much during the period. Most rural households relied 
on old seed varieties and natural fertilizers, with a comparatively small number of cultivators 
owning carts and ploughs. Growth in output required increases in inputs because of the lack of 
improvements in production processes. Water supply, in particular, played a crucial role in shifting 
yields each year. Volatile climates predictably led to volatile output and income. In this context, 
there were several opportunities for private investment. Investments in innovation or land 
improvement could have yielded high returns. But money was supply-constrained and expensive 
in rural areas.   
Commercial banks did not lend in rural India until the 1960s. Private moneylenders controlled 
the supply of credit in the colonial and early post-colonial period. The profile of moneylenders in 
Madras differed from the creditors in other provinces. Urban traders and indigenous bankers were 
major players in the credit market in Bombay and Punjab. Marwari traders, for example, were 
bankers by profession. They ran large and diverse lending portfolios, which included lending to 
cultivators in the countryside. In contrast, the urban trading communities in Madras did not lend 
to cultivators in the province. In the absence of credit businesses in the agricultural sector, money 
was circulated among the cultivators in Madras. Cultivators with disposable income provided 
credit to other cultivators. This feature placed constraints on the money market in Madras but 
provided creditors flexibility in enforcing repayments. 
Rural credit markets were fragmented within the province. Creditors were lending to borrowers 
in the same village. Creditors with disposable income in one village rarely provided loans to 
borrowers without disposable income in another village. Indeed, there is little evidence of money 
trading between rural districts. As a result, credit supply in the villages was directly linked to the 
profitability of cultivation. When cultivation was profitable, savings increased and more cultivators 
could disburse loans. When cultivation was unprofitable, savings decreased, as did the number of 
cultivators with the ability to provide credit. Short-term fluctuations in agricultural outputs and 
income made this structure particularly problematic. 
The volume of credit supplied was correlated with the value and volume of crop output. The 
majority of land in rural Madras was unirrigated. The government constructed large irrigation 
186 
 
projects along already naturally irrigated river deltas. Infrastructure to support groundwater 
extraction was limited in the hinterland. The entire province was vulnerable to fluctuations in 
rainfall. Low rainfall caused droughts and famines in the hinterland. The wet districts were better-
off but not entirely shielded from climate fluctuations as high rainfall caused waterlogging near the 
deltas. Crop output was impacted in the hinterland and the deltas, affecting the profitability of 
cultivation in the province. Fluctuating commodity prices were an added constraint. The prices of 
cotton, groundnut and rice approximately halved between 1929 and 1934, leading to unprofitable 
cultivation and illiquid money markets. However, outside the Depression, prices remained 
comparatively stable during the period in question. Recovery began from 1934 and commodity 
prices saw large increases in the 1940s. During this period, environmental factors and crop failure 
had a more significant impact on household revenue than prices.  
This study of credit in Madras points to complications when the suppliers and consumers of 
credit belonged to the same industry. When cultivation revenue fell, credit supply decreased and 
default rates increased. In bad years, creditors faced a dual problem as the revenue from their 
primary business fell and borrowers defaulted on loans which also diminished their secondary 
income stream. Indeed, as crop failure was common, default rates were high in rural credit markets. 
This had two implications for rural credit markets. First, markets were regularly illiquid. Creditors 
commonly provided small and seasonal working capital loans. Credit supply was not large enough 
to expand private investment in capital and land improvement. Second, poor peasants were most 
impacted by these credit constraints. Working capital requirements were high as poor households 
had low savings. Poor peasants, especially in the dry districts, either could not access credit or 
borrowed money at high prices. Creditors in the dry districts mitigated risk by selectively lending 
to the richer borrowers. Where they could borrow, poor households were regularly over-leveraged 
as farming offered low profits.  
Despite these constraints, evidence shows that creditors continued lending to over-leveraged 
households. From government commissioned surveys of rural villages in Madras, the primary 
purpose of borrowing was the repayment of prior loans. For the creditors, belonging to the same 
industry and locality as the borrowers offered information and enforcement advantages. Creditors 
knew the profile of the borrowers they were lending to. The cost of monitoring the borrowers was 
low. Creditors did not have to travel far to monitor businesses in the same village. As such, 
borrowers could not strategically default on loans. Defaults were caused by unprofitability, not by 
borrowers deliberately avoiding the repayment of loans. When borrowers did default, cultivators 
cum moneylenders had flexible options to enforce repayment. Informally, creditors acquired the 
borrower’s produce at a lower value than the market price. In bad years, evidence suggests that 
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creditors sometimes acquired the entirety of the borrower’s produce to satisfy the principal and 
interest on loans. Formally, lenders executed financial instruments and enforced these in courts to 
recover defaulted loans. Courts were an expensive solution to the problem of high default rates. 
However, in the unregulated market, nineteenth century contract laws gave creditors the flexibility 
to transmit enforcement costs to the price of credit. In other words, creditors initiated legal 
proceedings against defaulters and indirectly charged them for the additional enforcement 
expenses. Cultivators cum moneylenders could choose between informal, formal or both types of 
enforcement structure depending on which offered the most cost-effective approach. 
The accent on enforcement is a particular contribution of this thesis. When borrowers defaulted 
on loans and informal arbitration did not provide creditors with full repayment, courts were the 
final destination for lenders to enforce contracts and acquire the borrower’s assets. However, 
moneylenders in rural Madras did not have strong judicial protection. Courts were inefficient as 
disputes lasted between three and ten times longer than seasonal loan agreements. The costs of 
approaching courts significantly exceeded the average size of loans. In this context, the costs of 
enforcing contracts were lower than the costs of enforcing mortgages. As a result, creditors only 
approached courts when the size of the repayment included the costs of enforcement. When 
borrowers defaulted, lenders executed contracts that either inflated loan principals or increased 
interest rates to account for these costs. Creditors adopted a three-tiered loan structure, and 
charged flexible interest rates, to compensate for weak judicial protection. In the first stage, loans 
were unsecured. In the second stage, promissory notes were attached to loans and the price of 
these loans increased. In the third stage, mortgages were attached to loans and the price of these 
loans increased further.  
Credit pricing has a large scholarship in development economics but less so in economic 
history. As the credit markets in rural India were informal, the data on pricing is mostly indicative 
rather than analytical. Some government-commissioned surveys provide broad ranges of interest 
rates in select villages and districts, leaving little possibility to trace changes over time. In this 
context, scholars revert to traditional market structure theories to analyse credit prices in colonial 
India. The expectation is that monopolistic structures point to high rates and more competitive 
structures suggest otherwise. This thesis expands this approach to suggest that institutional rather 
than market structures were better explanations of credit prices. Markets were not always 
monopolistic. Disposable income was the only barrier to lending. In good years, lenders were 
numerous. Institutional factors, on the other hand, explain both levels and ranges of interest rates. 
From this study on rural Madras, credit was expensive because markets were illiquid and legal 
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institutions functioned poorly. Loan structures were complex and multi-tiered. Prices fluctuated 
between the tiers to compensate for the costs of lending.  
The provincial government in Madras acted on a belief that credit prices were high because 
moneylenders were not regulated strongly enough. The government commissioned reports and 
surveys from the late 1920s that attempted to estimate the size of the rural credit market. The 
larger the credit market, in the government’s view, meant that the ‘disease’ of indebtedness was 
more widespread. The Legislative Assembly in Madras enforced laws from the mid-1930s that 
attempted to reduce the level of expensive borrowing. A series of policies ultimately culminated in 
the 1938 Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, a law which the government enforced until the mid-
1970s. The MARA declared an interest rate ceiling of 6.25 per cent per annum on all rural loans. 
The judiciary administered the law. When creditors initiated legal proceedings against defaulters, 
judges voided contracts and imposed the new interest rate ceiling. Post intervention, borrowers 
repaid loans at half or a quarter of the interest rates they incurred before 1938.   
This intervention was broadly a failure. The credit market contracted and did not operate more 
equitably after the MARA. Lending in accordance with the regulations was unprofitable and, in 
the short term, the supply of mortgage and unsecured credit declined. The already illiquid money 
market was more constrained after intervention. Government reports and contemporary studies 
in the 1940s suggest that the creditors that continued to lend did so in a black market, outside the 
regulatory scope of the judiciary. Following intervention, creditors could not transmit the high 
costs of enforcement to the price of credit. Lenders avoided courts and relied on informal 
enforcement arrangements instead.  
This transition has lessons for the role of property rights, courts and rural finance. The 
government strengthened property rights partially with the introduction of occupancy rights in the 
early twentieth century and more thoroughly with the abolition of the zamindari landlord system in 
1948. The subsequent strengthening of property titles had a limited impact when courts remained 
inefficient. Property rights alone is not enough protection or incentive to encourage expansion in 
lending. Private creditors required judicial protection from courts to incentivise lending. In the 
absence of this, creditors relied on informal arbitration methods including acquiring the borrower’s 
crop. Fortunately for the creditors in Madras, this institutional shift coincided with rising 
commodity prices. Crop sharing arrangements became more lucrative in the 1940s. However, 
prices themselves did not dictate the shift. In a recent study of rural credit in colonial Punjab, 
Chaudhary and Swamy find that professional moneylenders captured a smaller share of the credit 
market following the implementation of laws that restricted land transfers.561 The authors show 
 
561 Chaudhary and Swamy, “A Policy of Credit Disruption”. 
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that cultivators became the dominant creditors following intervention. Enforcement, and the 
convenience of informal arbitration, explains this shift. Agriculturist moneylenders had more 
enforcement flexibility than indigenous or commercial banks. The thesis offers a cost-analysis 
framework to study this institutional fluidity in informal credit markets.  
The winners were few but the losers were many from credit regulations. The black-market 
lenders won because they remained unregulated. They could price loans higher than before and 
captured a larger share of the credit market. The impact of intervention on the government is hard 
to determine. The government might have won in the short term because they delivered on their 
promise to enact policies with the sole aim of protecting borrowers. The 1946 Report of the Economist 
for Enquiry into Rural Indebtedness praised the MARA for reducing the volume of indebtedness in the 
province. The government did believe that the policy was a success at the time. Not long after this 
intervention, key policymakers in the Congress-led provincial government earned influential 
positions in the federal government of independent India. C Rajagopalachariar and P J Thomas, 
for example, held powerful positions in the Congress Party and federal government in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.  
Most importantly, and contrary to the government’s expectations, the borrowers lost. the 
amount of credit available in the market declined. The remaining credit was not accessible at lower 
interest rates than before. Working capital was more difficult to obtain, especially at a time when 
prices were increasing and the agrarian economy offered more profitable opportunities. 
Moneylenders lending in accordance with the law also lost. Moneylending provided cultivators an 
additional source of income, especially when they were protected by contract laws and could 
transmit the high costs of lending to the borrowers. The interest rate ceiling barred this practice, 
constraining lending as an additional income stream for cultivators with disposable income. This 
outcome highlights a broader contradiction in the government’s approach to market failure. The 
definition between formal and informal credit was not entirely clear in the unregulated market. 
Creditors were unregulated but contracts and administrative procedures played a role in the 
market, blurring the boundary between formal and informal. Whereas the success of intervention 
hinged on the market operating within the scope of formal procedure, it ultimately had the 
opposite effect. The market operated more informally as lenders opted to avoid administrative 
procedures altogether. The emergence of the black market demonstrates that regulations 
themselves were a significant part of the market failure problem. 
Perhaps it was the design of the MARA that explains its failure. If artificial price ceilings did 
not work, did increasing market competition with cooperatives solve problems in rural credit 
markets? The government launched credit cooperatives in rural Madras from 1904. The 
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establishment of these cooperatives had more potential for success than the price ceilings. If 
designed well, cooperatives could solve the liquidity problem by expanding the credit supply and 
successfully lending to poor peasants at lower interest rates than in the informal market. Members 
absorbed the risk of lending in cooperatives that were self-funded and well-managed. This allowed 
cooperatives to lend to poor peasants and remain insured against bad years. Under the right 
conditions, cooperatives did not need to access courts. If deposits were high, then members 
enforced other members to repay loans, and imposed punishments on the defaulters. Social capital 
substituted courts as a method of enforcement.  
The intervention to establish cooperatives did not achieve the desired outcome. The thesis 
demonstrates that the government designed a cooperative model that was poorly regulated and 
failed to nurture cooperation in villages. The government’s main objective was to increase the 
supply of low-cost credit. It designed two features of the cooperative model to allow for this 
increase in supply. First, the government established a multi-layered cooperative banking structure 
to compensate for low savings in villages. Second, the post-colonial Indian government injected 
public money to the cooperative structure to increase the volume of lending. The thesis shows 
that credit supply increased but cooperatives failed to capture a sizable share of the market. A small 
sub-section benefitted from loss-making cooperative banks throughout the early- to mid-twentieth 
century.  
Incurring losses is in itself not a measure of failure. Cooperatives were potentially a profit 
satisficing rather than profit maximising banking initiative. Indeed, cooperatives could have 
claimed success if they were incurring losses but lending to the poor and increasing private 
investment in the countryside. Given the volatile nature of the agrarian economy in South India, 
it is feasible that cooperatives were loss-making because they were lending to the poor. However, 
the cooperatives in South India were neither profit satisficing nor profit maximising. The poor did 
not have access to cooperative credit and repayment rates remained low despite selective lending 
to the rich.  
Weak regulation and the resulting mismanagement of cooperatives explains this outcome. The 
government designed a regulatory system that resulted in conflicts of interest between auditors, 
supervisors and managers of cooperative banks. External bodies did not regulate the cooperative 
sector. Managers supervised themselves while government audited the banks. Laws did not specify 
a regulatory structure for cooperatives until the mid-1960s, and even then, the law delegated 
regulation to the executive. In these circumstances, it was common for the economically and 
politically influential villagers to manage and embezzle from local cooperatives.  
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The focus on credit expansion, at the expense of strong institutional development, reflects an 
ideological failure in the design of credit intervention. Governments in late-colonial and post-
colonial India prioritised equity over efficiency in their policy approach. Artificially constructing 
credit markets with expanded supply that were fair to the poor, in the government’s view, would 
reduce inequality and improve living standards. Illiquid and expensive credit markets were a 
symptom rather than the cause of the problem. The government acted on an assumption that 
peasants remained poor because of failures in market allocation. However, intervention further 
restricted investment potential of the rural poor. 
The government failed to acknowledge the real problem. The credit market was allocatively 
efficient before intervention. Monopolistic market structure was not necessarily the problem. 
However, the market was not productively efficient. Production costs, or the costs of lending, and 
transaction costs were high. This had a detrimental effect on prices which in turn affected the poor 
consumers more than the rich. In this context, altering the price of credit was a largely superficial 
response. The market became less transparent, more allocatively inefficient and similarly 
productively inefficient. In other words, the government’s mis-diagnosis encouraged policy 
strategies that made the problem worse. Markets operated less efficiently and as inequitably after 
intervention. 
The policy lessons from this thesis demonstrate that cosmetic changes to credit markets will 
have negligible effects when underlying public institutions are either missing or function poorly. 
Though the thesis does not argue the details of the solution, it implies that the problem lies in 
failure of public goods provision. Expansion in irrigation infrastructure, for example, needed 
public investment. Poverty and constrained credit markets restricted private investment. The 
colonial government collected a tax in the form of an ‘Irrigation Cess’ from the mid-nineteenth 
century. This failed to translate to the size of investments needed to make crop production less 
unpredictable and more profitable. Similarly, legal institutions functioned unproductively. The 
design of contract laws was not entirely the problem. Courts themselves needed to function more 
productively.562 While the Green Revolution saw rising public investment in irrigation, new seed 
varieties and artificial fertilizers, courts remained expensive and unproductive well into the latter 
decades of the twentieth century. The government continued to intervene in the informal credit 
 
562 Further research could consider the sources of unproductivity in the functioning of civil courts. One problem could 
be the number and quality of judges. Another could be the design of laws themselves. The duration of civil disputes 
increased exponentially in the post-colonial period. The number of credit disputes in courts declined in the same 
period. This presents a puzzle in which the volume of cases was not necessarily causing delays in judgements. This 
outcome could be explained by arising complications due to the creation of a new constitution or the challenges in 
hiring enough judges with the establishment of new legal systems after independence.  
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market, however, restrictions on interest rates, loan waivers and similarly cosmetic interventions 
were unlikely to have any positive effects while this enforcement problem persisted. 
The case study of cooperatives in Madras has further implications on the development of 
financial markets in poor agrarian economies. One lesson is that poverty was a constraint on the 
development of rural finance. The poor rely on informal sources of finance because the risk of 
lending is too high for banks to enter the market. From the 1970s, state and private sector 
initiatives offered new avenues of lending in rural India. Cooperatives continued to expand their 
market presence while government-owned banks and microfinance organizations began lending 
in the countryside. Microfinance organizations, in particular, offered a potential solution to credit 
expansion in risky markets. Self-help and group banking arrangements, analogous to the credit 
cooperatives model, had the potential to overcome risk barriers and expand lending to the poor. 
However, a Reserve Bank of India report in 2013 finds that poor households continued to rely on 
informal sources of credit in the latter half of the twentieth century. According to the report, 43 
per cent of rural households borrowed from ‘non-institutional’ agencies including private 
moneylenders, traders, landlords and friends.563 The problem was worse in districts where 
cultivation was rain-fed and technological improvements were limited. For example, 73 per cent 
of rural households in Andhra Pradesh, located in the north-eastern part of the Madras province 
in colonial times, relied on non-institutional agencies for credit in 2002.564 The report shows that 
banking initiatives did not expand credit access for the ‘small and marginal farmers’ in rural India.565 
Similar to the performance of credit cooperatives in early-twentieth century Madras, the supply of 
credit increased but organizations continued to exclude the poor from accessing this expansion in 
the late-twentieth century. 
The RBI study goes further to suggest that policy and institutional persistence restricted the 
impact of rural banking initiatives. Informal moneylenders continued to benefit from enforcement 
flexibilities. Formal creditors relied on legal procedures which accentuated the risk of lending to 
poor households. Group lending initiatives avoided formal enforcement but they required the 
cooperation of rich and poor households. It was unfeasible for poor households to raise enough 
capital to circulate among themselves. The rich needed to participate in order to generate enough 
money to expand credit and investment. In this context, policies, such as external banking 
regulations, were required to ensure that the participation of the rich did not translate to exclusion 
 
563 Narayan Chandra Pradhan, “Persistence of Informal Credit in Rural India: Evidence from ‘All-India Debt and 
Investment Survey’ and Beyond”, RBI Working Paper Series WPS DEPR (2013), 6. 
564 Pradhan, “Persistence of Informal Credit in Rural India”, 10. 
565 Pradhan, “Persistence of Informal Credit in Rural India”, 11. 
193 
 
of the poor. Indeed, recent studies by Guérin and Mitra Kumar find that caste and class played a 
significant role in early twenty-first century rural banking.566 The authors show that the wealthy 
managed cooperatives and microfinance organizations. The managers selected borrowers by caste 
and income class in rural India. These findings suggest that the hypotheses in this thesis are robust 
and applicable in different temporal settings. Environmental, institutional and policy drivers of 
problems in rural credit markets are not just significant in historical contexts but also in the rural 
economies of modern India. 
The findings in this thesis are subject to potential limitations. The analysis in this study is 
vulnerable to bias in the sources. This dissertation uses data and qualitative material from 
government publications. These reports, in turn, collected this information through field surveys. 
Government agents and economists collected data by interviewing lenders and borrowers in select 
villages. This allows borrowers to overstate and lenders to understate areas of concern such as 
high interest rates or one-sided crop sharing arrangements. The government used the reports to 
inform policies. In this context, political interest might have conflicted with data integrity. 
Government officials could have manipulated data to justify conclusions and policy choices. 
Similarly, government-employed surveyors made qualitative observations but it is difficult to 
estimate the legitimacy of these claims.  As such, the thesis could be analysing unreliable data and 
supporting key claims with surveys infiltrated by vested interests. As mentioned in the Introduction 
chapter, contradicting views within government circles leave some room for analysing the merits 
of these limitations. However, due to the absence of other studies that surveyed informal credit 
markets, it is impossible to directly validate or authenticate the data contained in the government 
reports. 
Missing data from the war years also restricts the analysis in this thesis. The five-year period 
between 1941 and 1946 was problematic for government reporting. Judicial reports, including the 
Annual Statistics of Civil Courts, failed to publish yearly case numbers. The Report of the Economist for 
Enquiry into Agricultural Indebtedness in 1946 addressed some of these concerns by listing the number 
of court cases registered under the MARA. However, we lack a full understanding of the number 
of civil cases, the number of credit disputes and the processing time of these cases. Similarly, land 
registration reports failed to comment on the number of mortgages and sales in the same period. 
This leaves an unfilled gap in the third substantive chapter of the thesis as we do not yet know the 
 
566 Isabelle Guérin, Bert D'Espallier, and Govindan Venkatasubramanian. "Debt in Rural South India: Fragmentation, 
Social Regulation and Discrimination." The Journal of Development Studies 49, no. 9 (2013): 1155-171; Sunil Mitra Kumar, 
"Does Access to Formal Agricultural Credit Depend on Caste?" World Development 43, no. C (2013): 315-28.  
 Isabelle Guérin, and Santosh Kumar. "Market, Freedom and the Illusions of Microcredit. Patronage, Caste, Class and 
Patriarchy in Rural South India." The Journal of Development Studies 53, no. 5 (2017): 741-54.  
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full extent of the medium-term decline in mortgage lending after the MARA. Contemporary 
studies written in the 1940s and 1950s, and commenting on the issue, are the only sources to fill 
this missing gap. 
Despite these qualifications, in analysing the existing sources, this dissertation does provide 
reliable lessons for economic history and comparative development. The findings tackle problems 
of risk in poor agrarian economies, and the methods adopted to mitigate these risks in the past. In 
doing so, the individual chapters unite theories pertinent to ecological, institutional and policy 
discourses to understand why in a period where some parts of the global economy might have 
flourished, the rural economy in South India did not see the required expansion in capital markets. 
Apart from contributing to the historiography of a region in an under-researched time, these 
theories can be further tested against preceding and succeeding periods, as well as positioned in 
comparative global context, substantiating the importance of this dissertation’s findings.   
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